The Pre-Platonic Philosophers

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Translated from the German and Edited, with an Introduction and Commentary, by Greg Whitlock

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS
URBANA AND CHICAGO
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on the Pre-Platonic Philosophers
Greek philosophy is generally considered by asking, How far, in comparison with more recent philosophers, did the Greeks recognize and advance philosophical problems? We desire to ask, What do we learn from the history of their philosophy on behalf of the Greeks? Not, What do we learn on behalf of philosophy? We want to make clear that their philosophy advanced something incomprehensible from the dominant viewpoint on the Greeks. Whoever conceives of them as clear, sober, harmonious, practical people will be unable to explain how they arrived at philosophy. And whoever understands them only as aesthetic human beings, indulging in all sorts of revelry in the arts, will also feel estranged from their philosophy.

There is in fact also something more recent that Greek philosophy may regard only as an imported plant, something that is actually indigenous to Asia and Egypt; we must conclude that philosophy of this sort essentially only ruined the Greeks, that they declined because of it (Heraclitus, because of Zoroaster [Zarathustra of Iran]; Pythagoras, because of the Chinese; the Eleatics, because of the Indians; Empedocles, because of the Egyptians; Anaxagoras, because of the Jews).

We desire to establish first of all that the Greeks were driven from within themselves toward philosophy and to ask, To what end?1 Second, we want to observe how “the philosopher” appeared among the Greeks, not just how philosophy appeared among them. To become acquainted with the Greeks, it

1. Can a philosophy become the germinating point of a culture? No, but [it may] fend off the dangerous enemies of an already existing culture—Wagner’s rebellion against monumental art. There is an invisible bridge from genius to genius. That is the real true history of a people; everything else is murky, countless variations in inferior material, copies by unpracticed hands. It shall be shown how the entire life of a people impurely and imperfectly reflects the image that its highest geniuses offer.

How did the Greeks philosophize in the middle of their majestic world of the arts? Does philosophizing cease when a perfection of life itself has been achieved? No, then begins the real philosophizing. Its judgment on life means more.
proves extremely noteworthy that several among them came to conscious reflection about themselves; perhaps even more important than this conscious reflection is their personality, their behavior. The Greeks produced archetypal philosophers. We recall a community of such diverse individuals as Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Parmenides, Democritus, Protagoras, and Socrates. Their inventiveness at this distinguishes the Greeks above all other peoples: normally a people produces only one enduring philosophical type. The Germans as well cannot measure up to this wealth. Each one of those [pre-Platonic] men is entirely hewn from one stone; between their thought and their character lies rigorous necessity; they lack every agreement, because, at least at that time, there was no social class of philosophers. Each is the first-born son of philosophy. Imagine there were no longer any scholars in the world; the philosopher, as one who lives only for knowledge, consequently appears more solitary and grand. That leads us, third of all, to the relation of the philosopher to nonphilosophers, to the people [Volk]. The Greeks have an astounding appreciation of all great individuals, and thus the positions and legacies of these men were established incomparably early in history. It has been rightfully said that a time is characterized not so much by its great men but by how it recognizes and honors them. That constitutes the most noteworthy thing about the Greeks, that their needs and their talents coincided: an ingenious architect without work orders would appear quite ridiculous among them. Fourth, we should emphasize the originality of their conceptions, from which subsequent history has taken its fill. Ever again we move in the same circular path, and almost always the ancient Greek form of such conceptions is the most majestic and purest, for example, with so-called

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2. World history is at its briefest when one measures according to the most significant philosophical discoveries and to the creation of types of philosophers and excludes those hostile time periods of philosophy, since we see a liveliness and creative power like never before: they fulfill the greatest epoch; they have really created every type.

Continuation up until the moss and lichens of dogmatic theology.

3. The ancients were much more virtuous because they had many fewer fashions. Look at the virtuous energy of their artists and philosophers.

Those Greek philosophers overcame the spirit of the times to be able to feel the Hellenic spirit. Philosophy is justified in that it was invented by the Greeks, but that is merely an appeal to authority.

The sanction of the Seven Sages belongs to the great character traits of the Greeks: other times have saints; the Greek have sages.

4. The question, What is a philosopher? cannot be answered at all in more recent times. Here he appears as an accidental, solitary wanderer, as a daring "genius." What is he in the midst of a powerful culture that is not based on solitary "geniuses"?

Wagner concerning the genius. In the midst of unnatural scholarship.

How does a people consider the philosopher? What relation does he have to the culture? Now he shows himself as genius, like artists, solitary. The Republic of Geniuses.
materialism. Initially Kantian philosophy closed our eyes to the seriousness of the Eleatics; even the later Greek systems (Aristotle) regarded the Eleatic problems too superficially.

Now it remains to be explained why I am considering “pre-Platonic” philosophers as a group and not pre-Socratics. Plato is the first grand mixed character both in his philosophy and in his philosophical typology. Socratic, Pythagorean, and Heraclitean elements unite in his theory of the Ideas: it should not, without further qualification, be called an original conception. Also, as a human being he possesses the traits of a regally proud Heraclitus; of the melancholy, secretive, and legislative Pythagoras; and of the reflective dialectician Socrates. All subsequent philosophers are of this sort of mixed philosophical type. In contrast, this series of pre-Platonics presents the pure and unmixed types, in terms of philosopheme as well as of character. Socrates is the last in this series. Whoever wishes to do so may call them all “one-sided.” In any case, they are genuine “discoverers.” For all those afterward, it became infinitely easier to philosophize. They [the pre-Platonics] had to find the path from myth to laws of nature, from image to concept, from religion to science.

It is a true misfortune that we have so little left from these original philosophers, and we involuntarily measure them too modestly, whereas from Plato onward voluminous literary legacies lie before us. Many [scholars] would assign the books [of the pre-Platonics] to their own providence, a fate of books [fatum libellorum]. This could only be malicious, though, if it deprives us of Heraclitus, the wonderful poem of Empedocles, [or] the writings of Democritus, which the ancients compared to Plato, and if it wants to spoil them for us by means of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Cicero. Now we must essentially reconstruct and illuminate these philosophers and their teachings: scattered reports about their lives are just as important to us as the ruins of their systems.

Probably the greatest part of Greek prose is lost to us. In general they [the pre-Platonics] wrote very little yet with the greatest concentration of energy. There are, to be precise, the contemporaries of the classical period of classical Greece, foremost those of the sixth and fifth centuries—the contemporaries of tragedy, of the Persian Wars. The question is attractive enough: how did the Greeks philosophize during the richest and most luxuriant period of their power? Or more principled: did they philosophize in this period? The answer will decisively clarify Hellenic character for us. In itself it [philosophy] is of course necessary neither for one human being nor for a people. The Romans, as long as they grew only from within, are entirely unphilosophical. It depends
on the deepest roots of an individual and of a people, whether he philosophizes or not. It concerns whether he has such an excess of intellect that he no longer directs it only for personal, individual purposes but rather arrives at a pure intuition with it. The Romans are not artists for the same reason they are not philosophers. The most general thing that they truly feel is the Imperium: as soon as the arts and philosophy begin among them, it [the latter] concerns itself with the nibblings of a saccarine soul. As Ennius’s [tragic character] Neoptolemus says: “Philosophizing there must be, but by the few; Since for all men it’s not to be desired.” He advises having a “taste” of philosophy, but not “gorging oneself” with it.

The intellect must not only desire surreptitious delights; it must become completely free and celebrate Saturnalia. The free spirit surveys things, and now for the first time mundane existence appears to it worthy of contemplation as a problem. That is the true characteristic of the philosophical drive: wonderment at that which lies before everyone. The most mundane phenomenon is Becoming: with it Ionian philosophy begins. This problem returns infinitely intensified for the Eleatics: they observe, namely, that our intellect cannot grasp Becoming at all, and consequently they infer a metaphysical world. All later philosophy struggles against Eleaticism; that struggle ends with skepticism. Another problem is purposiveness in nature; with it the opposition of spirit and body will enter philosophy for the first time. A third problem is that concerning the value of knowledge. Becoming, purpose, knowledge—the contents of pre-Platonic philosophy.

5. Concerning Roman mythology here.

The Romans appropriate philosophy, like the entire Greek culture: Roman concept of art and of artificial culture—a distinguished convention, a decoration, hung up from outside.

The ancient Greeks without normative theology. Everyone has the right to write, and to believe, what one wishes.

The Greeks regarded Thales of Miletus as the first philosopher. In itself it is arbitrary to say that so-and-so is the first and that before him there were no philosophers, for a type does not [come to] exist all at once. Such a stipulation follows from a definition of "the philosopher." This [riddle of defining philosopher] is what we seek to solve. Thales posits a principle from which he makes deductions; he is foremost a systematizer. It might be argued that, on the contrary, we already find the same quality in many of the older cosmogonies. We need only think of the cosmological notions in the Iliad, then the Theogony, then the Orphic theogonies, [and] then Pherecydes of Syros (already a contemporary of Thales, however). Thales is distinguished from these in that he is unmythological. His contemplations were conducted entirely within concepts. The poet, who represents a preliminary stage to the philosopher, was to be overcome. Why does Thales not completely blur together with the Seven Sages? He does not philosophize sporadically, in separate proverbs: he not only makes one great scientific discovery but also synthesizes an image of the world. He seeks the whole. Thus, Thales overcomes (1) the mythic preliminary stage of philosophy, (2) the sporadic-proverbial form of philosophy, and (3) the various sciences—the first by thinking conceptually, the second by systematizing, and the third by creating one [unified] view of the world. Philosophy is therefore the art that presents an image of

1. In their mythology the Greeks reduced all of nature to [personified images of] Greeks. They likewise viewed nature only as a masquerade and disguise of men-gods. In this they were the opposites of realists. The distinction between truth and appearance was deep within them. All things are metamorphoses.

2. J. Burckhardt: No wonder that his meaning—fine, weighed out, constructive—that the richness of faintly suggesting the Whole, in service for the first time, was lost, and that one contents oneself, to one's greatest power, with decorative education. Here Roman culture shows its true grandeur. As soon as one forgets how many unconscious and reinterpreted Greek forms lay hidden beneath those of the Romans, one will have to wonder about the latter's practical, highly energetic achievements.
PRE-PLATONIC PHILOSOPHERS

universal existence in concepts; this definition fits Thales first. Of course, a much later time recognized this.

And even the description of him as the first philosopher is, of course, not in the character of Thales’ times. The word probably does not exist yet. And under no circumstances would it have had this specific meaning. Also, “σοφός” does not, without qualification, mean “wise” in the usual sense. Etymologically it is related to sapio, “to taste”; sapiens, “one who tastes”; and σωφής, “tastable.” We speak of “taste” in the arts. For the Greeks, the notion of taste is extended still further via a reduplicative form, Σίσωφος, “of sharp taste” (active); sucus is related to it (χ for p, like lupus [and] λύχος). According to etymology, then, the word lacks the eccentric meaning; it contains nothing of quietude and asceticism, only a sharp taste, a sharp knowledge, without any connotation of a “faculty.” We should strongly contrast this to τέχνη (from τεκτόν, to generate), which always denotes a “bringing forth.” Whenever artists are called σοφοί (Phidias, a wise sculptor; Polyclitus, a wise maker of portrait statues), it indicates, according to Aristotle, the perfection of their art—thus a “maker of portrait statues of the finest taste,” σοφός, like sapiens in the superlative.

Now if we call a human being wise not in one particular aspect but in general, Aristotle says, it shows that wisdom must be the most superb (and universal) scientific knowledge [Wissenschaft]. The wise man must not only be able to know how conclusions follow from principles, but he must know even this as well: which branch of knowledge contains those principles most worthy of knowledge. We always, of course, distinguish wisdom from cleverness: every being that finds its goods within its own circumstances we call clever. That which Thales and Anaxagoras know would normally be termed out of the ordinary, miraculous, difficult, divine, but useless, because to them it had nothing to do with humane goods. Thus σοφία receives the character of the useless. In its service an excess of intellect is necessary. In this connection we recall the important wise sayings on the part of the Delphic oracle. Thales is the first philosopher and one of the first sages (σοφοί).

3. Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 6, ch. 7.
4. [Cf. Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, sect. 3, and Human, All Too Human, part 2, no. 170, to end.]
5. “Therefore wisdom must plainly be the most finished of the forms of knowledge. It follows that the wise man must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about the first principles. Therefore wisdom must be intuitive reason combined with scientific knowledge—scientific knowledge of the highest objects which has received as it were its proper completion” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 6, ch. 7. English-language translation is from Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. W. D. Ross, in Aristotle, Basic Works, ed. Richard McKeon [New York: Random House, 1941]).
6. Σοφία indicates one who chooses with discriminating taste, whereas science founds itself,
I must emphasize that Thales was designated as σοφός on entirely other grounds than [those invoked] when he was called the first philosopher. We have distinguished a mythic preliminary stage of philosophy and a sporadic-proverbial one. Which is the preliminary stage of σοφία? Or better, that of wisdom (σοφός)? . . . How has the type wise man (σοφός ἄνήρ) developed by degree, up until the Seven Sages (σοφοί) of the Delphic oracle? In which embryonic form does philosophy reveal itself? In which the philosopher? These are two separate questions!

without such picky tastes, on all things knowable. Philosophical thinking is, specifically, of the same sort as scientific thinking, only it directs itself toward great things and possibilities. The concept of greatness, however, [is] amorphous, partly aesthetic and moralistic. Philosophy maintains a bond with the drive to knowledge, and therein lies its significance for culture. It is a legislating of greatness, a bestowal of titles in alliance with philosophy: they say, “That is great,” and in this way humanity is elevated. It [philosophy] begins with legislating morality. The Seven Sages say, by way of their teachings and example, “That is morally great”: the Romans never strayed far from this practical side of philosophy.

The philosopher is contemplative like the artist of images, compassionate like the religious, [and] causal like the man of science (he searches out the tones of the world to test their resonances and to represent their collective sound in concepts, swelling to the macrocosmic but with the greatest rigor in doing so); [he is] like the actor or dramatic poet, who transforms himself and maintains calm to project his transformation into words. He always emerses himself in dialectical thought, as if he were plunging into a stream.
Mythical Preliminary Stage of Philosophy

The power to systematize—very strong in the Greek’s ranking and genesis of their gods—presents us with a drive never coming to rest. It would be utterly incorrect to consider the Greeks as being entirely rooted in their native soil and as having introduced gods from within themselves alone; nearly all are probably borrowed. It was a grand task to establish the rights and ranks of this colorful divine realm. The Greeks met it with their political and religious genius. The continual blending of the gods (θεῶν κράσις) was faced with a crisis of the gods (θεῶν κρίσις). It was especially difficult to bring the ancient ranks of the Titans into a relationship with the Olympians: Aeschylus makes another attempt in the Eumenides to assimilate something entirely alien to the new cult. Bizarre contrasts allowed the possibility of fantastic inventions. Finally, a peace among the gods was established; Delphi was involved, probably above all; there, in any case, we find an epicenter of philosophical theology.

The most difficult juxtaposition, perhaps, would prove to be that of the mystery gods to the Olympians. This problem is resolved with extraordinary wisdom. First of all, [there were] gods who clarify everything at hand, as continual guardians and observers of all Greek existence, and likewise gods of mundane existence: next, for especially earnest religious elevation, as an invitation to all ascetic and pessimistic affects, [there were] the mysteries, with their hope of immortality. That these two currents did not harm or dishonor one another must be deemed especially wise. There were ancient theogonies that had already subscribed first to one ranking of the gods and soon thereafter to another.

1. [Aside from providing footnotes composed in 1873, Nietzsche left a few margin notes to the manuscript of these lectures. Here he adds the following marginal note to this lecture title: “The various regions of the cult.”]
Last of all, there are the Orphic theogonies. Aristotle says that the poets of old (σηχαυτοί ποιηταί) and in turn the latter-day philosophical theologians (θεολόγοι) allow the highest and greatest to be not the first in time but instead the outcome of a developmental process, a later Being. Those who stand midway between the poets and the philosophers (e.g., Pherecydes) regard the perfect as later than the one first in time. He hints at the ancient poets by designating their foundations: “Night and Heaven or Chaos or Ocean”—Hesiod refers to Chaos, Homer to Ocean (Ὀκεανός), and a theogony attributed to Eudemus (from which the Neoplatonist Damascius narrates) refers to Night and Heaven (Νύξ καὶ Ὀκεανός). This is the simplest form of the Orphic theogonies.

Apollonius assumes a second [such theogony]. He depicts Orpheus sing-
ing as, in the beginning, the earth, sky and sea separated themselves from the admixture of all things; as the sun, moon, and stars took up their orbits; [as] mountains, rivers, and animals came to be; as the Oceanids ruled over Ophion and Eurynome for the first time in Olympus; and as they were hurled into the oceans by Chronos and Rhea, who were in their turn ousted by Zeus.¹¹

A third Orphic theogony¹² places water and primeval mud at the pinnacle; they thicken into earth. From this arises a dragon with wings on its shoulders and the appearance of a god; on both sides [it has] the head of a lion and that of a steer named Heracles or Chronos. He is said to have united with necessity, Adrestea; this then extended itself incorporeally across the entire universe. Chronos-Heracles produced a gigantic egg that broke open around the middle, with the upper half forming the sky and the lower half forming the earth. This theogony originates in later times, perhaps.

A fourth, more ancient [Orphic theogony], supported by many fragments, places Chronos at the pinnacle. He produces aether and chaos, from which he fashions a silver egg; from this is brought forth the all-illuminating, first-born god, Phanes, who is also called Metis, Eros, and Erikapaios . . . Androgynous, since he contains the seeds of all the gods in himself. Phanes generates out of himself Echidna, or night, who, along with Uranus and Gaia, the step-parents of the middle generation of gods, is portrayed by Hesiod in her essence. Zeus, having successfully taken power, devours Phanes, and precisely because of this, he is the epitome of all things. Plato refers to [the motto] “Zeus is the beginning and the middle, from Zeus is everything made” as an “old saying” (παλαιός λόγος).¹³ And so it is also said: “One is Hades and Zeus and Helios and Dionysus, One God dwells in all.”¹⁴ Zeus now brings forth out of himself the last generation. Most important is the story of Dionysus Zagreus, the son of Zeus and Persephone who, torn limb from limb by the Titans, lives once again as the younger Dionysus, after Zeus has eaten his still intact heart.

¹². Damascius, De princ. 381.
¹⁴. εἰς Ζήν, εἰς Ἀἴδης, εἰς Ήλιος, εἰς Δίονυσος, εἰς Ἑρεᾶς ἐν πάντεσα (Lobeck, 440). [This citation refers to Christian August Lobeck (1781–1860) and his Aglaophamus: Drei Bücher über die Grundlagen der Mystereinreligion der Grieken, mit einer Sammlung der Fragmente der orphischen Dichter. The phrase is indeed on page 440 of the first volume, on the Orphics; English-language translation from Zeller, Outlines.]
Especially significant is the first prosaic cosmogony—that of Pherecydes from the island of Syros—in ten books entitled *Seven Recesses* (or *Divine Mingling, Theogony, Theology*). In the beginning there are three primordial principles: Zeus, or aether, that whereby all else is made; Chthon, or matter, that wherefrom all is made; and Chronos, or time, that wherein all things are made. Zeus resembles the breath that flows through all things; Chthon, the water that puts pressure on all sides—water here, as with Thales, being primeval flow, primeval mud, the first and thus the best of all, formless and qualityless. Zeus transforms himself while he produces, in Eros, the creator spirit within the world. With the union of Eros and Chthon begins the second Chronos—measured, not infinite, time. Under the influences of Eros and time, matter now spills over into the elements fire, air and water: the heavier elements sink ever deeper, [while] the lighter elements float ever higher.

Now we have the Seven Folds, or World Spheres: the realms of (1) Eros the Demiurge, (2) Chthon (absolutely displacable), [(3)] Chronos, [(4)] fire, [(5)] water, [(6)] air, and [(7)] earth. If we take Eros, Chthon, and Chronos (Χρόνος) together as one region, then we have the πεντάκοσιος, or Realm of Five Worlds. A powerful generation of gods develops in these spaces. Heavenly Eros is born on earth in serpentine form and becomes known as Ophioneus. In opposition to him stands destructive time: this is the fight between the Ophionids and the Kronids. Chronos and his entourage plunge into the oceans. The earth, placed at the innermost recess (μυχός), in the universal mist, floating freely in the realm of water (clouds and haze), resembles a winged oak tree of the hardest wood, standing unmoved with outstretched pinions hanging in the air. Zeus places an honorary garment around it after his victory over Chronos—whereupon it received the name Gaia (Γαῖα)—a robe of rich, marvelous linen, and with his own hands embroidered it with land, water, and riverbeds. This literary work has exercised a definite, profound influence on those who study nature [Physiologen]: we discover time and again that all its principles are bound up with theirs—flowing primal matter with Thales, active breath with Anaximenes, the absolute Becoming of time with Heraclitus, and with Anaximander the unknown, formless, and qualityless primal Being, τὸ ἀπειρον. By the way, Zimmerman has proved beyond doubt that there was an Egyptian influence on Pherecydes.16

15. Έπτάκοσιος or Θεοκρατία Θεογονία Θεολογία.
Homer shows us ethically conscious thought already long in development; its expression lies far more with his opposition of individual persons to ethics rather than with his aphorisms, from which I recall the most famous:

As is the generation of leaves, so is that of humanity.\(^1\)

Of all creatures that breathe and walk on the earth there is nothing more helpless than a man is.\(^2\)

One bird sign is best: to fight in defense of our country.\(^3\)

For any man whose wits have hold on the slightest achievement, his suppliant and guest is as good as a brother to him.\(^4\)

Lordship for many is no good thing. Let there be one ruler, one king, to whom the devious-devising Kronos gives the scepter and right of judgment, to watch over his people.\(^5\)

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1. *Iliad*, bk. 6, l. 146 (οὐ̂ς περ̄ φύλλαν γενε̄τ θε̄ότ̄ καὶ ἀνδρόν). [The entire passage reads, in Lattimore’s translation, “Then in turn the shining son of Hippolochos answered: ‘High-hearted son of Tydeus, why ask of my generation? As is the generation of leaves, so is that of humanity. The wind scatters the leaves on the ground, but the live timber burgeons with leaves again in the season of spring returning. So one generation of men will grow while another dies’” (Homer, *The Iliad*, trans. Richmond Lattimore [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974]).]

2. *Odyssey*, bk. 18, l. 130 (οὐ̂δὲν ἀκῆδοντερον γαῖα τρέφει ἄνθρωπον). [The complete passage, in Lattimore’s translation, reads, “Of all creatures that breathe and walk on the earth there is nothing more helpless than a man is, of all that the earth fosters; for he thinks that he will never suffer misfortune in future days, while the gods grant him courage and his knees have spring in them” (Homer, *The Odyssey*, trans. Richmond Lattimore [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967]).]


4. *Odyssey*, bk. 8, l. 546 (ἄντι κακογνήτου ξείνος θ’ ἴκετης τε τέτυκται).

5. *Iliad*, bk. 2, l. 204 (οὐ̂ς ἄγαθον πολυκοιρανή· εἰς κοίρανος ἔστω, εἰς βασιλεύς ὁ ἐδωκε Κρόνου παῖς ἄγκυλομήτεω).
Hesiod displays this extraordinary wealth of such popular wisdom once more. He embraces it with both hands; he knows nothing of the sentiment that private [intellectual] property exists. On the contrary, he reveals a fondness for associating himself with the sporadic—but very externally, very crudely. In this regard, the fable whose foundations are laid in the *Works and Days* is as awkward as can be: [of] two brothers in an inheritance trial, one was cheated, and the other seeks to provoke the judge into an additional partisan decision. Then his brother comes and gives him poetic instruction about virtue, agriculture, navigation—that is, he assumes as his norm all those things, which every ship-faring farmer would have in his individual memory—ultimately, even [a sense of] auspicious and inauspicious days. That Hesiod could confer such a large amount of proverbs was doubtless due in part to the Delphic priesthood, who exhibit the same tendency here as later with the wise sayings of the Seven. But it is important that each one of these propositions (at least their ideas) is far older than the composition of the *Works and Days*; indeed, even the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* presuppose them. The contradiction between the aristocratic, heroic world of Homer and that of Hesiod's oppressed peasantry is frequently pointed out; in any case, they are not two successive periods of time; one does not develop out of the other.

Both groups probably share an essential proverbial wisdom that was likely older than either of them. Also, in the *Iliad* gnomology [Gnomologie] is much less exact than the descriptions of individual heroes. The Delphic Oracle likewise makes frequent use of these ancient moral sayings and their formulations; something similar is revealed in Homeric language. The latter contains an indefinite number of archaic formulations on which the genuine ancestry of the language depends—formulations that would no longer be grammatically understood by later singers and for this reason would be imagined, by

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6. His metaphorical speech, which signifies more than it expresses, is very Greek: like Heraclitus said, it "neither speaks nor conceals, but gives signs" (οστε λέγει ουτε κρύπτει ολλα σημαινει) [Heraclitus, fragment 93; English-language translation is from Philip Wheelwright, *The Presocratics* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966).] It is called σημαίνεις [a tale], connected in part to normal occurrences, in part to animal legends—for example, Crab, who, himself walking on crooked paths, promotes the straight and narrow to Snake. "Thus spoke the crab as he gripped the snake with his claw: 'A comrade should be straight, and not have crooked thoughts.' " (ο καρκίνος δε έφεσχε καλλιτ [claw] τοις δειν λαβον ένυθιν χρη τοις έπαιρναρ εμον και μη σκολια φρονειν). [This unidentified passage comes from Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae*, bk. 15, sect. 695, p. 233. It constitutes scholia θε 9. The MUSAIOS 1.06 program was crucial for locating this source.] Frequently, the instance is drawn in brevity and contents itself with a final verse. The proverb is an abbreviated instance [Beispiel] and for this reason is called παρομοία (meaning chant [Beigesang] or final verse, so it can also mean refrain) προοίμιον, beginning of the song, ούμι. Or explained otherwise, an ούμι is a narration that only hints at the meaning, not directly proceeding to its goal.
false analogies, to be new expressions. These archaic formulations make reference to hymnals in poetry: in them may already be found those ethical aphorisms that contain character portraiture [Physiognomy] less exact than the later, luminous development of Homeric heroes. The ethical wisdom presupposed here is something entirely different from an archaic, mystery-laden symbolic oriental wisdom of priests, which several recent scholars have detected in the background of oldest Greece.

Also of importance concerning these maxims is their form, the hexameter, for here we come across the influence of Delphi once again: “The most prevalent view, however, is that Phemonoe was the first prophetess of the god, and first sang in hexameter verse.” According to Plutarch, the first hexameter is said to have been de Pythia oraculis (and not Pythius Delphicus theologicus): here “heroic verse was heard for the first time.” The Oracle Verses would certainly have to be called the most ancient maxims of wisdom, for example, such a verse as Works and Days 356: “A man gives to the free-handed, but no one gives to the close-fisted.” If the hexameter was the oldest temple verse, it becomes in this way the verse of wisdom—such a genre is first of all created and spread, and then it continually produces new verse out of itself. As the temple hymn, with an act of the gods at its centerpoint, unfolds by degree into epic poetry, so the oracle [unfolds] into lyric poetry. Thus shall we grasp the extraordinary position of honor given Delphi; there is neither prophecy nor ethical teachings [but only] an appeal to human conscience. Such oracular verses were inscribed on stellae and visible spots; thousands read them. We are even told of the custom of decorating border stones with ethical engravings: “Walk with just intent,” or “Deceive not a friend.”

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9. A number of maxims were already engraved in the temple at Delphi before the Seven Sages: Aristotle in the dialogue περὶ φιλοσοφίας.

10. δῶς ἁγαθῆ, ἐρασῆ δὲ κοσκῆ, θεατῶ τούτοις δότειρα. [English-language translation is from Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns, and Homerica, with an English trans. by Hugh G. Evelyn-White (Loeb Classical Library, 1959).]

11. See Plato's Hipparchus 228: στείχε δίκαια φρονῶν οὐ μὴ φίλων ἐξαπάτα. [Nietzsche's citation is slightly incorrect: the two phrases are at Hipparchus 229. English-language translation is from Plato, Hipparchus, ed. Gregory R. Crane, Perseus Project (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu).]
At first the ancient heroic princes were regarded as excellent teachers of wisdom. Consider Chiron, whose *Councils of Chiron* (ὑποθήκαι Χείρωνος) were in circulation—Pindar is familiar with them. His merit was summed up by the author of the *Battle of the Titans*: he was the first “to lead the race of mortals to righteousness, revealing oaths and sacred sacrifices and the constellations of Olympus.” Then there is Pitheus the Trojan, from whom Hesiod's verse 370 in *Works and Days* is said to come: “Let the wages for a friend be settled on and fixed.” Aristotle cited a maxim by Rhadamanthus: “Should a man suffer what he did, right justice would be done.” Hence, he will be led back, not to cursing the gods, but instead to “vow by the Goose.”

Then comes a series of archaic bards: a lyricist, *Olen* (Ὀλήν), who is said to have brought Apollonian hymns from Lykia to Delos and from there to Delphi, should also be considered the creator of the hemimeter; next, *Philammon*, who is said to have initially directed the maidens’ choirs; *Bakis*, an

1. Fragment 167, 171, Boeckh.
2. εἰς τε δικαιοσύνην θυτητῶν γένος Ἰταγε δείξε αρκους καὶ θυσίας θλοᾶς καὶ σχήματ' Ὀλύμπου (Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis* 1.361. [This fragment is found at *Stromateis*, or *Miscellanies*, bk. 1, ch. 15, sect. 73(3). According to Ferguson’s footnotes to Clement, the *Titanomachy* was an epic concerning the battles of giants and gods attributed to Arctinus or Eumelus. English-language translation is from John Ferguson, trans., *The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation*, 8 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1991).]
3. Concerning him, see Plutarch, *Theseus*, third scholium; Euripides’ *Hippolytus*, 264, also where, according to Theophrastus, sayings (λεγόμενα) of Sisyphus were referred to. Then scholium to Hermogenes T. 4.43.
6. (By) Goose and Dog and Ram and the like (χίνα και κόρα και κρίνα και δόμωα). [See] scholium to Aristophanes, *Birds* 521 ["Lampon the soothsayer is said to vow ‘By the Goose!’ instead of ‘By Zeus!’ whenever he lied. Two of Socrates’ favorite oaths were ‘By the Goose!’ and ‘By Dog!’" (my translation).]
oracular poet; *Eumolpus*, progenitor of the Eumolpids; *Pamphus*, between Olen and Homer; and *Linus*, who gave us a cosmogony (*κοσμογονία*). In the beginning, "Time was when all things grew up at once." We have two other fragments; they seem to be attributed [to Linus] by the Pythagoreans. [There was also] *Musaeus*, who produced a theogony (*θεογονία*), according to Diogenes Laertius: "He maintained that all things proceed from unity and are resolved again into unity." Aristophanes' *Frogs* explains:

"First, Orpheus taught you religious rites
and from bloody murder to stay your hands
Musaeus healing and oracle lore
and Hesiod all the cultures of lands."

A very rich literature existed in Plato's time, which Plato held in contempt: "And they produce a bushel of books of Musaeus and Orpheus, the offspring of the Moon and of the Muses, as they affirm, and these books they use in their ritual, and make not only ordinary men but states believe that there really are remissions of sins and purifications for deeds of injustice, by means of sacrifice and pleasant sport for the living, and that there are also special rites for the defunct, which they call functions, that deliver us from evils in that other world, while terrible things await those who have neglected to sacrifice." Thus, we have three preliminary stages to the wise man: the vastly experienced *old men and princes*, the inspired *singers*, and the ceremonial *priests* (Epimenides). We discover all these types once again in the term *Seven Sages*.

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8. Ioannis Stobaei, *Florilegium* 5.22 (100.9.1), and Virgil's *Eclogues*, bk. 1, ch. 10, 5. [The former text is Ioannis Stobaei (Joannes Stobaeus), *Florilegium*, authorized by Augustus Meineke, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1855–57), which will be cited frequently in these lectures.]

The pronouncement of a wise man is a fixed point for the visualization of Greek history; we may fix dates according to such points. The Delphic Oracle, which always seeks new means to religious reform, points out seven men as prototypes and exemplars, as a lively catechism according to which we may live. Only the Catholic catechism presents us with something similar. Human beings step into the position of moral proverbs. We must assume from this that they were very well known men. The Delphic Oracle shows us a certain darkness and cunning in that it does not speak completely indubitably of the Seven. It suffices that we seek Seven Sages. Only Thales, Solon, Bias, and Pittacus are definite and certain; they were probably clearly designated. The remaining three places of honor were unoccupied; we must assume a competitive zeal in all Greek states to place one of their own on this holy list. We have a total of twenty-two men who have been said to have a claim to such. It was a great contest of wisdom. At Protagoras 343a Plato names Cleobulus, Myson, and Chilon. Demetrius Phalereus and many others have Periander, Anacharsis, or Epimenides instead of Myson. The last of these [three] is named by Leander the Milesian, who also puts Leophantus in place of Cleobulus. Hermippus names seventeen names, including Pythagoras, Pherencydes, and Acusilaus. Dikaiarch makes a noteworthy remark when he calls these men "neither sages nor philosophers, but merely shrewd men with a turn for legislation." This assumes a specific sense of σοφός, obviously the Aristotelian, that of the universal, scientific mind. With the qualified exception of Thales, they were not this.

Wonderful but varied legends surround the selection of the Seven. Fishermen fish with a tripod, and so the Milesian populace awards one to their wisest. The argument revolves around the catch [the tripod]: they send it to Delphi, and there the decision is made. They send it to Thales, who further gives it to Solon, who says God is the wisest of all and sends it [back] to Delphi.

Another [legend] among many ("Αλλως"): Bathycles the Arcadian bequeathed a serving bowl and stipulated that it should be given to the wisest. Now Thales [first receives the bowl, and then he gives it to . . .], etc., etc., until it [the serving bowl] came back to him, who then [finally] bequeathes it to Didymaeic Apollo. The son of Bathycles had carried the serving bowl around with him. Another among many: One of the friends of Croesus received from him a golden pitcher for the wisest of all. He brought it to Thales, and so on,
and finally [it came] to Chilon; the latter asked the Delphic god who might be wiser than himself. And the answer awarded was Myson. Others claim Croesus sent the pitcher to Pittacus. Andron tells us that the Aegeans specified a tripod as their honorary award to the wisest of all men . . . this prize being awarded to Aristodem the Spartan. Several sources say that Periander sent a cargo ship to the Milesian prince Thrasybulus: it sank, and at that spot, fishermen found the tripod. And so on. The main points are: (1) To whom is the tripod first sent (Thales, Pittacus, Bias)? (2) Who receives it last? (3) What is the sequence [of possession]? (4) Where does the tripod originate? (5) Where is it awarded (Miletus, Delphi, Thebes)? The number seven appears to have already been distinctive in the form of the these legends. The core reason is probably an oriental fairy tale of the Seven Wise Masters; what characterizes it is obviously the self-determination of the wise ones. In contrast, it appears to be historical fact that the Delphic Oracle sanctioned several as wise men, e.g., Myson, of whom it is said by Hipponax:

And Myson, whom Apollo’s self proclaimed
Wisest of all men.14

The stories from Laertius,15 Plutarch,16 and Porphyry17 are all different. Accordingly, the Tablets of Sayings, which was finally awarded to the Seven Sages, is very important. Indeed, anyone at all with a pithy saying places himself in relation to them forever. We find extraordinary differences in

13. καὶ Μῦσον ὄν ὁπόλλων | ἀνέείπεν ἀνδρῶν σωφρονόστατον πάντων. Fragment 77 Bergk. [This verse may be found in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 1, sect. 107. It is fragment 45 in Bergk, Griechesche Literaturgeschichte, not 77, as Nietzsche has it.]

14. 1. Self-determination of the wise men (legends),
2. the Delphic Oracle determines (generalization of particular facts),
3. the official norms (historical, but only referring to Thales).

Diogenes Laertius, [Lives of Eminent Philosophers,] bk. 1, sect. 22, says that Demetrius Phalereus claimed in the ἀναγραφῇ τῶν ἄρχοντων [List of Archons] that Thales was proclaimed σοφός when Damasius was king of Athens (586–585 B.C.E.). That is the historical core fact. Marvel at a scientific feat. The reputation of the σοφός appears to depend on wise sayings that are fulfilled (notion of insight into the causality of things). With Epimenides, Pherecydes, and Chilon, it is still entirely prophetic: the capture of cities, declines, the sinking of ships and islands, and earthquakes foretold.

15. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 1, 18f.
16. Solon, ch. 4. [Life of Solon].
the case of the maxim "Know thyself!" (γνῶθι σαυτόν), for example, as to whether it is that of Thales, Chilon, Bias, or Apollo and Phemonoe. Three editings have survived for us: First, that of Demetrius Phalerus, [which quotes] Cleobulus, Solon, Chilon, Pittacus, Thales, Bias, and Periander. Each has twenty or more sayings. Given precedence as core sayings were

- μέτρον ἀριστον ("Moderation is best!" (Cleobulus))
- μηδὲν ἄγαν ("Nothing in Excess!" (Solon))
- γνῶθι σαυτόν ("Know Thyself!" (Thales))
- καὶρόν γνῶθι ("Know thine opportunity!" (Pittacus))
- ἕγγυα πάρα δ' ἄτα ("Give a pledge and suffer for it!" (Chilon))
- οἱ πλεῖστοι ἄνθρωποι κακοὶ ("Most men are bad!" (Bias))
- μελέτα τὸ πάν. ("Practice makes perfect!" (Periander))

Next the collection of Sosiades is not divided according to individual sages. In 1495 Aldus Manutius edited a third collection from an old codex, as well as Theocritus and other writers; [he includes] Periander, Bias, Pittacus, Cleobulus, Chilon, Solon, and Thales. According to Apollodorus, a fourth collection based on Diogenes Laertius, On Taking (περὶ αἱρέσεων), presents each with his apophthegms (ἀποθέματα). However, a far greater mass remains to be collected as Mullach has done, along with a bunch of witty anecdotes. The Anthology by Planudes contains a memorial verse:

20. "Give a pledge and suffer for it!" ["Bürgen thut Würgen."] Or Jesus Sirach: "Becoming a guarantor has ruined many rich people." Epicharmos: "Surety is the daughter of blindness, which to surety is harm."

It can be proven that five sayings were on two facing columns that fastened to the frontage of the temple made of marble from Paros [a Greek island] (Ferdinand Schulz in Philologus, vol. 24, 133), namely, γνῶθι σαυτόν, μηδὲν ἄγαν, ἕγγυα πάρα δ' ἄτα, θεῷ ἡρα ["To God the glory!"] and the riddlesome E, which has been read Ei ("God, Thou art!"). Schulz explains: "In this way God called to the human being: Thou art, i.e., thou art a truly finite, but thinking and conscious being; behave as such, behave as a thinking, reasonable being."

23. [Ibid.,] 218–35.
24. ἐπὶ σοφῶν ἔρεω κατ' ἔπος πόλιν, οὖνομα, φοινή, μέτρον μὲν Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λίνδιος εἶπεν ἄριστον. Χίλδον δ' ἐν κοιλῇ Λακεδαιμονίᾳ γνῶθι σεαυτόν. Ὁς δὲ Κόρινθον ἔνοια, χολοῦ κρατέειν Περιανδρός. Πίπτακος οὐδὲν ἄγαν, ὡς ἦν γένος ἐκ Μιτυλήνης. Τέρμα δ' ὁρῶν βιότοι Σόλον ἱεραῖς ἐν Ἀθηναῖς. Τοὺς πλέονος κακίως δὲ Βίας ἀπέφηνε Πριηνεῦς. Ἐγγύην φεύγειν δὲ Θαλής. Μιλήστος ηὕδα (bk. 1, ch. 86, trans. Ausonius). [English-language translation is from The Greek Anthology as Selected for the Use of Westminster, Eton, and Other Public Schools, trans. George Burges (London: George Bell and Sons, 1906).]
"I will speak of the Seven Wise Men with respect to their saying, city, name, voice. Cleobulus the Lindian said, Moderation is best. But Chilon in hollow Lacedaemon said, Know yourself. But Periander, who inhabited Corinth, said, Restrain anger. Pittacus, whose family was of Mitylene, said, Nothing too much. But Solon said, in holy Athens, Consider the end of life. But Bias of Priene declared, The majority are the worse. But Thales, the Milesian, said, Avoid being a security."
A strange question, whether he is a Greek or actually a Phoenician! Herodotus says of him, “Thales of Miletus, a Phoenician by remote descent.”¹ Clement calls him “Phoenician by birth.”² According to an anonymous author,³ he received the rights of citizenship in Miletus when he came there with Neleus, who was forced to leave Phoenicia. In this note we see an earnest effort made [to discuss] his Phoenician heritage, which was of prime significance to the later Alexandrian scholars. Laertius himself, however, adds that the judgment of the majority is that he was a native Milesian from the most brilliant of families—namely, from among the Thelidae (who produce the likes of Duris and Democritus)—the son of Examyes and Cleobuline: “And [Thales] belonged to the Thelidae who are Phoenicians and amongst the noblest descendants of Cadmus and Agenor”;⁴ this means only that his forefathers belonged to the seafaring people of Cadmus, who were mixed with the Ionians of Asia Minor. He is Phoenician only in the sense that his family may be traced back to Cadmus. This family therefore at one time migrated from Thebes to Ionia.

Concerning his dates we have two definite points: [first,] the testimony of Demetrius of Phalerum in the List of Archons (ἀναγραφή τῶν ἀρχόντων) that Thales was proclaimed a Sage (σοφὸς ὁνομάζωθη) under King Damasias

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(586–585 B.C.E.); second, he predicted a solar eclipse during the reign of the Lydian King Alyattes. In this connection the investigations by Julius Z. Zech and A. Hansen prove decisive. According to them, this eclipse fell on May 28 in the Julian calendar, May 22 of the Gregorian, in the year 585. It turns out that the Sage depends on this—not on the tripod. And this is a fixed point like few others: in his chronicles Apollodorus set his [Thales’] birthday at the thirty-fifth Olympiad, 1 (640–639 B.C.E.). Therefore he would have been approximately fifty-five years old at the time of this eclipse.

[Thales] must have been an extremely influential man politically: according to Herodotus, he advised the Ionians, in the face of their downfall to the Persians, to unify into a federation of states in defense against the same. Of course, he is also said to have accompanied Croesus on his campaign against Cyrus [of Persia], and by his resources a canal was constructed to make possible the crossing of the Halys River. As a mathematician and astronomer he stands at the pinnacle of Greek science.

According to Eudemus the Aristotelian, Proclus said, concerning Euclid: “Thales was the first to go to Egypt and bring back to Greece this study; he himself discovered many propositions, and disclosed the underlying principles of many others to his successors, in some cases his method being more general, in others more empirical.”

Thales asserted four propositions in particular: (1) that a circle is halved by a diameter, (2) that the angles at the bases of an isosceles triangle are equal, (3) that its vertical angles equal each other, and (4) that triangles are congruent if one side and two angles of the one are equal to the corresponding ones of the other. We may certainly assume that he sojourned in Egypt.

5. Herodotus, Histories 1.74.
10. It was a great mathematician that gives rise to philosophy in Greece; therefrom comes his feel for the abstract, the unmythical, the unallegorical. In this regard we should note that he is considered a “Sage” in Delphi, despite his antinarrathological sentiments. Early on the Orphics show the ability to express extremely abstract ideas allegorically. Mathematics and astronomy are more ancient than philosophy: the Greeks took over their science from the orientals.
11. Θάλης δὲ πρῶτον εἰς Ἕλληνων μετήρρησαν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα τὴν Θεωρίαν ταύτην καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτὸς εὗρε, πολλὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῖς μετ’ αὐτόν ψηφισσάτο, τοῖς μὲν καθολικάτερον ἐπιβάλλον, τοῖς δὲ αἰσθητικάτερον (I conjecture eidoikoteron). [Nietzsche does not give the exact reference (Summary, sect. 19). English-language translation is from Greek Mathematical Works, vol. 1: Thales to Euclid, trans. Ivor Thomas (Loeb Classical Library, 1939).]
According to Plutarch, he pursued business ventures there. The most senior witness, of course, is only Eudemus. Thales himself could not have produced it [his history], because he left us no writings. Naturally it is precisely the Egyptian sojourn that is most strongly emphasized by the oriental tendency of later scholars. Now, for the first time, Greek philosophy is said to have not originated in Greece. The Phoenicians still had to seek education among the Egyptians. In itself, it would be inconceivable that a great astronomical talent at that time would not have gone to the Egyptians—at that time, when nothing was learned from books and everything was learned orally. There alone he found teachers—but also there alone students of his discoveries. Otherwise he had no teachers, as was expressly attested. He is considered to have been a pupil of Pherecydes by only one source—Tzetzes—but this is probably only a conclusion drawn from his philosopsheme concerning water and Pherecydes’ mudlike matter.

[Thales] wrote nothing: this is said directly several times. Aristotle above all, however, speaks of him always following old, written traditions, as does Eudemus. A Nautical Astronomy (γαλακτικὴ ἀστρονομία) was attributed to him. This same was also considered as the work of Phocus of Samos. According to Plutarch, it was in verse: [it was] probably identical to the two hundred verses concerning astronomy. Laertius in addition cites On the Solstice, On the Equinox, and On Archons. Galen explicitly says: “For even if we are not able to show from his writing that Thales declared water is the only prime element, [still everyone believes it.]” He died in the fifty-eighth Olympiad, according to Apollodorus, at approximately ninety years of age. We read these verses on his statue: “Pride of Miletus and Ionian lands, Wisest astronomer, here Thales stands.” In addition, on his gravestone, the astronomer is

13. [John Tzetzes,] Chiliadium, 869. [Tzetzes was a late Byzantine anthologist.]
15. Pyth. orac. 18.
16. ἀστρονομία (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 1, sect. 34).
17. περὶ τροπῆς, περὶ ἵσμερίας καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν. [The first two titles appear at Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 1, sect. 23. I could find no reference to this third title in Laertius.]
20. Τόνδη Θαλῆς Μιλήτου ἡς θρέφων ἐνδέχετεν ἀστρολόγων πάντων πρεσβύτατον σοφία (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 1, sect. 34).
emphasized as wise (σοφός): “Here in a narrow tomb great Thales lies; Yet his renown for wisdom reached the skies.”

Philosophical thought is detectible at the center of all scientific thought, even in the lowest scientific activity, philological conjecture. It leaps forth on light steps: the understanding slowly huffs and puffs behind her and searches for better footing; accordingly, the magical apparition appears enticing to him. Two wanderers stand in a wild forest brook flowing over the rocks; the one leaps across using the stones of the brook, moving to and fro ever further, whether or not the other is left in the rear. The other stands there helplessly at each moment. He must first construct the footing that can support his heavy steps; when this does not work, no god helps him across the brook. Is it only boundless rash flight across great spaces? Is it only greater acceleration? No, it is with flights of fantasy, in continuous leaps from possibility to possibility taken as certainties; an ingenious notion shows them to him, and he conjectures that there are formally demonstrable certainties. With special alacrity, though, his fantasy observes the power in similarity; later reflection measures everything by fixed ideas and seeks similarities through equalities, to place what has been intuited into succession through causalities. But even inde¬monstrable philosophizing still possesses value, like that of Thales: here all footings are discarded, when the logic and rigor of the empirical wills to cross over to the proposition “everything is water.” The work of art [Kunstwerk] survives when scientific edifice lies in ruin. All fruitfulness, all driving force [treibende Kraft], lies in such instances. Thales [is] long gone, but a painter standing before a waterfall will agree with him. Humanity very slowly discovers how complicated the world is: at first it thinks it completely simple, as superficial as itself. The art of the painter also takes humanity as mere surface.

Concerning his actual philosophizing, Aristotle says: “Thales, the founder of this type of philosophy, says the principle is water (for which reason he declared that the earth rests on water), getting the notion perhaps from seeing that the nutriment of all things is moist, and that heat itself is generated from the moist and kept alive by it (and that from which they come to be is a principle of all things). He got this notion from this fact, and from the fact that the seeds of all things have a moist nature, and that water is the origin of the

21. ἡ ολίγον τόδε σάμα. τὸ δὲ κλέος οὐρανώμηκες τῷ πολυφροντίστῳ τούτῳ Θάλητος ὄρη (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 1, sect. 39). [In parentheses Nietzsche questions whether οὐρανώμηκες might not read οὐρανόν ἤξει.]

22. [This entire paragraph is a note to the main text; it is not included in the Musarion manuscript. I have inserted it at a likely spot.]
nature of moist things.”

Aristotle is the only reliable source of Thales’ fundamental principle. What he gives as conjecture later [scholars] give as an absolute certainty. They further add to this that plants, and even the stars, draw nourishment out of the moist mists [and] that all dying things dehydrate. It is, in any case, a hypothesis of the natural sciences of great worth.

Myth seeks to understand all transformation following an analogy to human behavior, to human acts of will. Perhaps this was first inspired by the image of the formation of animal bodies out of semen and eggs: thus could everything solid have arisen from the less solid. (Unclarity concerning aggregate conditions and chemical qualities.) Well then! Thales sought a material less solid and properly capable of formation. He begins along a path that the Ionian philosophers follow after him. Actually, astronomical facts justify his belief that a less solid aggregate condition must have given rise to current circumstances. Here we should recall the Kant-Laplace hypothesis concerning a gaseous precondition of the universe. In following this same direction, the Ionian philosophers

23. ὁ τῆς τουαότης ἄρχηγος φιλοσοφίας ([Aristotle,] Metaphysics, bk. 1, ch. 3. [In the manuscript the full quotation is given in German, with the exception of this short phrase. English-language translation is from Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).]

24. We should note that twice again the theory of transformation of water has had the greatest impact in the natural sciences. In the sixteenth-century water was considered by Paracelsus as the fundamental matter because it transforms itself into soil, because it serves as nourishment for plants and thereby organic matter and alkali, and finally because it gives an essential component to oil-based bodies and to alcoholic spirits, from which it may be separated by burning. “Why then would I not judge earth among the primary elements, even though created at the same time in the beginning? The reason is because in the end it is prone to change into water.” (Cur autem terram non inter primaria elementa, licet inition simul creatam, exist [i] mem [?] causa est quod tandem convertibilis est in aquam.) [Translation from Latin by R. Scott Smith.] Struggle against the Aristotelian elements.

Lavoisier’s first work (at the end of the eighteenth century) concerns the transformation of water into earth (Erde); he demonstrated the incorrectness of this universally accepted belief of the times. He placed a weighed amount of water into a glass receptacle that at that time was known by the name pelican and was so constructed that a tube (which was melted onto the neck above) leads back into the belly of the receptacle. He weighed it empty and full of water, as well as weighing the whole once he had closed an opening with a glass plug, and then distilled the water for one hundred days. The formation of sediments (or Earth, Erde) begins after one month, yet he continued with the distillation until the formation of sediment appeared sufficient to him. Then he weighed the apparatus all over again. He discovers it is just as heavy as before, from which he concludes that no fiery matter has embedded itself, for otherwise, he thought, the weight would necessarily have to increase. He next opens it, weighs the water with the sediment, [and] finds the weight to be greater yet that of the glass decreased. This leads him to accept that the glass was attacked by the water and that the formation of sediments is not a transformation but instead a decomposition.

PRE-PLATONIC PHILOSOPHERS were certainly on the right path. To conceive the entirety of such a multifarious universe as the merely formal differentiation of one fundamental material belongs to an inconceivable freedom and boldness! This is a service of such a magnitude that no one may aspire to it a second time.

We must be suspicious of everything else that one wishes to know about Thales, because there were texts attributed to him, e.g., Concerning First Principle (περὶ ἀρχῶν). In addition to that, indeed, [are attributed] the propositions of the unity of the world, the infinite divisibility and alterability of matter, the inconceivability of empty space, the fourness of the elements, the mixture of materials, the nature and immortality of the soul and of the daemons and heroes. Then comes the text Opinions of the Philosophers (Placita philosophorum), by Pseudo-Plutarch. Aristotle further adds that the earth swims on water, and Seneca said that earthquakes come about from the motion of these waters. We find a noteworthy passage [in Seneca's Natural Questions] where Thales has been cited by name: “The disc is supported by this water, he says, just as some big heavy ship is supported by the water which it presses down upon.” Thereto [Seneca remarks], “It is pointless for me to give the reasons for his belief, etc.” Must he not have meant the text Concerning First Principle here? Yet [this is] the same writing that Aristotle also appears to know and from which he appears to quote these thoughts. He further says, “According to Thales, magnets have souls, since they attract iron.” In this same work Thales is further said to have believed “all things are full of gods.” All these appear to be echoes of this text. Laertius says, “Aristotle and Hippias affirm that arguing from the magnet and from amber, he attributed a soul or life even to inanimate objects.” And so Hippias assures us of the existence of a Thalesian writing.

What, then, is the importance of a tradition? Who should hand this down? We see in the manner in which Aristotle cites such propositions that they

30. “supervacuum est reddere causas, propter quas existimat, etc.” (Seneca, Natural Questions, bk. 6, ch. 6.
32. 'Αριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ Ἰππιάς φασίν αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἀνώνυμους διδόναι ψυχὰς τεκμηριωμένον εἰ τῆς λίθου τῆς μαγνήτου καὶ τοῦ ἁλέκτρου (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 1, sect. 24).
stand next to each other pretty much as claims without interconnections, so that their grounds must be questioned first. Well then, there were no writings by Thales, only a very old list of main propositions in the form of “Thales thinks . . . , Thales said . . .” (Θαλῆς ὁ θεός, Θαλῆς ἐφη), and so on as attributions (ἀπομνημονεύματα), without grounds, or [at least] seldom with them. Only thus do we comprehend the unison between Seneca and Aristotle. Aristotle designates such propositions as attributions particularly explicitly: “Others say the earth rests upon water. This, indeed, is the oldest theory that has been preserved, and is attributed to Thales of Miletus.”33 Finally, that there was a set list [Verzeichniss] of attributions to Thales is proved by Plato: “The same as the story about the Thracian maid servant who exercised her wit at the expense of Thales, when he was looking up to study the stars and tumbled down a well. She scoffed at him for being so eager to know what was happening in the sky that he could not see what lay at his feet” [emphasis added].34 Finally, Laertius: “And some, including Choerilus the poet, declare that he was the first to maintain the immortality of the soul.”35 So then, separate propositions were attributed by Choerilus, Hippias, and Aristotle [and in] an anecdote from Plato. No unifying text [exists], because Aristotle speaks of his grounds only by way of conjecture. Yet Aristotle considers this collection of propositions as worthy of belief. It must be very ancient.36 Laertius finds a short letter from Thales to Pherecydes and to Solon.37 It is worth noting concerning this pseudepigraphic correspondence that Thales is explicitly described as “not writing”: he wants to come to Syros to conduct research, because he has already sailed to Crete and Egypt; he writes nothing but only travels through Greece and Asia. In another letter he invites Solon to visit him. These letters are always pleasant for the personal prestige of a philosopher in later antiquity, from time to time also because their authors know


35. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν πρῶτον εἰπεῖν φασίν ἀθανατοὺς τὰς ψυχὰς, δὲν ἔστι Χορίλος ὁ ποιητής (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 1, sect. 24).


something extra—for example, with the letters of Heraclitus, as Jacob Bernays has shown. [The letter quoted by Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers,* 1.122, is the reply by Pherecydes in which he assigns Thales the editing of his works and tells of his illness from lice. A letter from Anaxagoras to Pythagoras narrates the death of Thales: he plunged off a cliff during the night. "We his students, however, wish not only to remember the man but also to entertain our children and audiences with his speech. Thales shall forever be the beginning point of our talks." Here there is reference to propositions (λόγοι) by Thales. Another sort of death [is described] by Laertius; advanced in years, he watched a competition in gymnastics and died of heat, thirst, and weakness.  

Again a Milesian,\(^1\) son of Praxiades: [that Anaximander held] a respected position is attested by the note from Aelian that he had been the leader of the Milesian colony in Apollonia.\(^2\) Otherwise we know little of his life, yet much about his teachings, exactly reversed from the situation with Thales. According to Apollodorus, he was sixty-four years old in the second year of Olympiad 58 (547–546 B.C.E.).\(^3\) A note refers to a fixed event, probably (possibly?) the writing and completion of his book *On Nature* (περὶ φύσεως).\(^4\) This work is the first of its sort! Themistius says, “(Anaximander) was the first of the Greeks whom we know who ventured to produce a written account on nature.”\(^5\) “Previously writing in prose was usually cause for criticism and was not customarily practiced by the earlier Greeks.”\(^6\) But Laertius expressly shows us what sort of writing it was: “His exposition of his doctrines took the form of a summary which no doubt came into the hands, among others, of Apollodorus of Athens.”\(^7\) An except of his writing is not discussed here, but rather

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1. Concerning important remark about his personality, previously overlooked, see L. VIII 70. [Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, bk. 8, sect. 70.]
3. Olympiad 58, 2.
6. [Πρὶν δὲ εἰς ὅνειδος καθειστήκει τὸ λόγους συγγράφειν καὶ οὐκ ἐνομίζετο τοὺς πρόσθεν Ἐλλήσι (Themistius, *Orations* 26). This sentence immediately follows the previous one. Translation by R. Scott Smith.]
7. τῶν δὲ ἄρσεσκόντων αὐτῷ πεποίηται κεφαλαίωθη τὴν ἐκθέσιν, ἦπερ περιέτυχε καὶ ὁ
the writing itself is described (and then extremely unusually) as the summary of his main propositions (not an exposition), thus similar to that supposed for Thales—only he invented the form and spoke in the first person.

Aristotle and Simplicius have preserved several remarkable remnants characteristic of his dialectic. When the *Suidas* says, “He wrote *On Nature, Circuit of the Earth* and *On the Fixed stars* and a Celestial Globe and some other works,” it is a mix-up. Specifically, *Laertius* says of him, “He was the first to draw on a map the outline of land and sea, and he constructed a globe as well,” that is, a geographic chart and celestial globe. The invention of the sundial probably reduces down to this, that it was introduced by the Hellenes (in Lacedaemonia): the gnomon (γνώμων). The Babylonians had possessed it for a long time, according to *Herodotus*.10 *Pliny* attributes it to *Anaximenes*.11 We would be nearly guessing about his relationship to Thales if he had not also been described as a well-known student (ἐξουσία ὑπάρχοντα;) and so on. As a mathematician and astronomer, he must have studied with his famous countryman, during whose famous solar eclipse he was in his midtwenties. In this regard his philosophical principle reveals the intellectual continuation of Thales’ ideas. Since he did not write, however, we must presume an oral tradition. Reports about the most ancient successions are made very arbitrarily based on later paradigms. Philosophical schools did not exist at that time.

As his principle (ἀρχή)—an expression he made into a term—he contemplated the Indefinite (τὸ ἀρχεῖον). We should not be misled by this concept, as happened to the ancients, who transferred to him problems recognized later. It is horrible that genuine groundwork is absent in the writing—hence the varied outlooks in antiquity. We exhibit first a pair of firm statements: “The Unlimited, embracing and governing all,” according to *Aristotle*, “being ‘immortal and indestructible.’”12 We separate warmth and cold for the first

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8. *ἐγραφε περὶ φύσεως, γῆς περιβάλλον, περὶ τῶν ἀπλανῶν καὶ σφαιρῶν καὶ ἄλλα τινά*.

9. *καὶ γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης περὶμετρῶν πρώτος ἔγραψεν, ἄλλα καὶ σφαιρῶν κατεσκεύασε*.


12. *τὸ ἀρχεῖον περίμετρος ἕπαντα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾶ. ἄθάνατον γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἀνώλεθρον*.

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3. Nietzsche says this is a *Verwechselung*, or mix-up, often meaning a case of mistaken identity.

time by removal. The flux is produced from the mixture of both of these; he considered the water to be the semen of the world. Thus he made two great advances over Thales, to wit, a principle of water’s warmth and coldness and a principle of the Unlimited, the final unity, the matrix of continuous arising. This One alone is eternal, ungenerated, incorruptible, yet not only the properties of the uncreated lie expressed in its name. All other things become and pass away, [hence] the remarkable, deep sentence, “Where existent things have their coming-to-be, thereto must they also perish, ‘according to necessity, for they must pay retribution and penalty for their injustices, in accordance with the assessment of time.’”

We see an almost mythological representation here. All of Becoming is an emancipation from eternal Being; for this reason, [it is] an injustice consequently imposed with the penalty of perishing. We recognize the insight that all that becomes is not true. Water also becomes: he believes it to arise from contact between warmth and coldness. Thus it cannot be the principle, the ἄρχη. Warmth and coldness also evaporate and therefore must be two. He needs a background unity that can be described only negatively; the Unlimited, something that cannot be given any predicate from the actual world of Becoming and so something like the “thing-in-itself.” This was the incredible leap of Anaximander! His successors went more slowly. The individual who breaks off from the Unlimited must nonetheless return once again to the same, in accordance with the order of time (κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν). Time exists for these individual worlds [or monads, Individual-Welt] alone; the Unlimited itself is timeless. A view of the world worthy of serious consideration! All of Becoming and Passing Away expiates, must give τίσις (penalty) and retribution for injustice (δίκη τῆς ἀδικίας)! How can something that deserves to live pass away? Now we see all things passing away and consequently everything in injustice. We cannot attribute the predicates of perishable things, then, to that which is truthful: it is something other, to be described by us only negatively. Here we have stirred

13. Plutarch at Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica, bk. 1, ch. 8, sect. 1; Aristotle, On Meteorology, bk. 2, ch. 1.

14. [Since Nietzsche's Greek text differs in two ways from the received text, this translation is my own and incorporates his German translation in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks. Nietzsche reverses the order of τίσις (penalty) and δίκη (retribution) found in the received version; more important, he deletes the word ἀλλήλοις (to each other). His Greek text runs as follows: ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις ἐστὶ τῶν υἱῶν καὶ τὴν γορᾶν εἰς τῶν γενεσθαι, κατὰ τὸ χρῆσθαι. διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ τίσις καὶ δίκη τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν. Consequently this translation differs from well-known translations. This is a variant of Anaximander fragment 1 from Simplicius on Aristotle's Physics 6a, that is, Simplicius In phys. 24.17. For the original Greek text, as well as translations by Kirk, Raven, and Schofield and others, see the material on this section in the translator's commentary.]
up a gaggle of problems: How can individual worlds arise? What is the force that makes their development possible out of the One Unlimited? What is Becoming? What is time?

The influence of the first writing must have been incredible; the impetus to the doctrines of the Eleatics, along with those of Heraclitus, of Empedocles, and so forth, is given here. In this regard the question here was no longer purely physical; rather, the origin of the world as a sum of unexpiated injustices offers a look into the most profound ethical problems. Thales was infinitely outdone in this way: in the division of an eternal world of Being only negatively conceivable to us from an empirical world of Becoming and Passing Away lies a posing of questions of immeasurable importance. May the path that led to it now still be so harmless and naive!

Apparently the later Aristotelian philosophers did not at all grasp the seriousness of this question, since they argue over the proper auxiliaries [Ne-bending] for Anaximander, above all, what sort of matter the Unlimited has really been. It has been said to be something between air and water (for example, [by] Alexander Aphrodisiensis)\(^{15}\) or between air and fire. Aristotle probably gave the impetus in *On the Heavens*: “Some assume one [element] only, which is according to some water, to others air, to others fire, to others again something finer than water and denser than air, an infinite body—so they say—embracing all the heavens.”\(^{16}\) He does not say who these are, nor does he name those who assume something between air and fire.\(^{17}\) It is purely arbitrary, indeed, entirely false and contradictory to the essence of his Unlimited, to think of Anaximander here. However, the commentators have not understood Aristotle; he did not mean Anaximander, for he says all those who assume such a mediating thing consider all things to arise from thickening and thinning. Yet in the *Physics*,\(^{18}\) speaking specifically of Anaximander, Aristotle says that he did not consider things to arise from thinning and thickening. Just as mistaken is the argument, continued to this day, whether Anaximander had conceived the Unlimited as a mixture (μίγμα) of all actual material or as indefinite material. It is correct that something with no qualities known to us

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is intended; for this reason the one indefinable nature (μία φύσις ἀόριστος), is, as Theophrastus says, *indefinable* for us, yet not, of course, indefinable *in itself*. Thus [it is] not a material without definite properties, still less a mixed product of all definite properties of things, but rather a third thing, which is for us, of course, Unlimited. Well then! Aristotle is not completely correct in his pronouncement on this point. He says, “And this is the ‘One’ of Anaxagoras; for instead of ‘all things were together’—and the ‘Mixture’ of Empedocles and Anaximander. . . .” Yet this is the single passage that could mislead us; either it is a very imprecise expression that refers to an entirely distant similarity to the teachings of Empedocles, or we must suppose a lacuna that [the phrase] τὸ ἀπειροῦν occupies. By the way, a misunderstanding (through the teaching of Anaxagoras) strongly suggests itself. But a passage by Theophrastus says explicitly that Anaxagoras agrees with Anaximander in relation to primal matter only in the case when a substance without definite properties (μία φύσις ἀόριστος), instead of a mixture from definite and qualitatively different materials, is being presumed. With this expressed declaration I close the question as to the meaning of the Unlimited. The ancients and those more recent assume that it designates “the Infinite,” a material infinite relative to mass. We concede that the Indefinite (τὸ ἀόριστον) certainly also lies in concepts, but not in words, while among the Pythagoreans it was designated in words only as the Indefinite. The single reason for this interpretation is a short remark from the aphoristic book of Anaximander: “He tells for example why it is infinite, that the existing creation [of things] in no way fails.” Aristotle presupposes this sentence in *Physics*, book 3, chapter 8, where he polemicizes against the idea that primal matter must be infinite if it is said to be possible that continually more novel beings are produced from it. This conclusion is not correct, yet Aristotle credits it to Anaximander. He understood the Unlimited in this sentence, accordingly, as “infinite” and “infinitely large.” Out of the partitioning of his principle, however, follows only

19. καὶ τοῦτο εἶστι τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου ἐν καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους τὸ μίγμα καὶ Ἀναξιμίνδρου (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, bk. 12, ch. 2). [The entire passage runs: “And this is the ‘One’ of Anaxagoras; for instead of ‘all things were together’—and the ‘Mixture’ of Empedocles and Anaximander and the account given by Democritus—it is better to say ‘all things were together potentially but not actually.’” English-language translation is from Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. W. D. Ross, in *Basic Works*, ed. McKeon.]


21. λέγει οὖν διὰ τί ἀπειροῦν εἶστιν; ἕνα μηδὲν ἐλλεῖπη ἡ γένεσις ἢ ύψισταμένη (Stobaeus, *Eclogues*, bk. 1, 292). [The English translation here is from the standard text in Stobaeus and in Diels. My thanks to R. Scott Smith for help with this problem.]
that what is characteristic of his principle is precisely the Indefinite Nature (ἡ ἄδοριστος φύσις). Infinity is a viewpoint that lies far away: it would be odd if the principle were named not after what is characteristic but after something accidental.

Well now, this belief in the Unlimited as “infinite” refers precisely only to this sentence, which, first of all, does not interpret him logically and, second, can be interpreted in another way. The fundamental idea of Anaximander was indeed that all things that come to be pass away and thus cannot be a principle; all beings with definite properties are things that come to be, thus true Being must not have all these definite properties, [for] otherwise it would perish. So why must the primal Being be unlimited? Indefinable (ἀόριστον)? With this, Becoming does not cease. For every definite being, Becoming would inevitably come to an end, because all determinant things perish. The immortality of the primal Being lies not in its infinitude but rather herein, that it is bare of definite qualities leading to destruction. If primal Being were definite (ὀριστον), it would also be “coming-to-be” (γενόμενον), but in this way it would be condemned to perish. So that generation does not cease, the primal Being must be superior to it. With this we have brought unity into the explanation of Anaximander and are justified in this statement by the penalty τίσις and injustice. Of course, we must then accept that the Unlimited has not been understood previously. It is not the “Infinite” but instead the “Indefinite.”

Relative to the fundamental idea, the other physical doctrines are less important; here we see him standing on the shoulders of Thales. Out of the Unlimited come warmth and coldness; from them, water. From here on he is only a continuation of Thales, with whom he says “all things are made of water” (δῶρον φώμενον εἶναι τὸ πῶν). Three sorts out of the flux keep to themselves; the earth, the air, and the circle of fire that surrounds the whole like bark to a tree. The fiery circumference frequently shattered: the fire was enclosed by thickened air in wheel-shaped hulls; it flows out of the hubs of these wheels. Whenever these hulls stop themselves up, solar and lunar eclipses occur. The waning and waxing of the moon are connected with this. The fire is fed by evaporation of earth; through the warmth of the sun, the earth dries out. Anaximander described the stars as gods (the inhabitants of heaven). What is remarkable about his move, which repeatedly recurs from now onward, is that it is a rectification of folk belief by means of natural science rather than a freedom of spirit. That Anaximander considered the

world as infinite is impossible: that is a misunderstanding of the Unlimited. Otherwise, what could the ring of fire signify as the rind of the cosmic ball? Simplicius counts Anaximander among those who held the world to be bounded.23

A misunderstanding of his principle is connected with the question, What does it mean that he presumed “countless worlds”? Specifically, do they coexist or do they exist in succession? The countless worlds (ἄπειροι κόσμοι) stood fixed; “countless” worlds probably had a place in the “Infinite” once assumed. For example, Simplicius [says,] “Anaximander, by hypothesizing that the essential principle is limitless in size, seems from this to make the universes boundless in number.”24 Zeller states that the countless worlds existing alongside one another are the stars.25 I consider this explanation incorrect and in general consider the testimonies for a coexistence of the countless worlds as mistaken. Correct are those propositions that guarantee that the world is destroyed, that the sea gradually wanes and dries out and that the earth is gradually destroyed by fire. Hence this world perishes, yet Becoming does not cease; the next world coming to be must also perish. And so forth. Thus, countless worlds exist.

Anaximander thought of the origin of living beings in this way: the earth forms itself from a fluid condition, [and] the moisture dries through the effects of fire; the remainder, having become salty and bitter, runs together into the precipices of the sea. Its form is that of a wagon, one-third as high as it is wide. We are on the upper level. Out of the mud [originate] the animals, the land animals, too, along with human beings, originally in fish form, since the drying out of earth originates the later forms.

**Toward a General Evaluation.** His writing is important beyond its relation to Thales: acceptance of a metaphysically true Being, a world in opposition to Becoming and the transient physical world; the qualitatively undifferentiated as primal matter and, in contrast to it, all things qualitatively definite, individual, and particular as afflicted with injustice (ἄδικα); [and the] posing of the question concerning the value of human existence (the first pessimist philosopher). The consequences of these meditations: the future annihilation of the world, infinite worlds one after another. Otherwise he continues the physio-

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23. Simplicius, scholia in Aristotle 505a, 15. [I was unable to determine this reference.]
24. Ἀναξιμάνδρος μὲν ἄπειρον τῷ μεγέθει τὴν ἄρχην θέμενος, ἄπειροις εὗ αὐτοῦ τῷ πλήθει κόσμους ποιεῖν δοκεῖ (Simplicius, *In de caelo* 91.6.34. [See Simplicii in Aristotelis de Caelo Commentaria, ed. I. L. Heiberg, vol. 7 (Berlin, 1894), p. 202, sect. 34. Thanks to R. Scott Smith for this translation of the Greek.]
logical theory of Thales, that all things originate from water. That is not his genuine greatness but rather his knowledge that the primal origins of things may not be clarified out of any material at hand: he fled into the Indefinite (τὸ ἄπειρον). His successor? Anaximenes, by nature far more impoverished and unoriginal [than Anaximander] as a philosopher and metaphysician but far more significant as a student of nature.
Anaximenes

[Anaximenes was] likewise from Miletus, the son of Eurystratus; otherwise, we know nothing [of him]. The real problem is his chronology and his alleged study under Anaximander. The trustworthy Apollodorus says he was born during Olympiad 63 (529–525 B.C.E.) and died around the time of the conquest of Sardis—that is, the conquest by the Ionians under Darius, in Olympiad 70 (499 B.C.E.). Accordingly he would have died early, at approximately thirty years of age. Well then, no one believed this testimony, and [all] presumed its corruption. Given this testimony, specifically, he could not have been a student of Anaximander, who died shortly after the second year of Olympiad 58 (that is, 547 B.C.E.), thus around twenty years before the birth of Anaximenes. If this testimony has been properly handed down, Apollodorus denied his studies, rejecting the teacher-student succession (διαδοχή) of Anaximenes. Well, we must remain extremely suspicious of these ancient successions (διαδοχαί) in themselves; it would be entirely unmethodical to give preference to testimony making the student relationship possible. If the remark by Laertius stands entirely alone, however, we would be justified to assume a mistake in communication by Laertius. I pose the question: Is there any item that supports this chronology by Apollodorus? Yes: “According to some, he was also a pupil of Parmenides.” Well, Parmenides’ period of flourishing was Olympiad 69, according to Apollodorus. This claim—that is, that Parmenides taught the twenty-year-old Anaximenes—makes no sense relative to all other datings of Anaximenes and is commensurable only with his birth in Olympiad 63. We gather from this that this testimony by Laertius is not a corrupted reference. We shall further even discover who is the guaran-

1. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 2, sect. 3.
tor for this testimony. According to Laertius,\textsuperscript{3} Theophratus testifies in his *Epitome* (φωςκή ἱστορία) that Parmenides had [in turn] been a pupil of Anaximander.\textsuperscript{1} Well then, Anaximander flourishes in the second year of Olympiad 58, at sixty-four years of age. Eleven Olympiads (i.e., forty-four years) later comes the flourishing of Parmenides. If we assume Parmenides was twenty years old while in the audience of Anaximander, then he flourishes forty-four years later, thus at approximately sixty-four years old, in Olympiad 69. We should remark here that in any case, we must trust Theophratus also that the twenty-year-old Parmenides was taught by Anaximander.\textsuperscript{5}

Thus in the second year of Olympiad 58, Anaximander flourishes at sixty-four years of age. A twenty-year-old Parmenides hears him [lecture]. In Olympiad 69 Parmenides flourishes at sixty-four years of age. Anaximenes is taught by him at twenty years of age.

This chronology is so consistent that we must trust it to [be from] one source—Theophratus—the most ancient witness. This becomes important, because this most ancient witness rejected the Anaximander-Anaximenes teacher-student succession (διοδοχοί). All later datings, however, were made to clarify this [relationship]. The conquest of Sardis would be a fixed point in time; one looked around for a more ancient one, for the conquest by Cyrus in Olympiad 58; for example, Hippolytus’s *Refutations* reckoned the prime of his life in relation to it, as did the *Suidas*,\textsuperscript{6} (where γέγονε = ἤκμαζε and where υε’ should be written instead of νη’). Well then, to justify [attribution of] the succession, a previous conquest was harked back to, and the flourishing of Anaximenes was dated thereto. However, then the floruit dates of Anaximenes and Anaximander coincide, and consequently they are turned into contemporaries or friends.\textsuperscript{7} We naturally embrace Theophratus and Apollodorus and reject the teacher-student relationship [alleged by Diogenes Laertius]. Quite to the contrary, a vast panorama opens up around the student relationship of Parmenides to Anaximander! That Anaximenes heard Parmenides, is, however, not equally valid, and remains ineffectual to his ideas. Yet he is not—like Hippo, Idaeus, and Diogenes of Apollonia—from the lower classes, and he has attained such incredible stature only to create a bridge

\textsuperscript{3} Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, bk. 9, sect. 21.

\textsuperscript{4} *Suidas*: Παρμενίνις—ὡς ὅ Θεόφραστος, Ἄναξιμάνδρου τοῦ Μιλήσιου. This may not be found in Laertius, as Zeller thinks (I, 468). [This material is from the *Suidas* lexicon entry for Parmenides: “according to Theophrastus, Anaximander the Milesian” (my translation).]

\textsuperscript{5} *Suidas*: Ἀναξιμάνδρος καὶ Παρμενίνιου ἔφοσσαν. [This material is from the *Suidas* lexicon entry for Anaximenes: “they said Parmenides also” (my translation).]

\textsuperscript{6} Hippolytus, *Refutations* 1.7.

\textsuperscript{7} Simplicius, *In de caelo* 373b; Eusebius, *Praep. evang.* 10.14.7.
between Anaximander and Anaxagoras. Consequently Apollodorus also must have rejected that Anaxagoras was his student, for Anaximenes died at Olympiad 70, just when Anaxagoras was born. Well then, according to Apollodorus, Anaxagoras remains without successors of his own (connection to a previous one). Those who believe in the succession are required to reckon his flourishing at Olympiad 70, the year, according to Apollodorus, in which he was born. Thus, Anaximenes is backdated, Anaximander is backdated—all to favor the Ionian διαδοχή! At just this moment I will introduce a table of datings by Apollodorus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Olympiad</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35, 1</td>
<td>Thales is born.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Xenophanes is born.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42, 2</td>
<td>Anaximander is born.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Anaximenes (who thus, to be a pupil to Parmenides, must have been in Elea), is born.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Parmenides and Heraclitus flourish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Anaxagoras is born.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Democritus is born.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So Apollodorus had already leveled a sharp criticism against the successions (at least according to Erastosthenes), and we must entrust ourselves to him. The method of preferring the numbers with whose help the succession becomes possible is entirely incorrect. We separate Anaximenes from Anaximander, therefore, and believe that he belongs with Parmenides. Well, Parmenides, in essence, thought deeper through the ideas of Anaximander in

8. Antisthenes—who regards Diogenes [of Apollonia] as the pupil of Anaximenes and [says] “his period was that of Anaxagoras” (ἡν δὲ ἐν τοῖς χρόνοις κατὰ Ἀναξιγέρων)—also belongs to this postdating (9.52). This Diogenes [of Apollonia] has also received a false stature and has been mistaken for Diogenes Smyrnaeus. Dioctes had found “Democritus, Diogenes, Anaxarchos” and so made an empty list. The division between Ionian and Italian philosophy from Dioctes himself? [This very confusing footnote may be explained as follows. Antisthenes the chronicler considered Diogenes of Apollonia to have been a student of Anaximenes and to have lived during the same period as Anaxagoras. Coming across the name “Diogenes” in Antisthenes’ list of successions, Dioctes mistook it to refer to Diogenes of Smyrna, the Democritean philosopher. These two thus become inverted in historical order. To complicate matters further, a third Diogenes, Diogenes Laertius, accepted the mistake made by Dioctes and reports in Lives of the Eminent Philosophers that Diogenes of Apollonia, according to Antisthenes, was a student of Anaximenes and lived in the time of Anaxagoras. Nietzsche implies that Laertius preserved the mistake for the sake of backdating, hence supporting his own theory of succession. Simplicius also apparently suffered the same confusion as Dioctes. A final complication: Nietzsche gives an incorrect citation for Lives; the relevant passage is at book 9, chapter 57, not chapter 52. Nietzsche also adds an inconsequential év to the Greek text. See Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, Presocratic Philosophers, and Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3d ed., ed. Simon Hornblower and Anthony Spawforth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), s.v. “Diogenes.”]
half of his philosophy—as shall later be demonstrated; he sought in the second half of his thinking to show what view of the world results from the standpoint of ordinary awareness. And here he proceeds from the dualism of hot and cold posited by Anaximander, who also designates thin and thick, light and darkness, and earth and fire as opposites. Anaximenes adds to this completely mythical presentation of imagery—accepted certainly for the first time—that all things have arisen due to the thinning and thickening of an original material. Simplicius: “For in the case of him [Anaximenes] alone did Theophrastus in the History speak of rarefaction and condensation, but it is plain that the others, also, used rarity and density.”

Also in this connection thinning and thickening. To him, heating up is the same as thinning down; cooling off, the same as thickening. Air turns into fire through thinning and into wind through thickening; [it] further [turns] into clouds, then into water, then into earth, and finally into stone. The significance of this principle of thinning (άρσινιος) and thickening (πόκνωσις) lies in its advancement toward an explanation of the world from mechanical principles—the raw material of materialistic atomistic systems. That, however, is a much later stage that already assumes Heraclitus and Parmenides: [atomism] immediately after Anaximander would be a miraculous leap! What we have here [in Anaximenes] is the first theory answering the question, How can there be development out of one primal material? With this he ushers in the epochs of Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Democritus—in other words, the later movement of the natural sciences. In the later period this problematic how is still not brought up at all. Anaximenes is a significant student of nature who, as it appears, rejected the metaphysics of Parmenides and rather sought to consolidate his other theories scientifically.

Yet it is entirely incorrect to place him without further qualification in the series Thales and water, Anaximander and the Unlimited, Anaximenes and air, Heraclitus and fire, for his feat is not to suggest something as the primal material but rather [to formulate] his ideas about the development of the primal matter. He belongs, in this way, to a later period. We may not speak of him before we get to Anaxagoras, until after Heraclitus and the Eleatics. We have, specifically, seven independent paradigms [Rubriken], in other words, seven appearances of independent original philosophers: (1) Anaximander, (2) Heraclitus, (3) the Eleatics, (4) Pythagoras, (5) Anaxagoras, (6) Empedo-

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9. ἐπὶ γὰρ τούτου μόνου (Ἀναξιμένους) Θεοφράστος ἐν τῇ ἱστορίᾳ τὴν μάνοις εὑρήκει καὶ τὴν πόκνωσιν Simplicius, Physics 32a. [English-language translation is from Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, Presocratic Philosophers. They cite Physics 149.32.]
cles, and (7) the atomists (Democritus). The coupling of these by means of successions is arbitrary or entirely incorrect. There are seven totally different ways of considering the world: where they coincide, where they learn from one another, usually lies the weaknesses in the nature of each. Anaximenes is a forerunner of the last three paradigms: he died young and cannot be properly compared to these seven. His relationship to them is similar to that of Leucippus to Democritus, Xenophanes to Parmenides, or Thales to Anaximander.
Immediately following Anaximander comes the place of Heraclitus. He would be entirely falsely characterized if we, like [Max] Heinze,¹ were to find the decisive advance of Heraclitus in an acceptance of a qualitative transformation of fire, in contrast to those who explain the manifold nature of appearances by way of association and separation, thickening and thinning, for these theories of thinning and thickening (ἀρωίωςις and πόκνοςις) are later and newer than [those of] Heraclitus. Precisely here we observe an advance of natural scientific thinking, as opposed to Heraclitus. We must on the contrary compare Heraclitus with Anaximander to specify his advance. The Unlimited and the world of Becoming were compared in incomprehensible ways, as a sort of absolute dualism. Heraclitus rejected the world of Being altogether and maintained only the world of Becoming: Parmenides does the reverse to resolve Anaximander’s problem satisfactorily. Both seek to destroy this dualism; consequently, Parmenides struggles most vigorously against Heraclitus as well. Both Heraclitus and the Eleatics are necessary conditions for Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Democritus: we observe among them in general a knowledge and supposition of Anaximander. In this sense we may speak of a development [between these paradigms].

In contrast, Pythagoras remains entirely solitary. That which we call the Pythagorean philosophy is something much later, hardly earlier than the second half of the fifth century. He bears no relation to the later philosophy, because he was not a philosopher at all but something different. Strictly speaking, we might even exclude him from a history of philosophy, yet he produced the image on a type of philosophical life; for this, the Greeks thanked him. This image exerted a powerful influence on the philosophers Parmenid-

¹. Lehre vom Logos, 3. [This refers to Max Heinze’s Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie (Oldenburg, 1872). This reference proves the manuscript could not predate 1872.]
des and Empedocles but not on philosophy itself. For this reason we shall speak of him here.\(^2\)

First of all, the chronology for Pythagoras. Concerning this task, we must discover the real dates of the philosopher, according to [philologist Erwin] Rohde, and avoid the major mistake of combining dates handed down; even Bentley does not do so.\(^3\) There are two incommensurable series of chronological combinations. The Alexandrian scholars proceeded from two incommensurable dates, from which anyone might choose, but which no one combined.

1. It was inscribed in an Olympian register (ἀνιγραφή) that during the first year of Olympiad 48 (588 B.C.E.), Pythagoras of Samos, clad in a purple robe and flowing hair, was not allowed to compete with the men in arm wrestling and so competed with the youth and won. Eratosthenes considers this Pythagoras to be identical to the philosopher. He would not have competed with the youths, or even have been considered for competition with the men, unless he stood right on the line between youth and manhood. Bentley infers from this that he was eighteen years old at that time and so born around 606 B.C.E.

2. [Pythagoras] flourished during Olympiad 62, according to numerous testimonies, indicating a high point of his life, specifically, his excursion from Samos to Croton. This is based on reports by Aristoxenus that Pythagoras was forty years old when he left Samos to avoid the tyranny of Polycrates. This tyranny began in the first year of Olympiad 62, and so he is taken to emigrate precisely in the earliest year possible in order not to have to move his year of death too far back. (Darker motives: postdating him as far back as possible in order to make him as old as possible.) He reached an advanced age. Aristoxenus calls him elder (περιπάτης). Apollodorus makes this calculation. He didn’t care to join in the approach of Eratosthenes: according to Eratosthenes, Pythagoras would in fact have been seventy-five years old in 532, far too old for the starting point of his vital activity. Apollodorus often directly rejects the identification with the arm wrestler. Also, the year of death was not handed down to us: we must choose a life span and proceed from a year of birth. Well then, testimonies range from 75, 80, 90, 99, nearly 100, and 104 to

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2. The best discussions are in Zeller (vol. 1, 235, 3d ed.), Grote (vol. 2, 626), and Erwin Rohde on the origins of the iambic in his biography of Pythagoras (Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 26 and 27). [Reference is made here to English classicist George Grote (1794–1871), who wrote a three-volume study of Plato in 1865.]

117 years of age. They are often naive calculations; for example, Heraclides Lembus attributes eighty years to Pythagoras because that is the normal life span of a human being. Apollodorus had every reason to attribute to him as short a life as possible. The estimate of seventy-five years probably is traced back to him; that would mean [that Pythagoras died in] the fourth year of Olympiad 70 (497 B.C.E.). Eratosthenes had wider latitude: we assume that he followed the usual opinion of 99 years and so set his death in the year 507 B.C.E.

This simple presentation of the facts has previously gone unrecognized because it was presumed that the expulsion of the Pythagoreans had taken place soon after the destruction of Sybaris (in 510 B.C.E.) and that the death of Pythagoras followed soon thereafter. Well then! It is not correct, as Zeller claims, that all sources of reports, without exception, placed the destruction of Sybaris directly before the death of Pythagoras. Rohde has proved that the combination of Cylonian unrest and the destruction of Sybaris is a pure invention of Apollonius of Tyana.

We shall array ourselves on the side of Apollodorus because he follows the most cautious witness concerning all things Pythagorean, Aristoxenus: therefore, his [Pythagoras's] acme [would be] Olympiad 62. If he [Apollodorus] deviated from the great Eratosthenes only one time, it certainly happened for the most convincing reasons: he could prove that the arm wrestler had been called “the son of Crates” (ο Κράτεω) in an old epigram. The father of the philosopher, a rich businessman, was named Mnesarchus (Μνήσαρχος). [Pythagoras] was born on Samos. After extensive travels he returned to Samos at the age of forty to find the island under the tyranny of Polycrates. He decided to leave his homeland for Croton, renowned for the physical prowess of its citizens and the excellence of its physicians. (These were interconnected; the theory and practice of the physicians were considered further advancement for gymnastic trainers.) There he wins enormous political influence as the founder of an isolated order strongly bound together by laws of ritual: several rich Crotonians were among its members. The network of the order spread out in other places, for example, Metapontum. We detect in him the religious reformer; it is absolutely certain that he shared the doctrine of

the transmigration of the soul and certain religious observances with the Orphics, [although] Aristotle and Aristoxenus know of no physical and ethical doctrines. He seeks spirituality in the more profound significance of the long-worshiped chthonic gods. He teaches to conceive earthly existence as punishment for a prior transgression. According to one account, a human being is reborn eternally in ever-new bodies. Piety, practiced in secret ceremonies, to which his entire life complies by holy customs, is able to extract one from the circle of eternal Becoming. The virtuous are born (as with Empedocles) as soothsayers, poets, physicians and princes: complete liberation is the perfect fruit of philosophy (φιλοσοφίας ὁ τελειωτότατος καρπός). Well then, aside from the theological ideas of the Orphics and their laws of ritual, the Pythagorean way of life must have contained, according to Rohde, a core of scientific curiosity. We would do well to note the complaint by Heraclitus, who could meet neither a real philosopher nor a pure Orphic but only thinkers divided between Orphic mysticism and scientific studies. According to Laertius,

Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, practised inquiry beyond all other men, and in this selection of his writings made himself a wisdom of his own, showing much learning but poor workmanship. [Πυθαγόρης Μνησάρχου ιστορίαν ἔσκισεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων, καὶ ἐκλέξαμενος, ταύτας τὰς συγγραφές ἐποιήσατο ἕκαστον σοφίαν (ironic, perhaps ἐν γὰρ τὸ σοφὸν), πολυμαθίαν (polymath knowledge and deception) κακοτεχνίτην (not σοφία but rather τέχνη, deceptive practice).]

Much learning does not teach understanding; else would it have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, or, again, Xenophanes and Hecataeus.

The words “selection of his writings” (ἐκλέξαμενος, ταύτας τὰς συγγραφές) must refer to writings that were named shortly before: I am thinking if Phercydes or the Orphic writings (but not in the same way as Zeller); history (ἱστορία) is research by way of inquiries, which is condemned by Heraclitus, and he certainly foremost means travel. Since a Polymathy (πολυμαθία) cannot be found in the Orphic texts, Egyptian authorship is probably meant

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7. [At this unlikely place in the Bornmann and Carpitella manuscript the comment “Vorsichtiger!” (Greater caution) appears. It does not appear in the Musarion edition. If it is a comment by Bornmann and Carpitella, it should appear in square brackets, but it does not.]
9. Πολυμαθία νόν ἔχειν οὐ δυσάκει. Ἡσιόδον γὰρ ἦν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, σοθίς τε Ἐναφανέα τε καὶ Ἐκταῖον ([Heraclitus,] fragment 129, 40d) ([see] Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 8, sect. 6, bk. 9, sects. 1, 2).
instead. Hecataeus of Miletus is a great traveler, along with Xenophanes; perhaps Heraclitus even wanted to say that Pythagoras got his wisdom from Hesiod, Xenophanes, and Hecataeus and not by means of travel. That is valid in foreign customs that the *Circuit of the Earth* (γῆς περίοδος) contained.\(^{10}\) Herodotus makes similar remarks.\(^{11}\) The Egyptian priests wear linen britches under their woolen outer clothing: in the latter they may neither enter the temple nor be buried. They are in agreement with the so-called Orphics and Bacchics—who are in truth, however, Egyptians—and with the Pythagoreans. The Egyptians taught immortality and transmigration of the soul for the first time. “This theory has been adopted by certain Greek writers, some earlier, some later, who have put it forward as their own. Their names are known to me, but I refrain from mentioning them.”\(^{12}\) The *Polymathy* consisted of a collection of exotic customs (for example, the laws of ritual called *Acousmata*, or *Symbola*) and that, likewise, was on dark arts (κακοτεχνίη). I would recommend placing these propositions one after another.

In this manner the most ancient witness would verify first of all the travels and second [the claim] that no scientific curiosity is known in Pythagoras. He [Herodotus] considers him [Pythagoras] unoriginal, indeed even deceptive, in his *Histories* (ιστορίη), which refers only to customs, not to science. A mathematician would at least have received a reputation as [having] polymath knowledge (πολυμορφίη). “That which is authentic in Pythagoras, his alleged wisdom (σοφίη), is only deceptive, superstitious procedures (πολυμαφίη)!” That is the thought of Heraclitus, [in which he is] similar to Herodotus, only he even names the bridges—specifically books, not travels. Here we may also think of Hesiod, of the superstitious customs in *Works and Days* with which the Pythagoreans agree, then [of him] as the author of soothsayings (μαντικὰ ἔπη), and so forth. What naturally comes into consideration here, then, is not Xenophanes as a philosopher but rather his struggle [*Kampf*] against polytheism, against the luxury of his contemporaries, and so on. (*These three positions are united.*)

Hence, Heraclitus, too, is thinking only of the religious reformer; [Pythagorean] scientific philosophical development comes at a much later stage. To be precise, Heraclitus rejects the scientific principle, along with the doctrine

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11. [Ibid.,] 2.81.

12. τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶ οἱ Ἔλληνων ἐχρήσαντο, οἱ μὲν πρότερον, οἱ δὲ ὑστερον, ὡς ἰδίω ἐκτὸς ἐδντι· τῶν ἐγώ εἰδὼς τὰ ὀνόματα οὐ γράφω *Histories* 2.123).
of numbers, as found in the one wisdom (ἐν τῷ σοφόν) of Pythagoras. With the appearance of Empedocles, above all, we still have a noteworthy witness; he shall bring the silenced secrets of the school into the light. Empedocles, however, has no idea about the theory of numbers; the secret was the teachings of the transmigration of the soul and the religious practices. All of the more ancient legends also refer to his memories of prior existences, to his interactions with fabulous beings such as Abaris and Zalmoxis, to his miraculous powers (taming of animals), and so on. Such is the most ancient form of the legends of Pythagoras.

Well then, in time (not earlier than the second half of the fifth century) a scientific direction developed within the school: Rohde has advanced the important idea that at the same time a division entered the school. Some, by their scientific researches, neglected the religious foundations; the others held fast to the Pythagorean way of life (Πυθαγορικὸς τρόπος τοῦ βίου). Only in this fashion may we explain the striking fact that, according to Aristotle, the physical doctrines of the Pythagoreans (Πυθαγόρειοι), and their ethical ones, according to Aristoxenus, bear no relationship to the religious beliefs of the Pythagoreans. Only [the existence of] two entirely distinct parties explains the precipitous contradiction of our witnesses, for example, in reference to ascetic vegetarianism. Aristoxenus claims it; Eudoxus and Onesicritus deny it. Aristoxenus followed the testimony of Pythagorean friends and attributed their praxis to Pythagoras himself. At the same time one party must have allowed themselves wine, meat, and beans, about which the poets of the middle comedies poked fun. The tales of a separation of the exoteric from the esoteric connects to this as well: [Erwin Rohde’s theory of] the division of the scientifically educated and those that satisfy themselves with short proverbs entirely worthless to the later period of Pythagoreanism.

This tale originated in order to explain a really latter-day distinction and to preserve for each party its claim to Pythagoras. The scientific orientation presented its teachings as the ancient secrets of the school, which Philolaus violated for the first time: to explain the simultaneity of these two orientations, however, we must allow the claim that Pythagoras himself had already instructed two classes with entirely different subject matters. This old tale about Philolaus demonstrates that the teachings and writings of Philolaus are the beginnings of the philosophy of number; he, however, is the somewhat older contemporary of Socrates. Well then! The wisdom of the students of acoustics was considered only as a preliminary stage toward the wisdom of the mathematician. No one has ever ventured to ascribe the entire late Pythag-
orean philosophy to Pythagoras himself: consequently, we too will not do that, not even in Zeller's nearly colorless [abgeblassten] form.

Yet it is important that among the hands of the scientific faction the image of the master altered and became more pragmatic; now we are confronted with the characteristics of a political reformer: the secretive practitioner of miracles obviously does not properly translate into the image of a figure of political enlightenment. The other party, increasingly separated from philosophy, sinks ever more into superstition, and here Pythagoras becomes the "grandmaster of superstition," as Rohde says, who then, because of his "great prestige," is said to have studied with Egyptians, Chaldeans, Persians, Jews, Thracians, and Galileans.

Thus, before the Alexandrian scholars (Eratosthenes, Neanthes, Satyrus, and Hippobotus) lay a threefold tradition: (1) old legends; (2) rational histories; and (3) late superstitions, to which they did nothing novel but simply combined them (with the exception of Hermippus, who produced from them a hostile satire on Pythagoras). Diogenes Laertius gives us a picture of Pythagorean knowledge during the Alexandrian period without any neo-Pythagorean extras. Gradually, however, when the teachings were revitalized, the Alexandrian's mosaic no longer sufficed. Apollonius of Tyana undertook a self-consciously arbitrary, complete description of the lifestyle, with many of his own inventions. Nicomachus of Geraea, who proceeds without intentional falsification, uses Aristoxenus nobly, along with Neanthes. His contemporary Diogenes Antonius created from murky sources but also added nothing of his own: just as little as does Porphyry. In the Life of Pythagoras, (βίος Πυθαγόρευτος) by Iamblichus, the author produces a work of errors alone: in all essentials he uses the writings of Apollonius and Nicomachus; he uses Nicomachus (from older traditions) as a foundation and adds to this only several colorful sections from the novel by Apollonius. By way of Nicomachus we receive important remains of the writings of Pseudo-Aristotle, Neanthes, and Hippobotus. We may believe nothing at all from Apollonius.

Well then! Truthfully, what do we know about Pythagoras's life following these three sources—legends, rational histories, and later superstitions? Next to nothing. We should use only the most general outlines and the sparse remarks of contemporaries. What appears as history is especially dangerous. So Aristoxenus is indeed the most believable of all concerning the later Pythagoreans, yet Rohde considers his biographical notes to be the most questionable of all. In and of itself this chronology by Aristoxenus, which follows Apollodorus, is also dubious (because of Polycrates and the forty
years). Yet it must be approximately the correct time, especially if my explanation of Heraclitus’s placing is correct, since he must be able to use Xenophanes and Hecataeus. On the other side, Xenophanes,13 who derides his belief in immortality, knows of him. He is certainly a younger contemporary of Xenophanes, therefore, who was born in the fortieth Olympiad, according to Apollodorus. We place the acme [άκμη, the prime of one’s life, or one’s flourishing] of Hecataeus in Olympiad 65: accordingly the flourishings of Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Pythagoras approximately coincide. The Olympiad prior to Olympiad 69 was the acme of Heraclitus and Parmenides; he [Pythagoras] would be some sixty-eight years old, according to Apollodorus, which is indeed the approximate acme of a philosopher. Well then! Xenophanes, several witnesses testify, certainly reached ninety-two years of age; meaning he died (soon) after Olympiad 63.

In any case Pythagoras must have been a person famous for his doctrines already by Olympiad 62 at the latest. Thus we receive Olympiad 62–69 as the time of his acme and so agree with Apollodorus and Aristoenus. In this connection Aristoenus appears to have been careful and reserved, as Rohde too recognizes in his reports concerning the death of Pythagoras. Aristoenus narrates [it] in this way: Cylon of Croton, a violent nobleman whom Pythagoras had refused to accept among his friends, became an embittered enemy of Pythagoras and his followers from then onward. For this reason Pythagoras went to Metapontum, where he is said to have died. The Cylonians, however, continued their animosity toward the Pythagoreans: in the meantime the cities good-naturedly turned over control of the state, as before, to the Pythagoreans. But in the end the Cylonians set the House of Milon in Croton ablaze and cast the Pythagoreans, as they assembled in council there, into the flames; only Archippus and Lysis, as the most powerful, escaped. Well then! The Pythagoreans left these cities so ungrateful for their concern. Archippus went to Tar[t][um], and Lysis went to Achaia and then to Thebes, where he became the teacher of Epaminondas and died. The remaining Pythagoreans assembled in Rhegium; with continuous deterioration of the political circumstances, they left Italy entirely, except for Archytas of Tar[t][um], and went to Greece, where they practiced their old customs until the collapse of the entire school. Approximately 440 Pythagoreans withdrew to Rhegium; some 410 remaining Italian philosophers went to Greece.14 According to Apollodorus

and Aristroxenus, the last Pythagoreans (pupils of Philolaus and Eurytus) lived in the first year of Olympiad 103 (around 366 B.C.E.). The ascetic Pythagoreans, Diodorus of Aspendus at their pinnacle, survive this date by a wide margin.

This report from Aristroxenus concerning the Cylonian attack is the most cautious: there are countless variations, increasingly more nonsensical, due, above all, to mixing in Pythagoras himself.\textsuperscript{15}

[Heraclitus was] from Ephesus, the son of Bloson (or Heracon): the latter is perhaps an epithet of Heraclitus himself, like Simon to Simonides, Callias to Calliades, and so on. He belonged to the most noble of all races, that of Codriden Androclus, the founder of Ephesus, in which the worth of a martyred king found new heirs. He was a merciless opponent of democratic parties; among this herd moved those rebellious to the Persians. Heraclitus, like his friend Hermodorus (similar to the statesman Hecataeus), had probably counseled against reckless measures against the Persians, and both were decried as friends of the Persians, until Hermodorus was ostracized; Heraclitus left the city voluntarily, giving up his archonship in favor of a brother. He subsequently resided in the seclusion of the Temple of Artemis. Heraclitus refers to this turn of events with the proposition: "The Ephesians would do well to end their lives, every grown man of them, and leave the city to beardless boys, for that they have driven out Hermodorus, the worthiest man among them, saying, 'We will have none who is worthiest among us; or if there be any such, let him go elsewhere and consort with others.'" Now Darius appears to have directed an invitation to Heraclitus, having had a falling out with his father city, in order to achieve for himself a political accommodation; he declined the invitation, along with another one from Athens. The increasingly more powerful leader from Isogoras, funded by conservative parties, could hope for greater power with the like-minded Ionian.

2. δέξον Ἐφεσίοις ἢβηδόν ἀπέγκεισθαι πάσι καὶ τοῖς ὀνήβοις τὴν πόλιν καταλιπεῖν οὕτως Ἐρμοδώρον ἄνδρα ἑωτωτον ὄνηστοι ἐξέβαλον φάντας ἡμέων μηδὲ εἰς ὀνήστος ἔστω, εἶ δὲ τις τοιοῦτος ἀλλην τε καὶ μετ' ἀλλων (Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, bk. 9, sect. 2 ([Heraclitus,] fragment 121d). [Immediately following the Greek, Nietzsche gives the verbatim German translation.]
Determination of dates appears to hinge on this request from Darius; consider the Suidas: “During Olympiad 69, in the time of Darius, son of Hystaspes.” Diogenes Laertius places his acme in this Olympiad. Most important, according to Eudemus, “Heraclitus, Blyson’s son, persuaded the dictator Melancomas to abdicate. He scorned an invitation from King Darius to come to Persia.” The Olympiad number is just lost; certainly it would have specified the acme as after this event (Olympiad 69). Melancomas is the same person who appears, in the abbreviated form Comas, in the biography of Hipponax, the Ephesian poet ostracized by him; in any case, he was a tyrant hostile to the nobility. Accordingly, the flourishing period of Heraclitus would be approximately contemporaneous with the outbreak of the Ionian revolution: perhaps the uprising against the Persians connects just as much to the end of the tyrant Melancomas as to the banning of Hermodorus. There exists still another political remark by [Diogenes] Laertius in which the Ephesian was invited to a passage of law; he declined because the state was already too deeply rooted in a faulty constitution. The seventh and ninth pseudo-epigraphic letters introduce the banning of Hermodorus as a consequence of his legislative activity: the eighth proceeds from the dismissal of Hermodorus’s laws by the Ephesians. Hermodorus later lived in Italy and gave his service to legislation of the Twelve Tablets: a statue of him was erected at the Comitium. The idea that guilty Ephesians should turn over their city to their innocent children was taken up by Plato as the fundamental notion of a reform; similarly [there is] the Heraclitean anecdote in which Heraclitus, after having retreated into the solitude of the sanctuary of the Temple of Artemis, played knuckle bones with children, and when the Ephesians stood around him in wonder, he called to them: “Why, you rascals, are you astonished? Is it not better to do this than to take part in your civil life?”

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4. ἤν ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνάτης καὶ ἐξηκοστῆς ὀλυμπιάδος ἐπὶ Δαρείου τοῦ Ὑστάσπου. [Except for two cases with an entry title, Nietzsche’s quotations from Suidas have no citations. The quotation here has none. The Suda entry is Ἡράκλειτος. Nietzsche borrowed Thomas Gaisford’s edition of Suidas (1834–37) from the Basel University Library only once. The translation is mine.]


7. [Diogenes Laertius,] Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 9, sect. 2.


What we have seen from his political behavior shows us every characteristic of his life: the highest form of pride, from a certainty of belief in the truth as grasped by himself alone. He brings this form, by its excessive development, into a sublime pathos by involuntary identification of himself with his truth. Concerning such human beings, it is important to understand that we are hardly able even to imagine them; in itself, all striving after knowledge of his essence is unsatisfactory, and for this reason his regal air of certainty [Überzeugheit] and magnificence is something nearly unbelievable. We observe the entirely different form of a superhuman [übermenschlich] self-glorification with Pythagoras and Heraclitus: the former certainly considered himself an incarnation of Apollo and acted with religious dignity, as Empedocles records. The self-glorification of Heraclitus contains nothing religious; he sees outside himself only error, illusion, an absence of knowledge—but no bridge leads him to his fellow man, no overpowering [übermächtig] feeling of sympathetic stirring binds them to him. We can only with difficulty imagine the feelings of loneliness that tore through him: perhaps his style makes this most obvious, since he himself [uses language that] resembles the oracular proverbs and the language of the Sibyls.

The lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but gives signs.

The Sibyl with raving mouth utters solemn, unadorned, unlovely words, but she reaches out over a thousand years with her voice because of the god within her.¹⁰

Being a Greek, he dispenses with lightness and artificial decoration, foremost out of disgust at humanity and out of the defiant feeling of his eternity: yet he then speaks in entrancement, like the Pythia and the Sibyls, but truthfully. That is, it is pride not in logical knowledge but rather in the intuitive grasping of the truth: we must recognize the enthusiastic and inspirational in his nature. We must conceive of such a grand, solitary, and inspired human being as placed in an isolated sanctum: he simply cannot live among his fellow man—at best he could still interact with children. He did not require humans or their sort of knowledge, since everything into which one may inquire he despises as

¹⁰ ὅναξ οὖ τὸ μαντεῖον ἔστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύστει, ἄλλα σμαινεῖ (Plutarch, The Oracles at Delphi No Longer Given in Verse 18.404d); Σίβυλλα δὲ μαντομένη στόματι καθ' Ἡράκλειτον ἀγέλαστα καὶ ἀκαλλάπιστα καὶ ἀμύριστα φθειομένη χιλίων ἐτῶν ἐξίκνετι τῇ φωνῇ διὰ τὸν θεὸν (Plutarch, The Oracles at Delphi No Longer Given in Verse 6.397a). ([Heraclitus,] fragments 93, 92d). [English-language translations are from Philip Wheelwright, The Presocratics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), 70, 75.]
PRE-PLATONIC PHILOSOPHERS

history, in contrast to inward-turning wisdom (σοφία). All learning from others was a sign of nonwisdom, because the wise man focuses his vision on the one intelligence [Logos, λόγος] in all things. He characterizes his own philosophizing as a self-seeking and -investigating (as one investigates an oracle): “He declared that he ‘inquired of himself,’ and learned everything from himself.”

It [the exact fragment] ran, “I have searched myself.” This was the proudest interpretation of the Delphic proverb: “And of the sentences that were written in Apollo’s temple at Delphi, the most excellent and most divine seems to have been this, Know thyself.”

Well, how did he [Heraclitus] view the religious excitement of his times? We have already discovered that he found an only borrowed knowledge in Parmenides, that he denied his wisdom and characterized it as deception. He was likewise unsympathetic to the ceremonies of the Mysteries: we know in addition that the Ephesian royal lineage celebrated as a familial cult “the superintendence of the sacrifices in honor of the Eleusian Demeter.” He prophesied that something they did not expect awaited all “night-roamers, magicians, Bacchants, Lenaean revellers and devotees of the Mysteries” after death. “For if it were not to Dionysus that they held their solemn procession and sang the phallic hymn, they would be acting most shamefully and Hades is the same as Dionysus, in whose honor they go mad and keep the Lenaean feast.” In Dionysian excitement he saw only an invitation to ill-bred drives by way of hot-blooded festivals of desire. He turns against the existing ceremony of expiation: “When defiled they purify themselves with blood, as though one who had stepped into filth were to wash himself with filth.”

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11. έκοπτών ἐφη διξήσασθαι καὶ μαθεῖν πάντα παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ. [Nietzsche incorrectly cites Diogenes Laertius, bk. 4, sect. 5, whereas the quotation comes from bk. 9, sect. 5.]

12. ἐξιηθησάμην ἐμεωτόν. [Heraclitus, fragment 101d. Nietzsche incorrectly cites Diogenes Laertius, bk. 4, sect. 5, whereas the quotation comes from bk. 9, sect. 5.]


16. εἰ μὴ θεὸς Διόνυσος ποιητὴν ἐποιεότατο καὶ ὠμένον ἄμμα αἰδοίωσιν, ἀναιδεστάτα ἄν εἰρηστό—οὕτως δὲ Ἀἰδής καὶ Δίονυσος ἢπερ μαίνονται καὶ ληπαλίζουσι (Clement of Alexandria, Exhortation to the Greeks, ch. 2, sect. 30 [Heraclitus,] fragment 15d).
argument that the outward sacrifice of purification should only be a symbol of inner emotional purity, he replies that we would be lucky to find such a purification done by one single human being. He compares this with animals that wash themselves with dirt, mud, and ashes. He attacks worship of images: “They pray to images, much as if they were to talk to houses; for they do not know what gods and heroes are.” Yet he reserves a special hatred for the creators of popular mythology, Homer and Hesiod. “Homer deserved to be chased out of the lists and beaten with rods, and Archilochus likewise.” That probably refers to expressions such as “divinity, according to its preferences, hangs happiness and misery over mankind,” which contradicts eternal necessity: [Ferdinand] Lasalle relates this to *Odyssey* 18.135 and Archilochus’s fragment 72.

Since Hesiod, the knower of much, had allowed Night to give birth to Day not as a mere separation from herself but rather as an absolutely opposite divinity, Heraclitus mocked him [on the grounds] that the teacher of most men, presumed in possession of the greatest knowledge, had never known day and night, for they are unthinkable separated except as opposite sides of one and the same relationship. Then he [Heraclitus] must have censured him [Hesiod] because of his calendrics: “Every day is like every other”—the equality of days as opposed to the counting of days. Over all things, we perceive *wahrnehmen* the highest starlight; in comparison to that which we take to be true *wahrnehmen*, all other things are considered to be lies or deception: he treats poets not as poets but rather as teachers of falsehood. His hatred always finds the sharpest possible word: he finds the religious sensitivities of the masses absolutely unapproachable; he curses their purification, their honoring of the gods, their cult of the Mysteries. He views the

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18. καὶ ἁγιάζωσιν τουτέστι εὐχόνται, ὁκὼν εἰ τις δύομι λεπτόντι, οὕτω γυνώσκοντες θεοίς οὕτως ἡρωας οὕτινες εἰσι (Clement of Alexandria, *Exhortation to the Greeks*, ch. 4, sect. 33b. [Heraclitus, fragment 5d.])
Dionysians, still a relatively new cult that must have been extremely powerful at that time, with hostility and misunderstanding.

He involuntarily created the new image of the wise (σοφός), which was entirely different from that of Pythagoras: later, blended with the Socratic ideal, it is used as the ideal image of the Stoic godlike wise man. We must designate these three as the purest paradigms: Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Socrates—the wise man as religious reformer; the wise man as proud, solitary searcher after truth; and the wise man as the eternal investigator of all things. All other philosophers are, as representatives of a way of life (βίος), less pure and original. These three types discovered three incredible unified ideas by which they developed away from the norm: Pythagoras by belief in the identity of the countless races of humanity, indeed moreso by the identification of all souls with all time; Socrates by his belief in the unity and binding power of thought, eternally the same for all time and in all places; and finally Heraclitus [by his belief in] the oneness and eternal lawfulness of nature’s processes. These prototypes are distinguished in their complete emersion in these unifying notions; it rendered them blind and exclusive to all other strivings and insights.

Heraclitus, who found himself in solitude and who recognized the unified lawfulness of the world, was accordingly exclusive to all other human beings: their folly lies in this, that they live in the middle of lawfulness and yet do not notice—indeed, that they know nothing at all thereof, even when it is remarked on. Thus the famous opening of his work:

> Although this Logos is eternally valid, yet men are unable to understand it—not only before hearing it, but even after they have heard it for the first time. That is to say, although all things come to pass in accordance with this Logos, men seem to be quite without any experience of it—at least if they are judged in the light of such words and deeds as I am here setting forth. My own method is to distinguish each thing according to its nature, and to specify how it behaves; other men, on the contrary, are as neglectful of what they do when awake as they are when asleep. [Heraclitus, fragment 1d. English-language translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics.]
He says of them, “Fools, although they hear, are like the deaf: to them the adage applies that when present they are absent”; 24 “Donkeys would prefer hay to gold”; 25 “Dogs bark at a person whom they do not know.” 26 Obviously he had to be cautious in the expression of his truth. “What is divine escapes men’s notice because of their incredulity.” 27 For this reason he praised Bias of Priene (obviously “A man of more consideration than any”), 28 which is more reasonable, because he had said, “Most men are bad.” 29 This probably belongs with: “What sort of mind or intelligence have they? They believe popular folktales and follow the crowd as their teachers, ignoring the adage that the many are bad, the good are few.” 30 Thus the wisdom of the wise men appears impoverished to him: he speaks of others only as such who have promoted history. As to that which everyone equally encounters: “Humans in all their activities and in any of their arts only emulate the natural law and nevertheless do not recognize this”; 31 “Men are at variance with the one thing with which they are in the most unbroken communion, the Reason that administers the whole Universe”; 32 “The law under which most of them ceaselessly have commerce, they reject for themselves” (such is the contents of the writing

24. παρέντας ἵππειναι (Clement of Alexandria). [Nietzsche cites Stromateis 5.116.718; it is found at bk. 5, ch. 14. The quotation is Heraclitus, fragment 34d; the translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics.]
25. [Here Nietzsche gives a German translation of the Greek text (Heraclitus, fragment 9d); English-language translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics.]
26. [Here Nietzsche gives a German translation of the Greek text (Heraclitus, fragment 97d); English-language translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics, no. 90.]
27. ἀλλὰ τά μὲν τῆς γνώσεως βάθεα κρύπτειν ἀπιστή ἁγάθη· ἀπιστή γάρ διαφωγγάνει (scholia τά βάθεα) μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι (Clement of Alexandria) [Nietzsche cites Stromateis 6.99.699, but I was unable to find this quotation anywhere in book 6. Bornmann and Carpitella give Stromateis 5.13. The quotation is Heraclitus, fragment 86d; English-language translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics.]
28. οὗ πλέον λόγος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 1, sect. 88 [Heraclitus, fragment 39d]).
29. οἱ πλεῖστοι ἄνθρωποι κακοὶ.
30. τῆς γὰρ αὐτῶν (sch. τῶν πολλῶν? probably τῶν σοφῶν superscript!) νόσος ἢ φρῆν; δήμων ἀοίδοις ἔπονται καὶ διδασκάλων χρέονται ὑμῖλω, οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι πολλοὶ κακοὶ (ἄσθοι) ὁλιγοὶ δὲ ἄγαθοί. ἀφρόντον γὰρ ἐν αὐτία πάντα νομεῖν οἱ ἄρσιτοι (the wise man) κλέος ἁρώνου θνητῶν (extremely ironic), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκόρηνται ὅκωστερ κτίνω (fragment 71, Schleiermacher). [Heraclitus, fragment 104d. Nietzsche cites Clement, Stromateis 5.60.682 (Bornmann and Carpitella give Stromateis 5.576). Nietzsche also cites Bernays, Heraclitea, 32. The English-language translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics.]
31. [This passage is given in German and so is likely Nietzsche’s paraphrase. The translation is mine.]
περὶ διαίτης;

"Wisdom is one—to know the intelligence by which all things are steered through all things."  

His vision has been locked onto two sorts of considerations: eternal motion and the negation of all duration and persistence in the world. There are two vast types of view: the way of the natural sciences was probably, in his time, short and uncertain; there exist truths, however, toward which the mind feels compelled, raising [notions] just as terrifying as the others. To achieve any impression whatsoever of such, I am reminded how the natural sciences approach this problem nowadays. For them, "All things flow" (πάντα ῥεῖ) is a main proposition. Nowhere does an absolute persistence exist, because we always come in the final analysis to forces, whose effects simultaneously include a desire for power (Kraftverlust). Rather, whenever a human being believes he recognizes any sort of persistence in living nature, it is due to our small standards.

A researcher in natural science at the Petersburg Academy, [Karl Ernst] von Bär, held a lecture in 1860 entitled "Which Conception of Living Nature Is the Correct One?" He offers a remarkable thought experiment. The rates of sensation and of voluntary movements, thus of conscious life, appear among various animals to be approximately proportional to their pulse rates. Well then! Since, for example, the pulse rate among rabbits is four times faster than that among cattle, these will also experience four times as much in the same time period and will be able to carry out four times as many acts of the will as cattle—thus, in general, experiencing four times as much. The inner life of various animal species (including humans) proceeds through the same astronomical time-space at different specific rates, and it is according to these that they subjectively and variously judge the fundamental standard of time. For this reason alone, only because for us this fundamental standard is small, does an organic individual, a plant or an animal, appear to us as something remaining at one size and in one shape, for we could observe it one hundred times or more in a minute without noticing any external alterations.

33. [This is my translation from Nietzsche's German—almost certainly a paraphrase of Heraclitus's fragment 72.]

34. [Nietzsche paraphrases this fragment (41) in German, mixed with some Greek vocabulary. This translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics.]

35. [See Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), bk. 2, aphorism 117. Nietzsche refers to Karl Ernst von Baer, Festrede zur Eröffnung der russischen entomologischen Gesellschaft in Mai 1860 (Berlin, 1862). Karl Ernst von Baer (1792–1876), a German-Russian embryologist who held a professorship at the University of Königsberg from 1817 to 1834, is considered a founder of embryology and comparative embryology. His work was used by Darwin, but Baer himself avoided Darwinism.]
Well then! We think it very important whether pulse rate, rate of sensation, and the human intellectual process either decelerate or accelerate, [since] in this way they are fundamentally altered. Assuming that the course of human life, with childhood, maturity, and old age, were reduced by a factor of one one-thousandth [auf den tausendsten Theil eingeschränkt] to one month, and that pulse rate were accelerated one thousand times faster, then we would be able to follow a flying bullet very easily with our vision. If this lifetime were reduced once more [by a factor of one one-thousandth], limited to some forty minutes, then we would consider the grass and flowers to be something just as absolute and persistent as we now consider the mountains; we would perceive in the growth of a bud as much and as little as a lifetime, like when we think of the geological periods of the earth. We would be totally unable to observe the voluntary movements of animals, for they would be far too slow; at best we could conceive of them as we [in our time frame] think of the heavenly bodies. And with a still further reduction of a lifetime [to a scale of 1:1,000,000,000], the light that we now see would perhaps become audible. Our sounds would become inaudible.

When, on the other hand, we enormously lengthen and expand a human lifetime, we get quite another picture! Reduce, for example, pulse rate and sensation threshold by one one-thousandth, and then our life would last, “at the upper end,” eighty thousand years: then we would experience as much in one year as we do now in eight to nine hours; then every four hours we would watch winter melt away, the earth thaw out, grass and flowers spring up, trees come into full bloom and bear fruit, and then all vegetation wilt once more. Many developments would not be observed by us at all because of their speed; for example, a mushroom would suddenly sprout up like a fountain. Day and night would alternate like light and shadows in but a moment, and the sun would race along the arch of the heavens in the greatest hurry. Were we to decelerate this lifetime already reduced a thousandfold once again [to a scale of 1,000,000:1], a human being would be capable of making only 189 perceptions in an earth-year; the difference between day and night would entirely vanish; the solar ecliptic would appear as a luminous bow across the sky, as a glowing coal, when swung in a circle, appears to form a circle of fire; and vegetation would continually shoot up and vanish in great haste.

Enough then! Every shape appearing to us as persistent would vanish in the superhaste of events and would be devoured by the wild storm of Becoming. Whatever remains, the unmoving (μὴ ἰσίν), proves to be a complete illusion, the result of our human intellect: if we were able to perceive still faster, we would have an even greater illusion of persistence: if we could think
of the indefinitely fastest—while still of course human—perception, then all motion would cease, and everything would be eternally fixed. If we were to conceive of human perception indefinitely increased according to the strength and power of the organs, there would conversely exist no persistent thing in the indefinitely smallest particle of time [or time atom] but rather only a Becoming. For the indefinitely fastest perception stops all Becoming, because we always mean only human perception. It would be indefinitely strong and would dive into every depth, and thus for it every form would cease; forms exist only at certain levels of perception.

Nature is just as infinite inwardly as it is outwardly: we have succeeded up to the cell and to parts of the cell, yet there are no limits where we could say here is the last divisible point. Becoming never ceases at the indefinitely small. Yet at the greatest [level] nothing absolutely unalterable exists. Our earthly world must eventually perish for inexorable reasons. The heat of the sun cannot last eternally. It is inconceivable that this warmth produce motion without other forces being consumed. We may pose every hypothesis concerning the heat of the sun; it comes to this, that its source of heat is finite. In the course of tremendous time spans, the duration of sunlight and heat so interminable to us must completely vanish. [Physiologist and physicist Hermann Ludwig von] Helmholtz says in his essay “On the Interaction of the Natural Forces”: “We come thereby to the unavoidable conclusion that every tide, although with infinite slowness still with certainty diminishes the stores of mechanical force of the system; and as a consequence of this, the rotation of the planets in question round their axes must become more slow [and they must draw nearer to the sun or its satellites. Thus we must not speak of our astronomical time in scale in an absolute sense].”

Well, this is the intuitive perception of Heraclitus; there is no thing of which we may say, “it is.” He rejects Being. He knows only Becoming, the flowing. He considers belief in something persistent as error and foolishness. To this he adds this thought: that which becomes is one thing in eternal transformation, and the law of this

36. [This translation is from Hermann von Helmholtz, Science and Culture: Popular and Philosophical Essays, ed. David Cahan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). Nietzsche omits the next sentence and the final clause of the last sentence quoted here. I have added them in brackets. Helmholtz (1821–94) was known to Nietzsche from 1865 onward, and Nietzsche sought or bought every new title by him. During Nietzsche’s adult life Helmholtz was widely regarded as the greatest living German physicist. Helmholtz taught the great historian of materialism, and a physicist of some importance, Friedrich Albert Lange. Helmholtz and Lange—along with Lange’s dear friend Friedrich Ueberweg—were the community allowing the Nietzschean phrase “we physicists,” which is, not so oddly after inspection, present in the published later works.]
eternal transformation, the Logos in all things, is precisely this One, fire (τὸ πῦρ). Thus, the one overall Becoming is itself law; that it becomes and how it becomes is its work. Heraclitus thus sees only the One, but in the sense opposite to Parmenides’. All qualities of things, all laws, all generation and destruction, are the continual revelation of the existence of the One: multiplicity, which is a deception of the sense according to Parmenides, is for Heraclitus the cloth, the form of appearance, of the One, in no way a deception: otherwise, the One does not appear at all. Well, before I explain the teachings according to the proposition of Heraclitus, I recall the relationship of these propositions to Anaximander.\(^{37}\)

Anaximander taught, “Everything with qualities arises and perishes mistakenly: thus there must be a qualityless Being.” Becoming is an injustice and is to be atoned for with Passing Away (φθορά). But how can that which is encumbered by qualities, Becoming, arise from the qualityless? And how might a world of such eternal lawfulness in its entirety be a world full of particular injustice? On the contrary, the course of all things, of every individual, is predestined and not violable by human defiance (ὑπρήξ). Justice (Δίκη) shows itself in this lawfulness. But if Becoming and Passing Away are the effects of a justice, then there is no such dualism between a world of the Unlimited and the qualities, because qualities are indeed tools of Arising and Passing Away, thus tools of justice. Rather, the principle (ἀρχή), the One within Arising and Passing Away, must also be rightful in its qualities: in opposition to Anaximander, it must accordingly have all predicates, all qualities, because all witnesses swear by justice. Heraclitus thus places the entire world of differences around the One in the sense that it evidences itself in all of them. In this manner, however, Becoming and Passing Away constitute the primary property of the principle. The Passing Away (φθορά) is in no way a punishment. Thus Heraclitus presents a cosmodyc\(^{38}\) over against his great predecessor, the teacher of the injustice of the world.

And so along with Becoming, justice is the second main concept: “Men would not have known the name of justice if these things had not occurred.”\(^{39}\)

“For the sun never transgresses its limited measures, as Heraclitus says; if it

\(^{37}\) [In lecture 7 Nietzsche argued that Heraclitus must have come later than Anaximander because the former owed much to the latter. Now he returns to demonstrate this point in detail.]

\(^{38}\) [In a letter Nietzsche thanks Rohde for the notion of cosmodyc. Rohde originally published an article in Rheinisches Museum with this term in its title. The term means a vindication of the goodness of the cosmos with respect to the existence of evil, as contrasted to ‘theodicy’; from κόσμος and Δίκη.]

\(^{39}\) Clement, Stromateis 3.473. [Heraclitus, fragment 23. English-language translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics.]
did do so, the Furies, which are the attendants of justice, would find it out and punish it.”

Then the famous passage: “This universe, which is the same for all, has not been made by any god or man, but it always has been, is, and will be—an ever-living fire, kindling itself by regular measures and going out by regular measures.”

The trial of this justice is war (Πόλεμος), the third main concept. The entire universal law (εἰμικριμένη, fate), is defined as “the principle of opposing currents of the demiurge of existent things.”

Or, according to Plutarch, it is “the harmony of the universe.” Fragment 80 names it directly: “It should be understood that war is the common condition, that strife is justice, and that all things come to pass through the compulsion of strife.”

This is one of the most magnificent notions: strife as the continuous working out of a unified, lawful, reasonable justice, a notion that was produced from the deepest fundament of the Greek being. It is Hesiod’s good Eris turned into a universal principle. Contests—but above all the immanent lawfulness in their decisions over contests—distinguish the Greeks. Every individual competes as if it alone is justified, yet an infinitely definite standard of just judgment decides who is linked to victory. From the gymnasium, musical competitions, and political life Heraclitus became familiar with the paradigm of such strife. The idea of war-justice (Πόλεμος-δίκη) is the first specifically Hellenic idea in philosophy—which is to say that it qualifies not as universal but rather as national. Moreover, only the Greeks were in the circumstances to discover such sublime thoughts as cosmodyc.

Eternal Becoming possesses something at first terrifying and uncanny: the strongest comparison is to the sensation whereby someone, in the middle of the ocean or during an earthquake, observes all things in motion. It calls
for an astonishing power to transmit the effects of sublimity and joyful awe to those confronting it. If everything is in Becoming, then, accordingly, predicates cannot adhere to a thing but rather likewise must be in the flow of Becoming. Well, Heraclitus perceived that contrary predicates imply each other, something like what Plato says about the pleasant and unpleasant in the *Phaedo*: they are intertwined like a knot. “In every human being the power of death works, like that of life, at every moment of his existence. The entrance of life and death, and of waking and sleeping, is only predominance becoming visible that one force has won over its opposite and momentarily begins to lose again to it. Both forces are continuously efficacious at the same time, since their eternal strife allows neither victory nor domination over time.”

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Honey is both bitter and sweet. The world is a mixing cup that must remain undisturbed to avoid upsetting it. From the same source flow the sunny light of life and the darkness of death.

This relationship is exemplified by a human being’s connection to the surrounding air. By day, when this surrounding (περιήχον) is filled with the vital principle of fire, the human being is at one with what is “in common” (ξυνόν), in the sense of [being] awake and lively (ἐμφρον). During the night, when fire is shut out, the bond individuals maintain to the collective severs. The individual then goes home by himself, must light a fire for himself, sinks into sleep, becomes forgetful and deathlike. He may be awakened again to life only by a new approach of fire, as dying embers start to glow brightly again once laid in a common bed of flames. This is a metaphor for human life.

[A character called “the Heraclitean” in] Lucian’s *Philosophies for Sale* says of the entire world, “Joy and joylessness, wisdom and unwisdom, great and small are all but the same, circling about, up and down, and interchanging in the game of Eternity.”

The Buyer [another character in Lucian’s *Philosophies for Sale*] inquires, “And what is eternity?”

The Heraclitean answers, “A child playing a game, moving counters, in discord, in concord.”

In his world-creating capacity, Zeus is compared to a child (as is Apollo) who

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46. Nietzsche sets this in quotation marks, but while the ideas reflect *Phaedo* 70e–72e, this does not appear to be more than Nietzsche’s paraphrasing.
47. Plutarch, *Consolation to Apollonius*, sect. 10. [Heraclitus, fragment 88. Here Nietzsche paraphrases in German. The English-language translation is from Wheelwright, *The Presocratics*.]
51. Homer: *Iliad* 361. [This citation refers to the *Iliad*, bk. 15 (omega), ll. 360ff., which read, in Lattimore’s translation, “Apollo . . . wrecked the bastions of the Achaians easily, as when a little
builds and destroys sand castles on the beach at the sea. The river of Becoming, flowing uninterrupted, shall never stand still, and again, against it [is] the river of Annihilation, called Acheron or Kokytos by the poets. These two opposing rivers are the opposed courses (ἐναντιοδρομία). “Opposition brings concord. Out of discord comes the fairest harmony.”

“Things taken together are whole and not whole, something which is being brought together and brought apart, which is in tune and out of tune; out of all things there comes a unity, and out of a unity all things.” “People do not understand how that which is at variance with itself agrees with itself. There is a harmony in the bending back, as in cases of the bow and the lyre.”

Good and evil come together in the same thing after the fashion of bow and lyre.” Here [Heraclitus] merely alludes to the design of these instruments: with Scythian and ancient Greek bows, as with lyres, both arms (κέρατα) are wildly cast apart, and only by bending them do they converge to the middle piece. [Jacob] Bernays first came to this [explanation], followed by [George Ferdinand] Rettig: “As the two conflicting moments of the extinguished and re-kindled fire condition the phenomenon, so the straining apart of the arms of the bow and lyre conditions the tension.” Aristote describes the bow (τόξον) as a chordless lyre (φόρμιγξ ἡχορδος) at one passage.

The fourth main conception is Fire. We have seen that Heraclitus gives an answer, that of justice, to the problem of injustice posed by Anaximander; for the second time he is profoundly dependent on fire, as he understands it. The first level of the world of Becoming was indeed, for Anaximander, the warm and cold; therefrom comes the moist, the birth canal of all things. Well then! Not only fire is visible, for Heraclitus, but also warmth, dry vapors, and


53. [Heraclitus, fragment 8. This translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics. The fragment is given in German, however, not Greek. Nietzsche cites Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 8, ch. 2, but this fragment is not found there, although the notion of harmony from discord within friendship is the topic.]

54. Aristotle, De mundo 5. [Heraclitus, fragment 10. This translation is from Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers. The quotation is given in German in Nietzsche’s notes.]

55. [Heraclitus, fragment 51. This translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics. The quotation is given in German in Nietzsche’s notes.]

56. [This is unreferenced and seems to be Nietzsche’s gloss on the previous quotation.]


58. [Aristotle,] Rhetoric, bk. 3, ch. 11.
breath; so he says, “It is death to souls to become water, and it is death to water to become earth. Conversely, water comes into existence out of earth, and souls out of water.”

We may understand soul to mean here only warm, “fiery” breath, hence the three levels of transformation: warm, wet, and fixed (Earth). This is precisely the worldview of Anaximander. Heraclitus believes him to be an authority in the natural sciences. “The transformations of fire: first, sea; and of sea, half becomes earth and half the lightning-flash.”

Water, then, turns partially into earth and partially into fire. From the sea arise only pure vapors, which serve fire as nourishment; from the earth, only dark mists, on which the moist draws for nourishment. Pure vapors constitute the bridge from sea to fire; impure [vapors], the transition from earth to water.

Thus [there is] a double process, “the way up and the way down (οδὸς κάτω and ἄνω),” both [of which are] one thing eternally running next to the other. We find here fundamental conceptions all borrowed from Anaximander: fire, which is maintained by vaporization of earth; the separation of earth and fire from water; and above all, however, the assumption that warmth is an originary given from which all other things develop. Only one [element] does not exist as a complementary principle, namely, cold as a complementary principle of warmth. Since everything is fire, then whatever is not fire, which would be the opposite of fire, cannot exist at all. We must probably attribute to Heraclitus the argument against Anaximander that there is no absolute cold but only degrees of warmth, which is physiologically easier to prove. Heraclitus, then, departs for a second time from a dualism in the teachings of Anaximander.

In addition, he modified individual doctrines, such as those concerning the stars. According to Anaximander, these consist of wheel-shaped shells that contain fire. According to Heraclitus they were barks in which pure vaporizations were gathered. Whenever these barks turn about, solar and lunar eclipses occur. The sun itself is thus a vaporous burning mass: daytime depletes the vapors, and in the morning they produce themselves anew; the sun is new every day.

A third noteworthy agreement with Anaximander lies in the acceptance of

59. ψυχῆις θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι: ἐκ γῆς δὲ ὕδωρ γίνεται, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ ψυχῆ. [Heraclitus, fragment 36. The translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics.]

60. πυρὸς τροπαί, πρῶτον θάλασσα. θαλάσσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἠμισυ γῆ, τὸ δὲ ἠμισυ προστήρ (Clement of Alexandria). [Heraclitus, fragment 31. The translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics. Nietzsche cites “Stromatei 5.101.712,” but Kirk and Raven have 5.104.3.]

61. [Heraclitus, fragment 60.]

62. [The other departure is Heraclitus’s rejection of the world of Becoming opposed to the world of Being, or the undifferentiated. In the first case he rejects Being altogether.]
[a doctrine of] the periodic destruction of the world. The current world shall dissolve itself in fire, bringing forth a new world from the flames; the Stoics, but not yet Heraclitus, calls the destruction of the world “conflagration” (ἐκκύρωσις). According to Hippolytus’s *Refutations*, “Fire in its advance will catch all things by surprise and judge them.” For Anaximander it was the gradual drying out of the sea, thus a gradual domination of fire. From Heraclitus’s having followed him to this point, we observe that the influence of the forerunner was even great enough to draw him into a less than logical conclusion. Schleiermacher and Lasalle fought against this previously, but Hippolytus’s book seems to remove any doubt that Heraclitus conceived of world epochs in which the plurality of things strives for the unity of the primal fire as a condition of miserable “craving” (χρησμοσύνη), in contrast to those world epochs of satiety (κόρος), which have entered into primal fire.

We do not know what he called striving for plurality in things. Bernays makes the noteworthy assumption that [Heraclitus] called such striving hybris (ὁβρις), based on the proposition “satiety breeds insolence” (τίκτει κόρος ὁβριν), in which a satiated fire breaks out into a desire for multiplicity. He also used the term λιμός instead of χρησμοσύνη. “God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and want (λιμός).” According to this idea, he probably considered fire to be eternal, whereas the world had developed—entirely as Anaximander [proposed]. We discover in this notion of hybris, in the notion of the development of the world, and in the notion of judgment by fire a facet of Anaximander’s ideas that was not completely overcome: plurality is associated with impulsiveness for Heraclitus also; the transition from pure to impure cannot be explained without recourse to guilt. The entire process of transformation carries out the laws of justice: the particular individual is thus free from injustice. Fire itself, however, is punished for its own inborn hybris by this craving and want (λιμός και χρησμοσύνη). Injustice is mislaid at the core of things; individuals are exonerated of it. The world process is a huge act of punishment, the workings of justice and the consequent purification, or catharsis, of fire. We should keep clearly in mind

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63. πάντα τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὼν κρίνει καὶ καταλήγεται (Hippolytus) [Heraclitus, fragment 66. The translation is from Wheelwright, *The Presocratics*. Nietzsche’s citation of *Refutations* 9.10, is not correct. This saying appears instead at *Refutations* 9.5.]

64. [Here Nietzsche again incorrectly gives his abbreviated reference to *Refutations* 9.10, whereas this quotation is found at *Refutations* 9.5.]

65. [Heraclitus, fragment 65.]


Heraclitus

the oneness of fire and justice; it is its own judge. With reference to [the fragment] "Justice will overtake fabricators of lies and false witnesses," Clement of Alexandria described the conflagration as "the purification by fire of those who have led bad lives." What a crude misunderstanding! The world process is catharsis; the conflagration is attained purity!

And so we finally have reached the vaguest general outline of the traits of Heraclitus, due to which he would later be known as the "weeping philosopher." The most noteworthy passage comes from Plutarch: "For certain it is, that both Empedocles and Heraclitus held it for a truth, that man could not be altogether cleared from injustice in dealing with beasts as he now does; often bewailing and exclaiming against Nature, as if she were nothing else but necessity and war, having neither anything unmixed nor any thing truly pure, but still arriving at her end by many, and those just and unjust passions. Whence they affirm that generation itself originally proceeded from injustice by the conjunction of immortal with mortal, and that the thing engendered is still contrary to Nature delighted with the parts of that which engenders, dismembered from the whole." Particulars belong to Empedocles, of course.

The world process as a whole is a cathartic act of punishment, then a satiety (κόρος), then new hybris and new purification, and so on. Hence [there is] the most miraculous lawfulness of the world—in it, though, a justice exonerating itself of its own injustice. And this—the just injustice—was a consequence inasmuch as Heraclitus had been forced to say that opposites are inside one another.

We must discard this entire assumption [made by Jacob Bernays]; discussion of it, however, leads into the heart of the Heraclitean view of the world. Foremost, the sameness of justice [and] injustice, and good [and] bad (άγαθον-κακόν), is completely un-Heraclitean. It is a consequence that he himself did not draw. We may demonstrate this most rigorously by the fact

68. καὶ δίκη καταλήγειται γευσάδων τέκτωνας καὶ μάρτυρας ([Clement] 5.9.649, Potter); τὴν διὰ ποιός κάθαρσιν τῶν κακῶς βεβαιῶκτων [Heraclitus, fragment 28. The translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics. Nietzsche cites Potter's edition of Clement of Alexandria without specifying the Exhortations or Miscellanies.]

69. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἡράκλειτος—πολλάκις ὤδυρόμενοι καὶ λοιδορούντες τὴν φύσιν ὡς ἀνάγκην καὶ πόλεμον οὖσαν, ἀμιγες δὲ μηδὲν μήδε εἰλικρίνες ἔχουσαν, ἀλλὰ διὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀδίκων παθῶν περαινομένην· ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν γένειν αὐτήν ἐξ ἄδικας συντυχανεῖν λέγουσι τῷ θηντῷ συνεργομένῳ τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τέρπεσθαι τὸ γενόμενον παρὰ φύσιν μέλες τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἀποσπωμένους ([Plutarch,] De sollert. animalium 7). [English-language translation is from Plutarch, Which Are the Most Crafty, Water-Animals or Those Creatures That Breed upon the Land? trans. John Philips, sect. 7, in Plutarch's Morals, Translated by Several Hands, vol. 5.]

that, in order to claim something similar about Heraclitus's pronouncements, Hippolytus does not seek support in other passages: "Doctors cut, burn, and torture the sick, and then demand of them an undeserved fee for such services." Hippolytus takes the ironic term ἀγαθά completely seriously: in other words, the doctors consider the illnesses they treat in mankind as something good (ἀγαθά).

It is far more Heraclitean in spirit that to God all things appear as good while to mankind much appears as bad. The entire wealth of contradiction and sorrow that Heraclitus affirms disappears for God contemplating unseen harmony. Well then! It was a major obstacle to explain how it is possible that the manifestations of one fire could be in so many and impure forms, without some injustice being transferred to it from things. Heraclitus possessed a sublime metaphor for just this purpose: only in the play of the child (or that of the artist) does there exist a Becoming and Passing Away without any moralistic calculations. He conceives of the play of children as that of spontaneous human beings: here is innocence and yet coming into being and destruction: not one droplet of injustice should remain in the world. The eternally living fire, αἰών [Aeon, boy-god of the zodiac], plays, builds, and knocks down: strife, this opposition of different characteristics, directed by justice, may be grasped only as an aesthetic phenomenon. We find here a purely aesthetic view of the world. We must exclude even more any moralistic tendencies to think teleologically here, for the cosmic child (Weltkind) behaves with no regard to purposes but rather only according to an immanent justice: it can act only willfully and lawfully, but it does not will these ways. That constitutes the abyss between Heraclitus and Anaxagoras, and that is the point that more recent commentators have failed to understand. Hippolytus testifies that [for Heraclitus], fire is "Wisdom [which] is one—to know the intelligence by which all things are steered through all things." It is an intelligence (γνώμη) connecting all things to one another. "Listening not to me but to the Logos it

71. Hippolytus, Refutations. [Heraclitus, fragment 58. The translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics. The quotation is given in the German in Nietzsche's lecture notes. Nietzsche incorrectly cites "9.10." This comes from bk. 9, ch. 5.]

72. The Stoics have made Heraclitus superficial. He himself embraced the highest lawfulness of the world, yet without the general Stoic optimism. How much strength the ethical power of the Stoics possessed may be seen in the fact that they violated their principle in favor of [the doctrine of] the freedom of the will.

is wise to agree that one thing knows all. “Of those whose discourses I have heard there is not one who attains to the realization that wisdom stands apart from all else.” That which alone is wise, intelligence [γνώμη], is separate from the many [τὸ πάντα]; it is one in everything. Plutarch compares the value of the living with that of the lifeless: “The divine is not engendered in colours or in forms or in polished surfaces, but whatsoever things have no share in life, things whose nature does not allow them to share therein, have a portion of less honor than that of the dead. But the nature that lives and sees and has within itself the source of movement and a knowledge of what belongs to it and what belongs to others has drawn to itself effluence and [a] portion of beauty from the Intelligence ‘by which the universe is guided,’ as Heraclitus has put it [ἐκ τοῦ φρονοῦντος ὅπως κυβερνᾶται τὸ σύμπαν, καθ’ Ἡράκλειτον].” Heraclitus would probably have used the word γνώμη [rather than φρονοῦντος]. Bernays thinks Plutarch interjected the word ὅπως [by which] because he could still conceive of only a contemplative knowing, in contrast to Heraclitus, who could acknowledge only dynamic knowing. We hear it too often said that it would nonetheless be only an analogy to “one thing knows all” (ἐν τὰ πάντα εἰδέναι). The far more important contrast is this: the fire eternally building the world at play views the entire process similar to how Heraclitus himself views this entire process; consequently, he attributes wisdom to himself. To become one with this intuitive intelligence, not somehow to do this with dynamic things, is wisdom. We must distinguish between the justice in the form of the trial and this all-contemplating intuition: this immanent justice and intelligence pre-

74. οὐκ ἐμοὶ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὑμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν ἐν πάντα εἰδέναι (Hippolytus). [This translation from Nietzsche’s German is mine. Nietzsche provides the Greek text immediately following his German translation, emphasizing the words one thing. Nietzsche incorrectly cites Refutations 9.9. This saying is found at Refutations, bk. 9, ch. 4. Far more important, Nietzsche here is reading εἰδέναι instead of εἶναι. See my commentary for a detailed discussion of Nietzsche’s rendition of this fragment.]

75. ὁκόσον λόγους ἡκουσα, οὐδεὶς ἀφικνεῖται εἰς τούτο ὅστε γιγνώσκειν ὅτι σοφόν ἐστι πάντων κεχωρισμένον (Stobaei, Florilegium 1.174). [Heraclitus, fragment 108. This translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics.]

76. Plutarch, Isis and Osiris, ch. 76. [The majority of this quotation is in German and may be Nietzsche’s paraphrase from the Greek.]


78. [Once again, Nietzsche reads εἰδέναι instead of εἶναι; see n. 74. The question is whether the original Greek text reads εἶναι, “to be,” or εἰδέναι, “to know.” The alternative meaning would be “one thing is all.”]
vailing over oppositions and this fiery power [Feuerkraft] overlooking the entirety of strife.

We may clarify this intuition—which oversees the reign of immanent justice [δίκη] and intelligence [γνώμη] over all things, war as its own territory, and once again, the whole as play—only in the capacity of the artist, the creative artist who further is identical with his work. In contrast, Anaxagoras wants something entirely different: he construes the order of the world as a determinant will with intentions, conceived after the fashion of human beings. On account of this teleological insight, Aristotle calls him the first no-nonsense thinker. The capacity, which everyone knows, namely, to desire consciousness [bewußt zu wollen], was placed in the heart of things here; this intelligence (νοῦς) is more precisely the will [der Wille] in the popular sense of the word, the willing after goals [Wollen nach Zwecken]. We find here for the first time in philosophy the crude opposition of soul [Seele] to matter: a force [Kraft] that knows and sets goals but also wills, moves, and so on and yet is rigid matter. It is strange how long Greek philosophy struggled against this theory: the Greek view of the world in no way distinguished body from spirit [Geist] as matter and nonmatter; these things are considered much differently today. Heraclitus still maintains a proto-Hellenistic, meaning internalizing, attitude toward these matters. Opposition between matter and the nonmaterial simply does not exist, and that is proper.

Thus it is entirely wrong to divest ourselves of this notion of intelligence (as does Heinze), just because Anaximander, according to Aristotle, first introduced the term νοῦς. How shall we evaluate the doctrine of conflagration? Heraclitus internalized Anaximander’s perception that the earth dries out; a destruction [Untergang] by fire awaits. This playful cosmic child continually builds and knocks down but from time to time begins his game anew: a moment of contentment followed by new needs. His continuous building and knocking down is a craving (χρησμοσύνη), as creativity is a need for the artist; his play (παιδία) is a need. From time to time he has his fill [Übersättigung] of it—nothing other than fire exists there; that is, it engulfs all things. Not hybris but rather the newly awakened drive to play [Spieltrieb] now wills once more his setting into order (διακόσμησις). Rejection of any teleologi-

79. Heinze, [Die Lehre vom] Logos, 35.
80. διακόσμησις is used by Plato to mean “a setting in order, a regulating,” according to Lidell and Scott. It is related to military words such as διακόσμεω, meaning “to divide and marshal” or “muster in array,” as in Thucydides, and διάκοσμος, meaning “battle array,” also in Thucydides, but Nietzsche also wants to suggest how a child sets up soldiers or imposes rules and orders on toys. See An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, founded on the seventh edition of Liddell and
cal view of the world reaches its zenith here: the child throws away its toy, but as soon as it plays again, it proceeds with purpose and order: necessity and play, war and justice.

Well then! We find it very characteristic also that Heraclitus does not acknowledge an ethic with imperatives. Indeed, the entire universal law (εἴμαιμένη, destiny) is everything, including the individual human being. The destiny of the individual is his inborn character: “Man’s character is his daemon.”81 That so few human beings live according to, and recognize, the Logos, because their souls are “moist,” spells their death by fire. To rejoice at mire (βορβόρω χαίρειν) is the essence of humanity.82 Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men having muddied souls.83 The question, Why is this so? is posed just as seldom as is, Why does fire turn to water and earth? Indeed, it is said to be not the “best of all possible worlds” but rather only a game of Aeon. “Souls take pleasure in becoming moist.”84 Aeon considers the human being in itself as contrary to the Logos (διαλόγος): only by his relationship to fire does he participate in the common intelligence (ξυνός λόγος). It would be entirely mistaken to pile up objections against Heraclitus, as has [Max] Heinze, that he has no ethic: “All things come to pass according to the Logos; all the world is rational. How is it possible that this highest law finds so little actualization precisely in the highest forms of nature? Wherefrom comes the sharp clash between those of no understanding and those products of the same nature who are gifted with understanding? What should justice punish if the eternal

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81. ήθος γὰρ ἀνθρώποις δαίμον. [Heraclitus, fragment 119. This translation is from Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers. Here we find a notion Nietzsche carries with him throughout his life: destiny comes from within; fate comes from without. “Becoming what one is” formulates destiny.]

82. [Heraclitus, fragment 13.]

83. [Cf. Heraclitus, fragment 107. This is my translation of Nietzsche’s German: “Schlechte Zeugen sind den Menschen Augen und Ohren, wenn Schlamm die Seele einnimmt.” He does not give the Greek text. Oehler comments in a footnote: “Nietzsche must have read βορβόρων φυσικής ἔχοντος. Sextus Empiricus hands down βορβόρους φυσικὸς ἔχοντον at Against the Professors, VII 126. This conjecture originates from Jacob Bernays in Rheinisches Museum (1854) page 263 [Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 10 (1854): 263 which is a page from ‘Alcmanis fragmentum de sacris in summis montibus peractis,’ by F. Th. Welcker. Gesammelte Abhandlungen edited by H[ermann] Usener, 1885, volume I, page 95 [Gesammelte Abhandlungen von Jacob Bernays, ed. Hermann Usener, 2 vols. (Berlin: Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz, 1885).]” In short, this fragment is generally translated (e.g., by Freeman and Wheelwright) as referring to barbarian souls, not “muddied” ones. Here Nietzsche is supported by Jacob Bernays; their conjecture comports with other Heraclitean fragments regarding “wet souls.” I add only that Aristophanes used the word βορβοροθυμός to mean “muddy-minded” and that Plato, in reference to ideas, used βορβοροθυμός to mean “murky.”]

84. [Heraclitus, fragment 77. The translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics.]
universal law (ἐνορμένη) and Logos determine all things?" This is all pure error! The highest form of nature is not humanity but fire. There exists no clash. To the contrary, insofar as humanity is fiery, it is rational; insofar as he [man] is watery, he is irrational. There is no necessity, qua human being, that he must acknowledge the Logos. The questions, Why does Water exist? and Why Earth? are very serious ones for Heraclitus, as is the question, Why are human beings such fools? Justice should not punish; it is itself immanent lawfulness, which demonstrates itself just as much among fools as among the highest human beings. The sole question worth posing in general is, Why is fire not always fire? He replies to that: "It is a game." Don't take this too dramatically! Heraclitus describes only the world at hand, in acceptance (εὐ-ἀρέστησις), in a contemplative well-being known to all the enlightened; only those unsatisfied by his description of human nature will find him dark, grave, gloomy, or pessimistic. At his core he is the opposite of a pessimist because he does not deny away sorrows and irrationality: for him, war reveals itself as the eternal process of the world. Yet he contents himself with an eternal universal law and, because it oversees all things, calls it Logos, intelligence (γνώμη). This is genuinely Hellenic! It is in itself a harmony, yet one that touches on its opposite, bending back (πολίντροσος). It is recognizable only to the contemplative god and to similar human beings.

85. [Heinze, Die Lehre vom Logos,] 49ff. [This is my translation of the German original.]
86. [Heraclitus, fragment 51.]
Parmenides and Heraclitus are contemporaries: Apollodorus calculates their primes of life at Olympiad 69 (504–500 B.C.E.). We see here that he has already launched a critique of a statement that has caused confusion up to the most recent of times. Specifically, Plato assumes that Socrates, [when still] quite young (σφόδρα νέος), met with Parmenides and Zeno, the latter as a forty-year-old, in Athens at the festival of the Panathenaea in approximately [Olympiad] 65.² Well then! We calculate Socrates was fifteen years old at that time, since Parmenides is born around 519 or 520. Probably for this reason, Eusebius and Syncellus set his prime of life around ten Olympiads later, at Olympiad 80; he seems to be a contemporary of Democritus, Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias.³ However, all conclusions built on Plato are to be discarded and have already been rejected by Apollodorus: Plato is an absolutely unhistorical type; his anachronisms should not be evaluated as conscious poetic license, still less as “deliberate falsifications” (Brandis). Later antiquity treated this point all wrong.⁴ It is this mystical atmosphere that Plato breathes: in it any historical meticulousness whatsoever means absolutely nothing. So Plato is not willing to restrain his image of Socrates; he produces it ever again anew as the objectification of his own development. When he internalized the Eleatic current, his Socrates also had to go to school under Parmenides. No historical sense held him back.

Apollodorus accepted that, as accords with our earlier calculations, Par-

¹ [The Musarion edition of the pre-Platonic philosophers lecture series deletes chapters 11, 12, and 13 as redundant to Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, a view to which I adamantly do not subscribe.]

² Plato, Parmenides 127a, Theaetetus 183e, and Sophist 217c. [Nietzsche’s citation of Parmenides 127a is incorrect; it should be 127c.]

³ Eusebius, Chron., and Syncellus 259c. [Nietzsche refers here to the Chronicles by Eusebius (260–339 C.E.) and to Michael Syncellus (760 or 761–846 C.E.), abbot of St. Sabas, who wrote Per la restaurazione delle venerande e sacre immagini.]

⁴ Athen[aeus] 505, for example.
Menides was somewhere around sixty-four years old at his acme. As a twenty-year-old he was instructed by Anaximander at his acme, in the second year of Olympiad 58—thus Parmenides must have been born around Olympiad 53, according to Theophrastus and Apollodorus. Against this is the sole objection that in this case Parmenides cannot have been born in Elea, because this was founded first in Olympiad 61. Well, in no case can his acme already be in Olympiad 69 if he was born after Olympiad 61. For this reason, Apollodorus must have assumed that he first immigrated to Elea at around thirty years of age and thus that he was born somewhere else; well, he was a student of Anaximander, so we certainly have to think of Miletus. This is similar to the case of Xenophanes, who indeed also is always described as Eleatic but comes from Colophon. The dates for Xenophanes are described thusly by Apollodorus, who "places his birth in the fortieth Olympiad, saying that he lived until the reigns of Darius and Cyrus." More exactly, we must switch these two names around. Cyrus dies in the fourth year of Olympiad 62, and Darius begins his rule in the fourth year of Olympiad 64. To think of Darius as still being alive, Apollodorus had to suppose him to be someone around ninety-six years old; that is, to Olympiad 40 we add twenty-four Olympiads (= 96), giving us Olympiad 64. The autobiographical testimony in Laertius is consistent with that: "Seven and sixty are now the years that have been tossing my cares up and down the land of Greece; and there were then twenty and five years more from my birth up, if I know how to speak truly about these things."

[Xenophanes' term] φροντίς is the expression for poetic and philosophical meditations, like the Latin curae, so at twenty-five years of age he began to "toss his poetry here and there," or in other words, to circulate as a rhapsode. He composed this, then, at ninety-two years of age. He settled down for the
first time as an extremely old man around eighty-four years of age in the just-founded Elea. Well, Xenophanes and the thirty-year-old Parmenides interact with each other there. (If Parmenides had been born after [Olympiad] 61, he would no longer have been able to have been his student.) Parmenides had already been instructed by Anaxagoras, and his philosophy presumes the Anaxagorean problems. We must not speak of an independently developed Eleatic school that begins with Xenophanes. Both Parmenides and Xenophanes must have found common ground on one essential point from which all other points proceed. Xenophanes is a poet, a rhapsode, and consequently a man learned through wide travels; for this reason Heraclitus describes him as a polymath. He is not as radical a personality as Pythagoras but is basically religious, and his wanderings are devoted to the betterment and purification of humanity; he reprimands and struggles. His background is a religious mysticism directed at divinity.

We do not know much about Xenophanes. Born in Colophon, he is the son of Orthomenes according to Apollodorus or of Dexios or Dexinos according to others. He was banned from his father city and lived in Zancle [in Sicily], Catana, and Elea. He composed a poem of 2,000 verses concerning the founding of Colophon, as well as that of Elea. His [last] primary work was *On Nature* (περὶ φύσεως), in which he fought against the opinions (ἀντιδοξάσαι) of Thales (whom he admired as an astronomer)\(^8\) and Pythagoras, as well as those of Epimenides; in any case, he was an opponent of transmigration of the soul.\(^9\) Of Epimenides he says that he lived to 154 years of age; obviously he treated the theme of his sleeping in a cave for fifty-seven years. Or he contested soothsaying [Mantik].\(^10\) His primary struggle, however, was directed against Homer and Hesiod; in this regard we are shown his relation to the religio-ethical movement of his century. He disputes the polytheistic folk beliefs, an incredible struggle that led to his exile.

Unto the gods are ascrib’d by Hesiod, like as by Homer,
All of the acts which are counted by men disgraceful and shameful,
Thieving and wenching and dealing deceitfully one with another.\(^11\)

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Well then! He noticed that everyone imagines the gods like themselves: Negroes [see them as] black and flat-nosed; Thracians, blue eyed and red haired. If horses and oxen could paint, they would certainly paint their gods as horses and oxen. Those who say that a god has been born are as heretical as those who believe one dies. His main propositions include the following:

One god, greatest among gods and men, in no way similar to mortals either in body or in thought.  

He with the whole of his being beholdeth and marketh and heareth.  

But without toil he shakes all things by the thought of his mind.  

Always he remains in the same place, not moving at all; Nor is it fitting for him to go to different places at different times.  

These religious insights originated from a need to eliminate anthropomorphism, but they still show the primordial Hellenic sensitivity toward the gods. These [gods] are the resolution of nature in lively, active figures: take these figures away and nature worship of the One—now attributed with the purest predicates—would remain. Xenophanes struggles for a mythical, general notion of nature. This incredible unity breaks; into what should it transform? It is complete knowledge, completely active. Plato and Aristotle understand his propositions in this way. It is not some doctrine of an (im)personal God existing beyond the world, which would be some pure spirit; rather, the entire dichotomy between spirit and matter, deity and world, is absent here. He


13. οἶλος ὥρα, οὐλός τε νοεῖ, οὐλός δὲ τ’ ἀκούει (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, bk. 9, ch. 144). [Xenophanes, fragment 24]; cf. Ka[rsten] 9.19. [This reference is to Simon Karsten, Philosophorum graecorum veterum, praesertim qui ante Platonem floruerunt, operum reliquiae, 2 vols. (Amsterdam, 1830; rev. ed. 1838).]


16. [Plato,] Sophist 242d, and [Aristotle,] Metaphysics, bk. 1, ch. 5.
resolves the identification of God and man in order to equate God and nature. In this regard he leads a heightened ethical consciousness that seeks to distance all things human and unworthy from the gods; we are shown here a struggle against what is specifically Hellenic, as in his other ethical notions.

He was the first who took exception to the people’s passionate desires for the public games.\(^{17}\) In a fragment probably belonging to him, he says that if animals were ever to gain entrance into Olympia, the ass would easily experience what would then be described in inscriptions about the victor: “It was such and such Olympiad that the ass defeated men there in the Pankration.”\(^ {18}\) Horses would win the long course (δολιχός), the hare in the short course (στάδιον), and so forth. He complains that physical strength and dexterity are esteemed, and he condemns pride, because he finds a price for the godlessness therein. He disapproves of conversation about the myths of the poets. In this regard he himself is to be judged unfavorably as a poet. Cicero ascribes “less good verse” (minus bonos versus) to him.\(^ {19}\) We have in him the ethical teacher still at the level of the rhapsode: in later times he would have had to be a Sophist. We must presume an extraordinary freedom of individuality here, especially because he did not withdraw into seclusion, like Heraclitus, but rather commenced with his attacks precisely on this public at the games of competition. His life of eternal wandering brought him together with the most famous of men, so it is certainly from personal reminiscence of Pythagoras that he narrated:

They say that, passing a belaboured whelp,  
He, full of pity, spake these words of dole:  
“Stay, smite not! ’Tis a friend, a human soul;  
I knew him straight when I heard him yelp!”\(^ {20}\)

If he presented perspectives against Thales, he must have known of him. For a number of physical propositions, Thales is certainly his only forerunner. Xenophanes was the first to observe fossilized mussels and the like atop mountains. Hippolytus names Syracuse, Paros, and Melita as the sites of his

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17. Athenaeus 413f. [The translation of Nietzsche's German is mine.]
18. Galen, "Ein Dichter bei Galenos," by F. W. Schneidewin. [The translation of Nietzsche's German is mine.]
19. Cicero, Academica 2.23, 74. [This citation seems to be only half-correct. The quotation comes from Cicero, Academica, bk. 2, ch. 74, but is not found in ch. 23.]
20. καὶ ποτὲ μὲν στυφελιζόμενον σκύλακον παρίτοντα φασίν ἐποικεῖται καὶ τὸ δοξάζει ἐποκόριον ἡ ἠφίλος αὐτὸς ἀνέρος ἑστιν νυκτῆ, τὴν ἐγερνον φθεγχομένης αἰῶν (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 8, sect. 36.)
observation. He [Xenophanes] concluded that the earth had crossed over from a fluid state into a fixed one and that with time it will once more transform into mud. Earth particles undergo a periodic conversion out of water into earth, and then the earth goes under in water; as a result, the human race, along with its environs, sinks into water. He explains clouds, rain, and wind by way of mist [that which is the thinnest, i.e., particles of water] drawn out of the sea by the heat of the sun. Sun, moon, stars, rainbows, comets, lightning, and so forth are nothing other than burning, fiery haze: they are extinguished on descent and formed anew on ascent. These hazy masses move themselves in an infinitely precise course over the Earth; if their orbits appear circular to us, it is an optical illusion, like the remaining clouds. From this it follows that continuously new stars must enter into our circle of stars and that different parts of the earth widely distant from each other must be illuminated by different suns.

All insights of this sort suggest a close association to Thales, whose genuine originality lies in the notion of the oneness of the world: [that of Xenophanes] was a dualism similar to Anaximander’s Unlimited: here, the world of Becoming and Passing Away; there, eternally fixed divine primal matter. Diogenes Laertius says, “Xenophanes was the first to declare that everything which comes into being is doomed to perish,” making reference here to his contemporary Anaximander. Well then! This relationship makes it possible that Parmenides was taught by them both. He merged the Unlimited with Xenophanes’ God and sought to eliminate the dualism in both contemplations of the world. How is plurality possible, if only true Being is? Xenophanes already accomplished intellectual progress; he believed we exist abandoned to delusion, to what is opinion—no absolute truth could exist for us. He stimulates a critique of our epistemological apparatus. “No man knows, or ever will know, the truth about the gods and about everything I speak of: for even if one chanced to say the complete truth, yet oneself knows it not; but seeming is wrought over all things.” (All is swayed to opinion.)

Parmenides shows a threefold influence: Anaximander, Xenophanes, and a Pythagorean [named] Ameinias, in this order. The influence of Pythagoras is at its height approximately following the founding of Elea: Parmenides cer-

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22. πρῶτος τε ἀπερήνατο ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γεγομένον φθαρτόν ἔστι (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 9, sect. 19).
23. καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτε ἀνήρ γένετ· οὐδὲ τις ἔσται εἰδώς, ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων· εἰ γὰρ καὶ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένοι εἰσίν, αὐτὸς δὴ ὡς οὐχ οἶδε· ὃσος δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται. [Nietzsche cites only “fragment 14,” but this is actually Xenophanes, fragment 34d. The translation is from Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers.]
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tainly comes into contact with Pythagoreanism for the first time as an Eleatic. Here the effect shows itself to be only [that of] the life of Pythagoras (βίος Πυθαγόρειος) [on] the life of Parmenides (βίος Παρμενίδειος). The Tabula of Cebes [speaks of] “a Pythagorean and Parmenidean way of life.”

24. We can find nothing at all of a Pythagorean philosophy. Laertius portrays him [Parmenides] as being “of illustrious birth and possessed of great wealth; moreover it was Ameinias and not Xenophanes who led him to adopt the peaceful life of a student.”

25. He was son of Pyres (Pyres). His influence must have been very great later, because he is said to have given the Eleatic Laws, which had to be sworn anew every year.

26. He takes a position similar to [that of] Empedocles: in addition to the secretive standing that the Pythagoreans still enjoyed, his personal prestige was incredible. The Pythagorean view of the world reveals itself here and there. Simplicius says of Parmenides’ world-governing deity, “And he [Parmenides] says that it [daimon] at times sends the souls from the manifest into the formless and at other times contrariwise.”

27. Here we find the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul.

To grasp the specifics of Parmenides, we must reflect on two great periods of those philosophical worldviews he generated: first, a furthering of the Anaximandrian system, and second, the theory purely of Being. The latter required him to discard every other notion, thus also his own previous one, as a deception of the senses. But he permitted himself to say, “if one were to partake in another direction, my previous viewpoint alone is justified.”

28. Only in this way do we psychologically grasp the careful execution of this other insight; it later forms the second book of On Nature (apparently he composed the first later). The discoveries here indicate him still to be in the full power of youth; much of it is mythic. Anaximander introduced for the first time the dichotomy between a world of Being and a world of Becoming (Not-Being); the latter follows from the dualistic principle of warmth and

24. Πυθαγόρειον τινα και Παρμενίδειον ἡγεμὸν (The Tabula of Cebes, ch. 2). [The entire passage reads in translation: “Rather, once long ago, a certain foreigner came here, a sensible man and exceptional in wisdom, who was emulating in word and deed a Pythagorean and Parmenidean way of life, and he dedicated both this temple and the painting to Cronus.” English-language translation is from Cebes, The Tabula of Cebes, trans. John T. Fitzgerald and L. Michael White (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1983).]

25. γένος τε ὑπὸ τοῦ λαμπροῦ καὶ πλοῦσιος ὑπ’ Ἀμεινίδος ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ Ἑνοφάνους εἰς ἡμαρχίαν προετράπη (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 9, sect. 21).


27. καὶ τὸς φυσικός [sic] πέμπειν ποτὲ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανοῦς εἰς τὸ άειδές, ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαυσιν φισι (Simplicius, Physics 9). [English-language translation is by R. Scott Smith.]

28. [This is a conjecture as to the reasoning pattern of Parmenides, not a paraphrase.]
cold. Well, Anaximander attempts to prevent this stark dichotomy such that, in the world at hand, he discovered immanent, opposing spheres of Being and Not-Being: he transferred the dichotomy between Being and Not-Being to the dualistic principle of worldly explanations. These two tables of categories—of which Anaximander had discovered only one pair, warmth and cold—run as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Being</th>
<th>Not-Being</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fire, light</td>
<td>Darkness, night</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire</td>
<td>Earth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warm</td>
<td>Cold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Heavy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thin</td>
<td>Thick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The active</td>
<td>The passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That which binds these elements together he describes as the goddess enthroned at the center of the world, “for she it is that begins all the works of hateful birth and begetting, sending female to mix with male and male in turn with female.”

All Becoming is accordingly a procreative bond of Being with Not-Being; also, Parmenides joins Anaxagoras in the belief that everything that comes to be must pass away; it must, obviously, undergo Not-Being. Yet he accepts the eternity of these elements compelled together; he describes this drive as Aphrodite, governess, justice, and necessity (Ἀφροδίτη κυβερνήτης δίκη ἀνάγκη). Now Cicero is of decisive importance: “he [Parmenides] deifies war, strife, lust and the like, things which can be destroyed by disease or sleep or forgetfulness or lapse of time.” Thus the same deity likewise expresses itself in war, in uprising [στάσις], in eros—in other words, mutual attraction and mutual repulsion; the Becoming of the world is in both elements. In the state of sleep, illness, et cetera—above all, in death—a reciprocal destruction, Passing Away, enters.—

Were we to compare this view of the world with [that of] Heraclitus, [we would see that] they share the beliefs that opposed qualities are active in each

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29. τὰντη γάρ στυγεροῖ τόκου καὶ μέξιος ἀρχὴ πέμπουσα ἄρρενα θῆλυ μιγῆναι, ἐναντία δ’ αὔθως ἄρρεν ἴσως ἃτερ, ἐκ τῆς τυχῆς ἄδειος ἄκαμμος ἐκτήσει καὶ ἐργῇ ἔφεσι (Ἀναξαγόρας, διάλεκτος 12d. The translation is from Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers. Nietzsche does not identify the quotation.)

30. quippe qui bellum qui discordiam qui cupiditatem ceteraque generis eiusdem ad deum revocet, quae vel morbo vel somno vel oblivione vel vetustate delentur (Cicero, De natura deorum, bk. 1, ch. 11). English-language translation is from Cicero, De natura deorum, Academica, with an English trans. by H. R. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library, 1933).
thing that becomes and that the thing perishes on them as well. But whereas Heraclitus sees only the endless transformation of one fire in all qualities, Parmenides in general perceives the transformation of two opposing elements. War, for Heraclitus, is a game, the characteristic mark of hatred here, yet the hateful elements have an instinct toward each other. This is a very significant conception, for the world of Heraclitus was without instincts: knowing and not knowing, fire and water, war—yet there is nothing in them that explains drive, instinct. It is an aesthetic view of the world. Here with Parmenides, everything aesthetic ends; hate and love are not a game but rather effects of the same daimon. We see in this genius the struggle to overcome dualism, yet it transpires in only a mythical manner—the notion of reducing Becoming and passing away to a love struggle between Being and Not-Being. What a colossal abstraction!

Becoming could in no way be derived from the one world of the Unlimited: something must be added to it, and that must be its complete opposite, the world of Not-Being. No third exists. Now he made the advance not to present this dichotomy as entirely abstract but instead to formulate the dichotomies into the actual world and to translate it into these primordial laws, an advance that Pythagorean philosophy later made possible.

The structure of his study of nature [Physiologie] is closely related to Anaximander, who had assumed three concentric spheres, the innermost earth, around it air, and around them the fiery circle. For Parmenides, the whole is assembled from several concentric balls. The innermost and outermost consist of dark, heavy elements; around the innermost and beneath the outermost lie circles of mixed darkness and fire. The earth is the nucleus of the mixed spheres of the starry heavens; the stars are fiery masses of vapor (πυρά θεον). A fiery circle lies around the realm of stars, with a fixed stratum around them. At the center of the entire world, the daimon has its domicile; yet in this regard I am thinking not of the innermost core of earth but rather of the middle sphere, as [the sixth-century Byzantine anthologist Joannes] Stobaeus explicitly says, “And in the middle of the whole mixture exists the begetter of all motion and creation, which he [Parmenides] calls a daimon.”

31. This is disputed by Krische and Zeller. 32. Humanity must have

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31. τὸν δὲ συμμιγῶν τὴν μεσαιτάτην ἀπάσαις τοκεὰ πάσης κινήσεως καὶ γενέσεως υπάρχειν, ἣντινα καὶ δαίμονα [κυβερνήτην καὶ κληρούχον] ἐπωνυμάζει (Joannes Stobaeus, Eclogues [Excerpts] 1.482. [The translation is by R. Scott Smith. Nietzsche added the words “motion and creation” (shown in brackets) to the received version. Even the received version is uncertain, however.)

32. Krische, Forschungen, 105; Zeller, 485. [The first reference is to August Bernhard Krische,
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originated, of course, out of warm and cold elements. Indeed, Laertius says only, "The generation of man proceeded from the sun as first cause," yet Steinhart is correct to read "from the sun and from mud." Life and reason lie in warmth; sleep and age are explained by depletion of warmth. The ideas vary, depending on which one element dominates. He [Parmenides] has merged, as Theophrastus and Aristotle note, knowledge (φρόνησις) with sensation (αἴσθησις). We must always remind ourselves that a dichotomy between "spirit" and "matter" is absent from the table of categories. Much of the more precise presentation is lost to us.

We cannot think of such a system, with so many significant discoveries, as an accommodation to the delusions of the masses: it is the result of the first period, and afterward it was powerfully reworked by Empedocles and the Pythagoreans. The concepts of Being and Not-Being, introduced here for the first time, however, demand their rights in a later period. We must assume, in the person of Parmenides, an entirely extraordinary power of abstraction. The cardinal idea was that only Being is; Not-Being cannot be. It is the greatest error to speak of a Being of Not-Being. His expressions are as sharp possible, because he internalized a sense of how long the element Not-Being has been spoken of as Being. Here, where it came to pure division of dichotomies, the system of Heraclitus, with its antinomies, was doubly hateful to him; he battles against him in verse 46, as [Jacob] Bernays has recognized. The Heracliteans were called "two-headed" (δίχρονοι) because of propositions such as "we are and we are not." Such a manner of expression, resembling law in that it is continually superseded, follows on their helplessness (ἀμηχανία). They were described as "knowing nothing" (ἐιδότες οὐδέν), similar to how Plato, at the end of the Cratylus, argues that, given eternal flux, no continuity in knowing, and therefore no knowledge, is possible. They are called "deaf

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33. γένεσιν άνθρώπων εξ ἡλίου πρῶτον γενέσθαι (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 9, sect. 22.
34. ἡλίου τε καὶ τιλός [my translation of the Greek]; Ersch and Gruber, Encyclopedia, 3 vols. [Nietzsche borrowed this encyclopedia from University of Basel Library in 1871 and afterward. He transposes the editors' names in his citation.]
35. Theophrastus, De sensu 3; Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 4, ch. 5 [1009b, ll. 13–14].
37. εἶμεν τε καὶ ὄν εἶμεν (Heraclitus, fragment 72, Schleiermacher). [Nietzsche's citation of fragment 72 is wrong; this is fragment 49a. He refers to Schleiermacher's Herakleitos, der Dunkle von Ephesos, dargestellt aus den Trümmern seines Werkes, und den Zeugnissen der Alten, in Sämtliche Werke, pt. 3, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1838).]
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and blind at once" (φορούνται, after πάντα φέρεσθαι), “maniacs” (φέρονται), as Plato\(^{38}\) says with a wordplay, “altogether dazed” (τεθηπότες). The specific astonishment is understood as undifferentiated; fundamentally, they are deaf and blind. Parmenides emphasizes the proposition, “Being and Not-Being are simultaneously the same and not the same.” He finally says, with clear allusions, “The path of all things is backward-turning” (πάντων δὲ πολιντροπός ἐστὶ κέλευθος), like the harmony of the spheres (πολιντροπος ἀρμονία κόσμου). Thus the polemic does not turn against the viewpoint of the masses, and hence also not against itself. He hates those who playfully consider, and dissolve, the dichotomy between Being and Not-Being.

Now [these are] the consequences of Being: that which is true is in the eternal present; we may not say of it, It Was or It Will Be. The concept of time has nothing to do with it. Being cannot have come to be; if so, whence [would it come], From Not-Being? But this is nothing and can produce nothing. From Being? This would be nothing other than self-creation. The same holds for Passing Away. In general, what has been, and what shall be, does not exist—yet we may not say of Being that it does not exist. Being is indivisible, because no second thing exists that could divide it; all of space is filled by it alone. It is immovable, for whither would it move if it fills all space, if it is of the one same sort through and through and is undivided? It may not be unfinished—the Unlimited—because that would be a deficiency, a need; consequently, it must be bounded. He compares this whole, eternally unchanged, hovering in equidistance, equally complete at all points, to a ball. Parmenides found this incredible abstraction Being analogous to the mythic One God of Xenophanes; only in this sense do they make contact with each other. The root [motive] is completely different for both: here, the eternal oneness of a pantheism; there, the abstract claim of the oneness of all Being. The latter claim is completely true; we, by dint of our organization, cannot imagine Not-Being; insofar as we extend the world with empty space, we nonetheless assume the existence, the Being, of space. Qua Being, the entire world is one, of the same sort, undivided, ungenerated, imperishable—assuming that our intellect is the measure of all things. We can conceive only Being. Of Not-Being we can have no idea. Possessing ideas and believing in Being merge together.

Now it may become what it will: the one overall presumed unity of Being is not affected thereby. Parmenides further concluded that Becoming belongs

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38. *Theaetetus* 179 [i.e., *Theaetetus* 179e: “For there is no discussing these principles of Heraclitus . . . with the Ephesians themselves, who profess to be familiar with them; you might as well talk to a maniac.”]
to the realm of deceptions, since it can belong to neither the world of Being nor that of Not-Being, for the latter does not exist. Well then! Toward this goal he launched for the first time an important critique of the epistemological apparatus. The philosopher says, “In order to attain truth, one should not follow stupid eyes, nor with ringing ears or the tongue, but rather one must grasp with the power of thought (λόγος).”

Here rests true belief (πίστις ἴσχύς), that from Being something else (still) cannot come; here true belief (πίστις ἀληθῆς) is rendered impossible by Becoming and Passing Away. Thus Logos recognizes the true essence of things; in other words, the abstractions and the perceptions of sensation are only deceptions. The fundamental deception is, however, that Not-Being also exists. A very remarkable advance! The most stripped-down generality, achieved by disallowing all other determinations, is said to be truthful; all closer determinations—in other words, the entire fullness of plurality, of predicates, and so on—are only a deception.

Here we have an unnatural tearing apart of the intellect. The consequence must finally be [a dichotomy between] spirit (the faculty of abstraction) and bodies (lower sensory apparatus), and we recognize the ethical consequences already in Plato: the philosopher’s task to liberate himself as much as possible from the bodily, meaning from the senses. [This is] the most dangerous of false paths, for no true philosophy can construct itself from this empty hull; it must proceed from intuition of reality, and the more it consists of fruitful individual aperçus, the higher it mounts. As a critique of epistemological faculties, however, this raw distinction is of the greatest worth; it is the original source first of dialectic (though there is no philosophy from a combination of concepts), and later of logic (in other words, we discover the mechanism of our abstraction in concepts, judgments, and conclusions). Add to this the explanation, as a partisan of the immovable whole (στασιώτης τοῦ ὀλίγου), of the entire world as a deception—an astounding and fruitful boldness.

Only we must not mistake Parmenidean idealism for that of Buddhism, still less for that of Kantianism. For Buddha it is an ethical, religious conviction.

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39. Karsten, [Parmenides,] no. 55. [This translation of Nietzsche’s paraphrase is mine. The full quotation may be found at Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 9, sect. 22: “And let not long-practised wont force thee to tread this path, to be governed by an aimless eye, an echoing ear and a tongue, but do thou with an understanding bring the much-contested issue to decision.” Nietzsche refers here to Simon Karsten (1802–64), a Dutch philologist and compiler of fragments by Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Empedocles.]

40. Intuitive knowing is the inexhaustible source of our insights: that which pertains to concepts is hidden therein.

41. [Cf. Plato, Theaetetus 181a. This is Socrates’ description of the Parmenidean school.]
tion to nothingness, to sorrow, to the perishability of all things: the world is Buddha's dream. For Kant the dichotomy between the thing-in-itself and the world of appearance is produced from a nearly inverted critique of knowledge. He considered precisely the predicates that Parmenides had left over—time and space, substance—as our necessary presuppositions of the world of representations, while he described the thing-in-itself as more [like] the Unlimited, as qualityless to our knowledge. Parmenides would have immediately rejected the thing-in-itself, for it would present itself to him as a Not-Being; that, however, is not allowed. Hence it is neither a mythic faith about pantheistic oneness, an ethical spite at the world as a fleeting dream, nor finally Kantian idealism but rather the more naive introduction of Being and Not-Being to the older system that brought him to the one idea "that Not-Being cannot be." Whereas he had earlier explained Becoming as a bond of Being and Not-Being, and in this regard had understood what does work (das Wirkende) as Being and matter as Not-Being (in other words, the living and that which does not in itself have life), now he has declared the entire table of categories as a delusion of the senses, since only the conceivable exists: Becoming cannot be conceived. Consequently, his elements are a delusion. With this, though, the problem of Becoming was not yet solved, because he retained Becoming and Passing Away in thought. Here he was not yet a partisan (στασιώτης). And then, if everything is only One, why appearance? Why delusion? Why the senses?

According to his older theory, Becoming originates when the living seizes the nonliving. According to the latter, it was only a phantasmagoria of the senses. Nothing whatsoever is explained with this. For this reason the later philosophers of nature take care to conceive Becoming in its connection to the earlier theory: Anaxagoras by means of νοῦς (living) and homoeomeries (nonliving), Empedocles by means of θύλα κούτις (living) and the four elements (nonliving), and the Pythagoreans [by means of] the bounded (living) and the unbounded. Dualism of principles runs throughout, from Anaximander on; Heraclitus and Parmenides alone are monists. The Atomists were pluralists, as was, on the other hand, Plato.

Yet of all standpoints, Parmenides' later one is the most void of content, the least fruitful, because it clarifies nothing at all: Aristotle rightfully calls him no natural philosopher (ἄφωσικός). It is also the sole piece of evidence
for a sharpness of the dialectical sense, but not for deep thought and contemplation; because of this, his school of eristic dialectics also declined. His first system had a more powerful, lasting effect, yet it was only an exposition of Anaximander's dualism. Through him, specifically, the problem of Becoming came into philosophy, not through the Eleatics. That they deny it is the shortest way out, yet the least illuminating. With this ceases all observation of nature, all desire to learn from things. Then the fundamental failure remains, that the apparatus of the senses is inexplicable: it moves itself; it is in plurality. If it itself is a delusion, how can it be the final cause of a second delusion? The senses deceive, but what if the senses did not exist? How could they deceive? So plurality and motion of the senses certainly exist, and so everything else may be moved and manifold.
Zeno

[Zeno was] from Elea, the son of Teleutagoras, and according to Apollodorus [he was] even the adoptive son of Parmenides. Laertius places his prime of life in Olympiad 79; the Suidas, in Olympiad 78. Of course by Plato’s calculation, to which we concede nothing, he was twenty-five years younger [than Parmenides] and was approximately forty years old in 455–450 B.C.E.; in other words, he must have been born in Olympiad 70 to 71 (495–490 B.C.E.). Obviously such calculations were authoritative; Eusebius, for example, has his acme as occurring during Olympiad 80, at forty years of age, which is precisely the time period Plato indicates (one that may have included Olympiads 79 and 78, too, although probably not). This chronological attribution is, for us, unfounded. If Olympiad 69 is the acme of Parmenides, then we have no further datings other than that he stayed in Athens at the time of Pericles; his leadership of the state begins, though, in the fourth year of Olympiad 77. Perhaps Apollodorus, whose statement was available to Laertius, calculated according to this. The reference to Pericles is just an acme. Well then! Laertius, on the other side, doubts the entire statement,1 [claiming that Zeno] lived only in Elea out of his devotion to his home, without so much as visiting Athens. Yet [this is true] only given the false reading οὐκ ἐπιδημήσας τὸ παράπαν πρὸς αὐτούς. The correct one is οὐκ ἐπιδημήσας τὰ πολλά πρὸς αὐτούς.2 He was [in any case] not often in Athens (τὸ παράπαν is probably only a conjecture by Cobet). We know nothing about his life, and his death is a resplendent theme of rhetoric already in early times. He was seized in an undertaking against a tyrant and unfalteringly died as a martyr. Elea appears to have been oppressed. The tyrant is named Diomedon or Nearchus or otherwise.

1. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 9, sect. 28. [Here I am reading bezweit als bezweitelt.]
Plato described a writing [by Zeno] more precisely as a summary (σύγγραμμα) (yet as the only one that existed) divided into several topics (λόγοι), each of which contained in turn several hypotheses (ὑποθέσεις), [all designed] to lead the presentation of the assumption to absurdity (ad absurdum [an indirect proof]). Obviously questions and answers occurred, and as a result it could later be said he was the author of dialogues. On the contrary, Aristotle designated him as the inventor of dialectic, as Empedocles [was] of rhetoric. Plato calls him the “Eleatic Palamedes.” Thus, he is the first to introduce the art of discussion in reasons and counterreasons into philosophy. A completely new talent! Philosophy previously had been monological. There are no other writings. It is completely wrong when the Suidas cites Epides, Exegesis on Empedocles, Concerning the Philosophers, and On Nature (ἐπιδεῖς, ἐξήγησις Ἐμπεδοκλέους, πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσόφους, περὶ φύσεως) (with the possible exception of ἐπιδεῖς). We must think of some other Zeno: the Stoic does not fit, for we are familiar with his writings; it could possibly be the student of Chrysippus, “who left few writings but many students.” Yet the best [choice] is the eighth, “a Sidonian by birth and an Epicurean philosopher, lucid both in thinking and in style.” Thus with the Suidas we have a case of mistaken identity between homonyms (ὁμώνυμοι). So the Epicurean Hermarchos wrote the twenty-two books of On Empedocles (περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους) in a hostile fashion. (They are opposed worldviews, Empedocles and Epicurus.)

Plato designates as the first hypothesis, “If existent things were a plurality, then they would have to be both like and not like (like as beings, unlike as many), [but] that is impossible, since neither the unlike can be called like, nor the like unlike: thus a plurality is impossible, because then something impossible would have been stated by it.” This is the genuine contents of his

4. Plato, Phaedrus 261[d].
5. βιβλία μὲν ὄλιγα γεγραφότας, μαθητάς δὲ πλείστους καταλελοιπότας (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 7, sect. 35).
6. Σιδώνιος τὸ γένος, φιλόσοφος Ἐπικούρειος καὶ νοησάς καὶ ἐρμηνεύσας σοφῆς (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 7, sect. 35).
7. Bernays, Theop. über Frömmigkeit, 8. [i.e., Jacob Bernays, Theophrastos’s Schrift über Frömmigkeit: Ein Beitrag zur Religionsgeschichte (Berlin, 1866).]
8. [This seems to be Nietzsche’s paraphrase of Parmenides 127e rather than an exact quotation. It is in German, not Greek; no citation is given; and it follows the text loosely. Cornford’s translation runs: “If things are many . . . they must be both like and unlike. But that is impossible; unlike things cannot be like, nor like things unlike. . . . And so, if unlike things cannot be like or like things unlike, it is also impossible that things should be a plurality; if many things did exist, they would have impossible attributes” (Plato, Parmenides, trans. Francis Cornford, in Plato, The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Bollingen Series 71 [Princeton,
writing, that plurality does not exist. It is the inversion of Parmenides' proposition, "all things are one" (everything is one). The concept that Zeno has discovered as additional to the "Being" of Parmenides is the "Infinite" par nobile fratrum. With it he contests the plurality of things and thereupon their motion.

There are four proofs against plurality (the first with Plato [already introduced]).

2. If Being were many things, then it would have to be simultaneously infinitely small and infinitely large. This is a contradiction.

*Infinitely small:* every plurality consists of unities, [but] a real unity is indivisible: what is indivisible cannot have size, because everything that has size is divisible into infinity. The individual parts of which the Many consists therefore have no size. It does not increase in size when we add to them; [it does] not [grow] smaller if we subtract from them. However, that which is not enlarged by adding to it, or decreased by subtracting from it, is nothing: Thus plurality is infinitely small, since all its constitutive parts are so small that they are nothing.

These parts must in turn be *infinitely large,* however, because, since that which has no size is nothing, the Many must, in order to exist, have size, [and] their parts must have distance between one another, meaning that other parts must lie between them. Yet likeness is true of them; they must also have a size and be separated from one another and so forth into infinity. We achieve, then, either infinitely many sizes or an infinite largeness.

3. The Many must be quantitatively both limited and unlimited—limited, because it is as many as it is, not more and not less; unlimited, because two things are two things only if they are separated from each other. In the case where they are separated, something must be between them, just as between this and that of the two, and so on. Between two a third is always placed, and so on. The ancients call this form of proof the dichotomy (dichotomy). (Consequently, the atomists: sizes are not infinitely divisible.)

4. If everything that exists is in space, then in turn space itself must be in space, and so on into infinity. Since this is unthinkable, Being in general cannot be in space. (Because then space is something that is, and thus it in turn would have to be in a space, etc.)

Proofs against motion: 1. Before the body in motion can reach its end-

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N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973). Note that this quotation constitutes not only the first hypothesis but also its reductio ad absurdum.

9. [Literally, "a pair of noble brothers"; figuratively, "two just alike, or as good, or as bad, as the other."]
point, it must have arrived at the midpoint of its path; before it can arrive at this one, it must arrive at the midpoint of the first half; before it arrives there, it must arrive at the midpoint of the first quarter, et cetera. To arrive at one point from another, then, each body must traverse infinitely many spaces. The Infinite, though, may not be traversed in any amount of time. It is impossible, consequently, to move from one point to another. Motion is impossible. The popular form of this is the so-called Achilles. The turtle, the slowest being, cannot be overtaken by Achilles, the fastest one, if it has a head start. 2. Each body in motion has a definite location in every point of time in which it rests. Well, motion nevertheless cannot materialize out of nothing other than individual moments of rest. The flying arrow rests at every instant of its flight; if we ask, Where is the arrow at this instant? we cannot say, “In transit from space A to space B” rather, [we must say] only at space A. Nothing but moments of repose added together cannot yield motion, just as little as the line cannot be generated from points added together. The individual moment of the flight path is infinitely small: we are not in the position to originate even the smallest motion, because we still do not attain size through infinitely many additions to the infinitely small.

All these proofs are produced under the hypothesis that space and time possess absolute reality. This is contradicted, and the leap is additionally made that they possess no reality at all. This leaves an essential possibility that was to be recognized, of course, only from a profound critique of the intellect, namely, the reality of space and time in our imagination, as a necessary formation for thought. Well then! It seems as if a contradiction is hiding here. We are required, first, to conceive everything under the form of time and space by means of our organization [in the sense of organic composition]. How is it possible that this same organization may render possible for us a counterproof against absolute reality? This occurs with the help of abstractions such as “Being” and “Infinity”—we can no longer imagine this, [however, for] it is a concept graspable purely negatively, through deletion of all definite predicates. The actual world gives us nothing of absolute Being or [of] something infinite. It yields for us, very relativistically, life and persistence; it gives us finite numbers. An absolute persistence and not passing away, a number whose end we never approach, a space that never comes to an end, and a time that never reaches its boundary are representations of dogmatic, nonempirical nature, in which we overlook the relativity of all our representational images. If we proceed from these dogmatic notions, however, then we discover a contradiction between them and our thoroughly relativistic, normal manner of reflection.
Now as a result of this, Zeno rejects the legitimacy of the latter. Since Kant we say, on the contrary, that the popular manner of contemplating space and time is correct; there are empirical realities for us. On the other hand, infinite time, infinite space, and in general the entire absolute reality of the same are indemonstrable. The contradictions enter in this way, that extremely relativistic opinions [Gemeinte] are reinterpreted as universal laws. For example, the motion of a thing to another\(^\text{10}\) is impossible if an absolutely real space lies between them, specifically because something infinite lies between. Well then! One thing does have contact with another, yet the reality of this thing in its motion is in no respect more real than the space between them. The one, like the other, is our representation; we know, in itself, neither whether a thing exists, whether there is motion, nor whether space exists. If we maintain anything whatsoever dogmatically, but the other not, we are just as incorrect as when we maintain the dogmatic reality of all things.

Yet this knowledge, which ancient philosophy did not know to expand, is important: all sorts of reflection on our notions as eternal truths [aeternae veritates] lead to contradictions. If there is absolute motion, space does not exist; if absolute space exists, motion does not exist; if an absolute plurality exists, unity does not exist; and so forth, since it should become clear to us how little we touch the heart of things with such general concepts. And if there had been a seed of profundity in Eleatism, it would have had to have foreseen the Kantian problem from here on. Yet it was lost in eristics and dialectic up until the manner of argumentation as in the Parmenides: every predicate and its opposite befits everything.

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10. [One body moving to another, that is, direct contact between two bodies, which is, according to Plato, a leg of Zeno's broader argument; see Francis Macdonald Cornford's Plato and Parmenides (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, n.d.), 167.]
Anaxagoras of Clazomenae

[Anaxagoras was the] son of Hegesibulus (or Eubulus), from a rich and noble family. He is generally designated as a pupil of Anaximenes, yet this is impossible, because, according to Apollodorus, Anaximenes dies and Anaxagoras is born in Olympiad 70. He [Apollodorus] states that Anaxagoras was born in Olympiad 70 and was twenty years old on Xerxes’ drive against Greece; thus, [he was] born in the first year of Olympiad 70 (500 B.C.E.) and died the first year of Olympiad 88 (428 or 427 B.C.E.) at the age of seventy-two. This is a very precise testimony that K. F. Hermann very unjustly doubts. Of course, those committed to the [theory of successions] are forced to postdate. Zeller rejects all other thoughtful grounds, yet only one statement about Anaxagoras is regularly misunderstood: “He began to study philosophy at Athens in the archonship of Callias when he was twenty; Demetrius of Phalerum states this in his list of archons; and at Athens they say he remained for thirty years.” It is not necessary, in this regard, to still conjecture about a “Calliades”; they are the same name. Calliades [= Callias] was archon in 480 B.C.E.

But of what did Demetrius make note, or false note? Certainly not that in far-off Clazomenae a youth began to philosophize? Rather, [it is] what is

1. Or Euphemus[,] Theopehus[,] Jocaste[,] Epicaste[,] Scamon.
3. As far as the first year of Olympiad 88 being his year of death [as Hermann suggests], Hippolytus says he flourished (ἡζημενεν) then at Refutations, bk. 1, ch. 8.
6. [Zeller agrees that these are two forms of the same name (Eduard Zeller, A History of Greek Philosophy from the Earliest Period to the Time of Socrates, trans. S. F. Alleyne, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, 1881), 322n3.]
stated there, and what is never believed, *that in Athens he began to philosophize publicly!* So what we have here is a precocious genius [*ingentium praecox*]. But why did he come to Athens? Apollodorus states the cause precisely. Apparently he was fleeing the Persians. Zeller wonders why he went to Athens to philosophize, even though no philosopher of repute had lodged there for decades. *It was not an educational journey but rather a flight.* He had the air of a researcher of nature, of course; that was his talent. He left his property behind and then left his relatives. Aristotle tells us that Anaxagoras had said, concerning the question of what gives life value, “For the sake of contemplating the heavens and the whole order of the universe.”

When someone chastised him, [asking,] “Have you no concern for your homeland?” “Gently,” he says, “I am greatly concerned with my fatherland,” and pointed to the sky. Well then, was not the occasion noted in the *Lists* that he *began to hold philosophical lectures in Athens as a young man?* Whereas I cannot imagine, given the usual approach and redaction of this passage, of what it takes note!

Of course, my approach follows from a conjecture. First, Anaxagoras left Athens a few years before his death. Among the attacks on Pericles immediately before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War was also a trial of Aspasia and Anaxagoras. Hermippus charged Aspasia with participation in the godlessness of Anaxagoras. She was acquitted with Pericles’ speech. Yet he did not venture to allow Anaxagoras his investigations: the latter left Athens for Lampsacus, where he died soon thereafter. The more precise circumstances are multifariously narrated, [for example, in] Diogenes Laertius’s *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* and Plutarch’s *Life of Pericles* and *Life of Nicias.* Accordingly, though, he spent not thirty years in Athens but rather

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7. [Zeller asks, “What could have induced him to come for this purpose [i.e., to study philosophy] at the very moment when the armies of Xerxes were pouring down upon Athens, to a city which neither them, nor for many decades previously, had harboured any noteworthy philosopher within its walls?” (*History of Greek Philosophy*, 2:322n3). Nietzsche argues his journey was a flight from Xerxes, but Zeller explicitly notes that the armies of Xerxes were pouring into Athens as well. Nonetheless, if Anaxagoras fled before the approaching armies, he might still have arrived in Athens at the time of its siege, and not for the single purpose of commencing philosophical activity.]


10. [My emphases.]

fifty, a very easy emendation. Thus Anaxagoras is the genuine, premier philosopher of Athens. The comics could not help but consider him a type of philosophical free spirit: Socrates receives essential characteristics from Anaxagoras. He enjoys the most noble and highest society: Pericles, Phidias, and Aspasia. His great worth is praised; Pericles is said to derive his seriousness from his contacts with him, [for] he never laughs. Concerning the remark, "You miss the society of the Athenians?" he says, "Not I, but they miss mine." When someone complained that he had to die in exile, he says, "The descent to Hades is much the same from whatever place we start." We see here, after all, that he was considered an Athenian.

The entire later generation of investigators of nature proceed from one definite viewpoint concerning Becoming: they reject genuine Becoming and Passing Away. It cannot originate from nothing. It [Becoming] can know nothing of what passes away. Thus, that which truly is must be eternal. He considered only combination (συμμίγγεςθαί) and dissolution (διακρίνεσθαί) as valid. The first one to present a theory of Becoming and Passing Away, but only roughly, is Anaximenes: thinning (μάνωσίς) and thickening (πυκνοσίς). The second hypothesis is mixture (μίξις) and separation (διάκρισις). Well then! The older theory was that one element explains all things, that all qualities ultimately lead back to one quality, be it air or fire. On the other hand, Anaxagoras now maintains mixture and separation in accord with his theory.

Through ever so much mixing together, something unlike can still never be extracted from like; thinning and thickening do not alter qualities whatsoever. The universe is full of different qualities; these exist—therefore, they must be eternal. He perceives the actual world as true Being: all its qualities must eternally exist. There are never more or less. We observe the influence of the

12. ἔνθα καὶ φασὶν αὐτῶν ἔτων διατρίψαι Ν (πεντήκοντα) (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 2, sect. 12). [Nietzsche offers an alternative here, reading Ν, the numeral fifty, rather than Α, the numeral thirty.]

13. ἐστερήθης Ἀθηναίων; οὐ μὲν οὖν, ἀλλὰ ἐξεῖνοι ἐμοῦ [(Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 2, sect. 10.).]

14. [Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 2, sect. 11. This quotation is given in German in Nietzsche's notes.]

15. [Nietzsche includes a disconnected footnote, that I will place here, where it seems most appropriate:] An entirely new situation by way of Anaxagoras: a substitute for religion in the circles of the educated. Philosophy as an esoteric cult of the man of knowledge in contrast to folk religion. Mind [νοῦς] as the architect and artist, like Phidias. The majesty of simple unmoved beauty—Pericles as orator. The simplest possible means. Many beings; countless many. Nothing goes lost. Dualism of motion. The entire mind moves. Against Parmenides: he takes into account the mind, the will with nous, but he must now carry out a new distinction, that of vegetative and animal.

16. Simplicius [on Aristotle's Physics], bk. 1, ch. 33.
Eleatics here. They agree about the meaning of Being (ὄν), yet, by Anaxagoras's account, countless beings (ὄντα) exist.\textsuperscript{17} His writings proceed from there. Becoming and Passing Away do not exist, but rather everything is the same into all of time. All difference concerns motion; motion is thus what it is to be genuinely alive. Well now, the actual world reveals itself to us not as a chaos but instead as order and beauty, determinant lawfulness, and so on. Chance, Anaxagoras says, cannot explain such things. What is it, then, that so orders and arranges lawful regularity? Naturally, [it is] also something “eternally being,” since we continuously observe its efficacy, yet not compenetrating\textsuperscript{18} with the other beings, since it orders just... well... independently.

Now the intellect ( νοῦς, neither intellect, understanding, nor reason—authentically Greek\textsuperscript{19}—the power of language!) in all things that possesses life is such Being; it alone moves. Hence, motion in the organization of the universe must be the aftereffects of such an intellect. So he supposes that intellect has given impetus to motion—it produces a circular motion (or vortical movement, ἑπερχόρησις) on one point of mass, which immediately expands outward and pulls ever larger parts into its range, moving ever farther outward. In the beginning things came together in two masses in accord with the general distinctions thick and thin, cold and warm, dark and light, and moist and dry: he calls aether the warmth, lightness, and thinness of all things, air, everything cold, dark, and heavy. The thick and moist are driven into the center, thin and warm to the outside, by way of momentum, just as the heavy is driven into the center. Water divides itself from the outer vaporous mass; from it, the earth; and from earth [divide] the stones by the action of cold. Several masses of stone, ripped from the earth by the violence of the momentum, glow in the aether, illuminating the earth; these are the sun and stars. Earth originally resembles mud; it is dried out by the sun, the remaining water becoming bitter and salty.

We must never speak of “Becoming” here. Everything divides [first]

\textsuperscript{17} Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, bk. 1, ch. 3.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{[Ineinanderfallen; compenetration} is Boscovich's technical term. Anaxagoras discovers the impossibility of compenetration, as does Boscovich later.]

from the general qualities and then [from] the more specialized, *yet the most specialized are actual from the beginning in the primal mass.* The self-encompassing circular motion brings the order of principle to this chaotic mass. This is the important idea of Anaxagoras, that rotation suffices to explain all order and regularity in the universe. Only in this way does intellect effect order, or so says Aristotle. Anaxagoras deduces reason as a means of information at the formation of the universe; otherwise he cites everything else as the cause before intellect. We should not, then, confuse him, without further qualifications, with the *teleologists.* He does not espouse a viewpoint of purposefulness for the intellect. Intellect does not work in every individual case; instead, order is a consequence of an *individual eternally continuous purposiveness,* of *circular motion.* From this all else follows immediately. Only in this sense is intellect simultaneously efficient cause (*caussa efficiens*) and final cause (*caussa finalis*), according to Aristotle’s *Metaphysics.* As a result of Anaxagoras’s insight, this final cause, by dint of which the world is good and which is the cause of motion, would simultaneously be made into his principle of Being. Aristotle’s *On the Parts of Animals:* “There are then two causes, namely, necessity and the final end.” Anaxagoras was far removed from a direct purposive end for all individual things, and this is the point where Plato (in the *Phaedo*) and Aristotle launch criticisms of him. He did not see how to use his principle; it is only a ghost in the machine (or *deus ex machina, θεός ἐκ μηχανῆς*).

To consider “spirit,” the testimony of the brain, as supernatural and even to deify it—what foolishness! The human being takes the workings of the most complicated mechanism, that of the brain, as being the effect of the same sort of original cause. Because this complicated mechanism produces something intelligible in a short time, he takes the existence of the universe as very recent; he thinks [the universe] cannot have taken the creator very much time. We, on the other hand, see in this the rigor of his natural scientific understanding: he [Anaxagoras] wanted to explain the actual world with the

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24. [These first three sentences of this paragraph were a disconnected footnote by Nietzsche. I have placed them in the text itself, where they seem to belong. Nietzsche’s early readings on the brain include works by Helmholtz, Lange, and, within a year, Africanus Alexandrovich Spir.]
fewest possible nonphysical theories. For him, circular motion suffices; had he immediately imagined an intellect with continual purposive ends, it would have become a mythological being, a god—precisely what he dismisses. He discovered intellect as the mover in the human being and in the living being (not some conscious intellect, because he does not find that in plants and animals). It was a dangerous distinction: he called everything that genuinely moves in the human “intellect.” Since it exists, he thought of the intellect as eternal: it is the sole thing that has motion in itself, and hence it is to be used for the movement of the eternal, rigid chaos of things. Everything else is moved; intellect moves itself. Its relationship to the [human] body qualifies it as an exemplar to the entire world; not everything has intellect—that differentiates it in principle from all the others. Everything else is mixed; each has something in itself of all things. Only intellect is not mixed; were it mixed with one, it would be mixed with all. Intellect relates differently to the body than any being whatsoever [does] to any other being. Every being has a small particle of all things in itself; it is named according to the preponderance of gold, silver, and so on.

The intellect is pure and unmixed. Intellect is not mixed in with anything else but instead, wherever it finds itself, rules and moves the other. Intellect is entirely homogeneous throughout. It differentiates itself only with measurement. “All living beings have active intellect, but not all of those beings suffer.”25 Zeller dismisses this unjustly.26 Every commentator explains intellect incorrectly: it is life, not conscious knowing. The principle of motion is active intellect, [whereas] suffering intellect is knowledge—few have that. That motion is produced by intellect means only that it is active intellect. We observe here that Anaxagoras means “act of will” as the primary expression of intellect on the other. Everywhere he sees nonmechanical behavior—for example, with plants—he assumes active intellect. The better the tool [Werkzeug], the more intellect can come to the fore and reveal itself. For example, Aristotle’s On the Parts of Animals [reports Anaxagoras as holding.] “The possession of these hands is the cause of man being of all animals the most intelligent.”27 He had built the best tool, because he had the most intellect.28 The “most intel-

25. Pseudo-Plutarch, Placita Philosophorum 5.20.3. [Nietzsche renders this quotation in German, which is the source for the translation here.]
28. [Aristotle continues: “For the most intelligent of animals is the one who would put the most
ligent being” is that one in which intellect can best express itself, because it is fundamentally the same intellect everywhere. Differences in intellect are produced, then, by matter. Intellect rules it, yet the more purposefully it is formed for behavior [Handeln], the better its grip [handhabt]. The seeds of living beings, of plants, are, of course, also eternal—their origin depends on circular motion (περικυκλώσεις), as with all other things. He presumes the eternity of humans and plants, et cetera, in the same way as that of gold. Reproduction is a transmission of the intellect of life to new beings. Yet fundamentally nothing is altered, neither the things nor intellect: there is always the same amount of spirit [Geist] in the universe. Indeed, it can never be destroyed.

It is foolishness for us to speak of a personality of the spirit: the spirit now in all living things is naturally also that which originally gave impetus to motion. He discovers the law of conservation of force [Kraft] and that of the indestructibility of matter. All motion is either direct or indirect. The form of direct motion is organic life or mechanical motion: the indirect is always [only] mechanical. In this regard we continually maintain that a dichotomy between matter and spirit did not exist for him. Intellect is only the finest (λεπτότατον) and purest (καθαρότατον) of all things and has all knowledge about everything (γνώμην περί ποινός πάσην ἢσχεν). Knowledge is one property of this Being. Representation and drive are both conjoined in the one concept intellect (νοῦς and ψιχή): both are effects of the life force [Lebenskraft], which is one in all things, meaning the unique thing that is totally homogeneous. All other things are heterogeneous, assembled together instead. Intellect “is all alone by itself.” In that regard the genesis of the universe can begin for the first time, because it could be inactive for an infinitude of time and could still move the beings in one definite moment. It is the uniquely voluntary one.

**Relation to Anaximander:** The Unlimited [is] more exactly defined as that which has all qualities mixed evenly throughout it. Beginning of the genesis by intellect: the way is a gradual deletion of qualities. Beginning of a dualism.

**Relation to Heraclitus:** Becoming is rejected; it is not the exchange of one

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organs to use; and the hand is not to be looked on as one organ but is many; for it is, as it were, an instrument for further instruments” (translation is from Aristotle, *On the Parts of Animals*, trans. W. Ogle, vol. 5 of *The Works of Aristotle*, ed. Smith and Ross.

29. [Wordplay on Handeln and handhabt.]

Anaxagoras

quality with another; no element is alive. A dualism: matter is not simultaneously what lives, as with Heraclitus’s fire. He was the true antagonist.

Relation to the Eleatics: Agreement with Being, rejection of Not-Being. It cannot become or pass away. Spirit moves itself: it must be the origin of all motion for all things. Either the Eleatics are correct, so that plurality and motion do not exist, or Anaxagoras, so that countless beings exist (unalterable, rigid, and eternal), there is no empty space, and motion does not exist. All the rigorous predicates of the Eleatics are valid for his οὐντα [beings]; it cannot be said of them, “It was,” and “It shall be.” They cannot have become; they cannot pass away. On the contrary, a being (ὁν) can be divided into infinity. “It is impossible that Being be annihilated through infinite division.” The Eleatics claimed indivisibility for the one Being, since what would divide it? Consequently, Anaxagoras now claims divisibility into infinity for his many beings. Nothing exists other than Being, thus the mass of beings is infinitely great. Anaxagoras introduces the concept of the infinitely small and of the infinitely many, via the Eleatics. According to the Eleatics, it was mind (νοῦς), specifically the senses (αἰσθήσεις), that produces deception by plurality (πολλά) and Becoming; it is, according to Anaxagoras, intellect itself that moves the rigid plurality and calls forth Life. All motion in the universe is thought of as a result of organic, spirited life. He may argue against the Eleatics that they, too, retain the liveliness of intellect, which does not dissolve in rigid, unmoved, dead oneness. What now lives and subsequently exists, though, must have lived and have been into all eternities. With this, the process of universal motion is explained. So actually, Anaxagoras really has the Eleatic teachings in his background.

The result of intellect is motion, and the result of motion is order. What was the condition, before the workings of intellect, of the mass of these beings? Unmoved and unordered, a chaos. Well then! Since every material was divisible into infinity, absolute disorder was identical with the mixture of all things in all things. “All things were together, infinite in respect of both number [πληθος] and smallness; for the small too was infinite. And while all things were together, none of them were plain because of their smallness; for air and aither covered all things, both of them being infinite; for these are the greatest ingredients in the mixture of all things, both in number and in size.”

31. Aristotle, Physics, bk. 4, ch. 6.
32. ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν, ἀπειρα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ συμκρότητα· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σιμκρὸν ἀπειρον ἦν. Καὶ πάντων ὁμοῦ ἐόντων ὁδὲν ἐνδηλον ἦν ὑπὸ συμκρότητος. Πάντα γὰρ ἀὴρ τε καὶ αἰθήρ κατείχε, ἄμφωτερα ἀπειρα ἐόντα· ταῦτα γὰρ μέγιστα ἐνετεί ἐν τοῖς σύμμοισαν καὶ πλῆθεὶ καὶ μεγάθεϊ (Simplicius on Aristotle’s Physics 33 or Simplicius in Phys., 155.26). [Anax-
The universe is infinite. Air and aether extend into infinity—these are the largest constitutive parts of the original chaos; everything is mixed together in infinitely small particles. And so chaos is endless with regard to its greatness and its smallness. [In fact,] πλῆθος is not “number” but rather extension in space: breadth, width—for example, as in Herodotus, where καὶ πλῆθεὶ καὶ μεγάθεὶ is identical to extension in breadth and height, “the longest and the loftiest.”[33] Πλῆθος καὶ σμικρότ [means] “greatness and smallness.”

“And since these things are so, we must suppose that there are many things of all sorts in everything that is being aggregated, seeds of all things with all sorts of shapes and colours and tastes [ἡδονάς].”[34] The “seeds of all things,” then, have multifarious shapes, colors, and smells. This is “scents” (ἡδονή), as, for example, with Heraclitus.[35] Probably the sense of “taste” is included with these. All these various seeds of things are so completely mixed in their smallest particles that specialization of sprouts is remarkable. Anaxagoras outlines this and concludes, “And since this is so, we must suppose that all things are in the whole.”[36] This unity recalls the Indefinite of Anaximander, and Theophrastus notes the similarity. The mixture of definite and qualitatively different materials in fact proceeds from one matter without definite characteristics (μία φύσις ἀόριστος)—yet this is the Unlimited of Anaximander. Aristotle says,

For when nothing was separated out, evidently nothing could truly be asserted of the substance that then existed. I mean, e.g., that it was neither white nor black, nor grey nor any other colour, but of necessity colourless; for if it had been coloured, it would have had one of these colours. And similarly, by this same argument, it was flavourless, nor had it any similar attribute; for it could not be either of any quality or of any size, nor could it be any definite kind of thing. For if it were, one of the particular forms would have belonged to it, and

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[34] τοῦτον δὲ οὕτως ὄντων χρή δοκέειν ἐνείναι (ἐν with a shorn?) πολλά τε καὶ παντοῖα ἔν πάσι, τούτων συγκρινομένων καὶ σπέρματα πάντων χρημάτων καὶ ἰδέας παντοῖας ἔχοντα καὶ χρυσά καὶ ἡδονάς [Anaxagoras, fragment 4d. English-language translation is from Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers. Nietzsche inserts this quotation without citation, rendering it with some variation from received text. His parenthetical question raises the possibility of an alternative reading of the Greek.]


this is impossible, since all were mixed together; for the particular form would
necessarily have been already separated out, but he says all were mixed except
reason, and this alone was unmixed and pure.  37

The seeds of all things, though, are in current things, too. Only in this way
does Becoming clarify itself now as a self-exclusion. For example, the various
matter contained in a body forms itself nutritionally from the same nutrients,
meaning these nutrients must contain all the various ingredients yet be imperceptible because of their smallness.  38 There exists blackness in snow, too,
since the water of which it consists is such.  39 So Aristotle says, “No such thing
exists as pure white or black or sweet.” We name things, though, “according to
the prevalence of one constituent or another in the mixture.”  40 Aristotle calls
these small primal particles present in all things “homoeomeria” (όμοιομερή).
Lucretius used “homoeomeria” first: “Now let us also examine the homoeo-
meria of Anaxagoras, as the Greeks call it,” 41 and so on.

Intelect, then, has produced no absolute order in any instance, no total
separation, but instead only one motion by which things are divided according
to general distinctions, in accord with warm and cold, light and light [dark?]; it
has produced a preponderance, no more, of one material. In this regard we
must speak not of any purposefulness whatsoever but instead only of motion.
This motion is a thing of regularity, and that is the origin of all order—one
circular motion continuing into eternity, which is the infinitude of the All.
“And all things that were to be—those that were and those that are now and
those that shall be—Mind arranged them all, including this rotation in which
are now rotating the stars, the sun and moon, the air and the aether that are
being separated off. And this rotation caused the separating off.” 42 “And when

38. Pseudo-Plutarch, Placita Philosophorum, bk. 1, chs. 3, 8; Aristotle, Physics, bk. 1, ch. 4.
40. διό [sic] φασιν ἐν πάντι μεμίγχαι, διότι πάν ἐκ παντὸς ἔωρων γινόμενον. ἐκ τοῦ
μᾶλλον ὑπερέχοντος διὰ πλήθος ἐν τῇ μίξει τῶν ἀπέρων (Aristotle, Physics, bk. 1, ch. 4).
[English-language translation is from Aristotle, The Physics, with an English trans. by Philip H.
Wicksteed and Francis M. Cornford (Loeb Classical Library, 1929).]
41. nunc et Anaxagorae scrutemus homoeomeriam / quam Grai memorant (Lucretius, De rerum natura, bk. 1, 830).
42. καὶ ὁκοῖα ἐμελλε ἐσεοθαὶ καὶ ὁκοῖα ἢν καὶ ἄσσα νῦν ἕστι καὶ ὁκοῖα ἔσται, πάντα
dιεκόσμησα νός καὶ τὴν περιχώρησιν ταῦταν ἢν νῦν περισσαίες τὰ τε ἄστρα καὶ ο ἢλιος
καὶ ἡ σειρὴ καὶ ὁ ἀτρή καὶ ὁ αἰθήρ οἱ ἀποκρινόμενοι. ἡ δὲ περιχώρησις αὕτη ἐποίησε
ἀποκρινοθαὶ (Simplicius, Physics, 33). [Anaxagoras, fragment 12, in Simplicius, in Phys. 164.24
and 156.13. English-language translation is from Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic
Philosophers. Nietzsche’s Greek text contains numerous variations from the received text.]
Mind initiated motion, from all that was moved Mind was separated, and as much as Mind moved was all divided off; and as things moved and were divided off, the relation greatly increased the process of dividing."\(^{43}\) Fragment 33b says of intellect, "But Mind, which ever is, is both at the present time, and has been."\(^{44}\)

He thought of the rise of living beings as follows: the seeds of plants come from the air; they unite with water and form plants. The seeds of anima come from the aether; they combine with mudlike earth. So Anaxagoras says, "The soul originates from aethereal seeds and returns on death to the aether, like the body to the earth from which it comes."\(^{45}\) After this primal production all other reproduction occurs from one another (ἐξ ἀλλήλων).

He ascribes pleasure (ἡδησθαι) and pain (λυπεῖθαι) to plants; Anaxagoras ascribes sensory experience to them, too. What a remarkable theory, that all sensory experience is associated with a sort of listlessness [Unlust]! "Every perception is accompanied by pain."\(^{46}\) Sensory experience, specifically, is caused not by what is related to it but rather by what is opposed to it—after the Heraclitean course of events. Like makes no impression on like. We observe, for example, the reflection of objects in our eyeball, but this develops only in what is of contrasting colors; because our eyes are dim we see only in the daylight. We experience the sweet with the sour, the nonsaline with the saline in us. All this is, obviously, passive intellect. The active one [intellect] is in motion, noticeable above all in the will.

In conclusion, let it be mentioned that according to Aristotle, Anaxagoras had a forerunner—Hermotimos of Clazomenae is said to have already presented the proposition of intellect. In Clazomenae a shrine to Hermotimos was erected, for he was able to separate his soul from his body for long periods

\(^{43}\) ἐπεὶ ἦρξατο ὁ νόος κινεῖν, ἀπὸ τοῦ κινειμένου παντὸς (τὸ πάν, supple) ἀπεκρίνετο, καὶ ὁσον ἐκίνησε ὁ νόος, πᾶν τούτῳ διεκρίθη· κινειμένων δὲ καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ περιχώρησις πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐποίει (sic) διακρινεῖθαι (Simplicius, Physics 67). [Anaxagoras, fragment 13, in Simplicius, In phys. 300.31. English-language translation is from Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers.]

\(^{44}\) ὁ δὲ νόος δοσα ἐσται τε καὶ νῦν ἐστι καὶ ἦν. [Anaxagoras, fragment 14, in Simplicius, Physics 33. This translation of Nietzsche's reading of a very difficult fragment is mine. According to Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, in The Presocratic Philosophers, Simplicius's manuscript has ὁ δὲ νοῦς, δοσα ἐστί τε κάρτα. Hermann Diels gives ὁ δὲ νοῦς, ὃς ἐστι το κάρτα (But Mind, which ever is, is assuredly even now where everything else is too) (Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: Griechisch und Deutsch, ed. Walther Kranz, 3 vols. [Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1934–37]).]

\(^{45}\) [This is a paraphrase given in German in the text. Bormann and Carpitella's edition is missing closing quotation marks here.]

\(^{46}\) ἐποσαν δ' ἀποθεσιν μετὰ λύπης (Theophrastus, On the Senses, bk. 1, ch. 29. [Diels-Kranz fragment 59A92. English-language translation is from Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, fragment 511.]}
of time and, on [its] return, was known to narrate far-off things. His enemies used one such instance to burn his body. The soul of Pythagoras is said to have inhabited his body during earlier transmigrations. Apparently what we have here concerns an interpretation that Anaxagoras himself gave to his familiar legend: in it he exemplified the division of intellect from bodies. The interpretation of myths is particularly at home among the Anaxagoreans; he himself had said that Homer is a poet of virtue and justice (περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ δικαιοσύνης). He is said to have recognized intellect (νοῦς) in Zeus and the arts (τέχνη) in Athena. This was most rigorously continued by his student Metrodorus. Physical interpretations (“Agamemnon is the aether”) is now characteristic of the Enlightenment. Homer and mythology are treated only as imagistic descriptions of philosophical doctrines. The physical principles are so memorialized, treated almost religiously, that the aether, clouds, and so on appear to the people as new divinities, which is mocked horribly in Aristophanes’ Clouds. Yet in any case, the most inspired comprehension of natural phenomena was part of the ethics of Anaxagoras: really, he vented his religious feelings in this manner, as with Pericles, Euripides, and so on, too.

Empedocles came from shining Agrigentum. His heritage is as follows:

- **Exainetos**
  - **Empedocles (wins at Olympics, Olympiad 71, in horse riding)**
  - **Meton**
    - **Exainetos (wins at Olympiad 71, in wrestling or footracing)**
  - **Callikratides = Empedocles**
  - **Daughter**
    - **Exainetos (wins at Olympics, Olympiad 92, according to Diodorus 13.82)**
  - **Empedocles tragicus (cf. Suidas)**

He is frequently mixed up with his grandfather, and in reference to the tragedians, perhaps with his grandson as well. This was a very noble and rich family; their horse breeding was especially renowned. It also speaks to the wealth of Empedocles that he undertook the correction of the Hypsas River at his own expense. There was great prestige that his grandfather and uncle were Olympic victors. His period of flourishing, according to Apollodorus, is after Olympiad 84. Laertius tells us what point in time this means: he [Empedocles] visits Thurii shortly after its founding (the fourth year of Olympiad 83). Apollodorus thus contradicts the report that Empedocles participated in the Syracusans’ war against Athens, because at that time he was already dead or quite old. [Since Empedocles died (as did Heraclitus) in his

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1. [In the Musarion edition, Oehler deletes a genealogical table for Empedocles and two full pages of text without any indication whatsoever.]
2. [The year 415 and so on.]
sixtieth year, according to Aristotle, Apollodorus accordingly presumed that he had been born approximately 475 [B.C.E.] or earlier. The date of his acme would thus already be at thirty to thirty-four years of age, [as] set by Apollodorus. In contrast, Neanthes (not Favorin, as Zeller believes) says he lived to seventy-seven years of age; in any case, he then placed his birth earlier, somewhere around 492. The settings of his acme at Olympiad 81 by Eusebius and Syncellus agree with this; specifically his acme is also placed in approximately his thirty-fifth year. That Simplicius says he was only a little later than Anaxagoras, who was born in 500, accords with this—thus, around eight years later.

According to Apollodorus:

- Born ca. 475
- Flourishes ca. 444
- Dies ca. 416 or earlier, at sixty years of age

According to Neanthes:

- ca. 492
- ca. 456
- ca. 415, yet seventy-seven years of age

Aristotle explicitly says, “Anaxagoras . . . though older than Empedocles, was later [ὑστερος] in his philosophical activity.”3

According to Apollodorus’s calculations, Empedocles was approximately twenty-five years younger. In any case, ὑστερος means “more mature, more accomplished.” It shows the overriding resentment against Empedocles in Aristotle; he calculated Empedocles to this position among the earlier physiologists and placed him behind Anaxagoras, unchronologically, but on the basis of values.4

4. [Nietzsche gives the following chart as a footnote:] In 415 he would be approximately 90 years old; that is, born 60 from 505 = died around 445.

Anaxagoras born 500
Empedocles born 490
born 430
415 παντελῶς ὑπεργεγηρακῶς
75 years?
Empedocles born 495 Olympiad 72 born 84 acme
died 435 48-year-old acme
415 he would have been 80 years old

He is earlier than Anaxagoras and in 415 had grown very old.

Forty-eight-years-old acme Laertius 2.2. Acme of Anaximander, according to Apollodorus. Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.14, extends his intellectual acme until his forty-ninth year. A time point in common from thirty to forty-nine years.
Everything we know of him\(^5\)—the mean in opposition to the boundless egoism of individuals (domestic instincts, competition, love)—comes to this, that he regarded all philosophical fame before himself with jealousy. Theophrastus declares that he was an “admirer” (ζηλωτής) of Parmenides and “imitated him in his verses.”\(^6\) According to Hermippus, he was an “admirer” (μυητής) of Xenophanes, not Parmenides, whose “writing of poetry he imitated.”\(^7\) Diodorus of Ephesus reports Empedocles “emulated” (ἐξηλώκει) Anaximander, “displaying theatrical arrogance and wearing stately robes.”\(^8\) According to the account of Alcidamas, he emulated Pythagoras “in dignity of life and bearing” and Anaxagoras “in his physical investigations.”\(^9\) He comes from a family of competitors: he also actually achieves the greatest feat in Olympia.\(^10\) He went about in a purple robe with a golden girdle, in shoes of bronze, and [with] a Delphic laurel wreath on his head. He wore his hair long; his demeanour was grave and unshaken; wherever he went, servants trailed behind him. In Olympia a rhapsode recited his Purifications. At a sacrificial feast he offered an ox made from honey and barley meal in order not to violate his own principles.\(^11\)

This was apparently an attempt to bring the collective Hellenes to the new Pythagorean way of life: outwardly, it was a reform of sacrificial services. His Purifications begins as a greeting to his friends in Agrigentum: “All hail! I go about among you an immortal god, no more a mortal, so honoured of all, as is meet, crowned with fillets and flowery garlands. Straightaway as soon as I enter with these, men and women, into flourishing towns, I am reverenced and tens of thousands follow, to learn where is the path which leads to welfare, some desirous of oracles, others suffering from all kinds of diseases, desiring to hear a message of healing.”\(^12\) “But why do I stress such matters, as if there

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5. [The Musarion text picks up here.]
7. μυησθαί τὴν ἑποτοίαν (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 8, sect. 56).
8. τραγικὸν ἀσκών τῶν καὶ σεμνὴν ἀναλοβῶν ἑσθήτα (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 8, sect. 70).
9. τὴν σεμνότητα ζηλούσα τοῦ τε βίου καὶ τοῦ σχήματος, τὴν φυσιολογίαν (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 8, sect. 56).
10. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 8, sect. 66.
12. [Empedocles, fragment 112 (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 8, sect. 62). English-language translation is from Diogenes Laertius, Lives, trans. Hicks, although this quotation is given—without citation—verbatim in German in Nietzsche’s notes. Nietzsche immediately follows with this footnote from 1873–74:] Goethe to Lavater: “Of secretive arts, I
Empedocles

were anything surprising in the fact that I am superior to mortal perishable men? Well then! He sought to impress the oneness of all life most urgently, that carnivorism is a sort of self-cannibalism [Sichselbstverspeisen], a murder of the nearest relative. He desired a colossal purification of humanity, along with abstinence from beans and laurel leaves. Aristotle reports,

And so Empedocles, when he bids us kill no living creature, says that doing this is not just for some people while unjust for others,

Nay, but, an all-embracing law, through the realms of the sky

Unbroken it stretcheth, and over the earth’s immensity.14

Theophrastus declares: “Since Love and the related sentiments prevail in all beings, no one murdered any creature, and so on.” Empedocles’ entire pathos comes back to this point, that all living things are one; in this respect the gods, human beings, and animals are one.15 Sextus Empiricus is quite explicit that breath (ἐν πνεύμα) is the soul of the entire world, which relates us to the animals as well.16 The “oneness of life” is the less productive form of Parmenides’ idea of the oneness of Being: we find here the most internalized empathy, an overwhelming sympathy, with all of nature: his life’s mission is presented as being to make good once more what had been worsened by strife (νέκυς), to proclaim and even to aid the idea of oneness in love inside the world of strife wherever he finds sorrow, the result of strife. Heavily he plods

am mistrustful. Our moral and political world is mined with subterranean passages, cellars, and cesspools. No one thinks and feels how a great city, in its connectedness and relations to its occupants, used to be. Only to he who has done some reconnoitering about this does it become more conceivable, when the Earth shakes for the first time, smoke rises over there, and here strange voices are heard.” [Nietzsche quotes Goethe’s correspondence to the Swiss pietist writer and preacher Johann Kaspar Lavater without citation. This is my translation from the German. This letter comes from Weimar, June 22, 1781. It is reproduced as letter 542 in Goethe: Gedankenausgabe der Werke, Briefe und Gespräche, ed. Ernst Beutler (Zurich: Artemis-Verlag, 1949), vol. 18.]

13. [Empedocles, fragment 113. English-language translation is from Philip Wheelwright, The Presocratics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966). This quotation is given in German except for the final phrase, which is also given in Greek.]


15. Bernays, p. 80. [The quotation given by Nietzsche is in German, not Greek. and appears to be his paraphrase of the original text. Here I have simply translated the German. Nietzsche probably refers to Jacob Bernays, Theophrastos’s Schrift über Frömmigkeit: Ein Beitrag zur Religionsgeschichte (Berlin, 1866).]

16. Goethe: “And so every creature is only a tone, a shading of a grand harmony, which must be studied in large and whole, otherwise every individual is a lost character.” [Nietzsche quotes Goethe without citation. This is my translation from the German.]

17. Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, bk. 9, ch. 127.
through this world of agony, of oppositions: the fact that he is within it may be explained only as a transgression: in some time or another, a crime, a murder, a perjury, must have transpired. Existence in such a world punishes a guilt.

His political mindset also clarifies itself in the light of this opinion. After the siege of Himera, the cities allied with Gelon were richly rewarded with booty: in particular Agrigentum received countless numbers of slaves to the state. This begins the happiest time in Agrigentum for seventy years, private citizens having five hundred slaves at their service: it built itself up in grandiose fashion. Empedocles says of it, "The Agrigentines live delicately as if tomorrow they would die, but they build their houses well as if they thought they would live forever." At that time Gelon was the ruler of Syracuse and Gela, Theron [was the ruler] of Agrigentum, and his son Thrasydaeus [was the ruler] of Himera. After the death of Gelon, [who was] a great patron of the arts for Pindar, Simonides, Bacchylides, Epimarchus, and Aeschylus, violence in fact befell Hieron. By way of Theron's death in 472 [B.C.E.], important changes were introduced into Sicily. Empedocles, some twenty years of age, experienced them. Thrasydaeus, now ruler of Agrigentum also, developed his violent and bloodthirsty instincts, increasing his army command to 20,000 men. Unwisely, he provoked his neighbor Hieron: a monstrous bloodbath ensued, with 2,000 slain on the side of the Syracusans and 4,000 on the side of the Agrigentines—most of them Hellenes, according to Diodorus. Thrasydaeus, completely beaten, fled to Megara in true Greece, where he was sentenced to death. Hieron considered both cities defeated and cast many into banishment. The Agrigentines installed a democratic government now; apparently Meton is now an influential founder of this government.

The young Empedocles experienced this transition to government by the people. Tyrannical rule begins again after the death of his father. Commanding authority lay with the Senate of the Thousand: aside from them, however, the reactionary outcasts in particular may have made a hostile opposition after the downfall of the House of Gelon in Sicily. Empedocles, apparently as a young man, suppressed an attempt at tyranny: it was his first incursion into politics [and] certainly at the same time into oratory. Empedocles was invited to a dinner party by magistrates (ἁρχοντες) of the thousand; he became angry [when the nominal host served no wine], having expected such with the meal,

18. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 8, sect. 63. [English-language translation is from Diogenes Laertius, Lives, trans. Hicks, although the quotation is given verbatim in German.]
and "ordered wine to be brought (τὸν τῆς βουλῆς ὑπηρέτην)." When he [the actual host, the senator] arrived, he was made the "master of the revels" (συμποσίαρχος). In any case, because resistance had been fomented, this man commanded the "guests" either to drink or to have it poured over their heads. A symbolic allusion may have perhaps been made by this as well. Empedocles remains silent; another day, he brings both of them before the court, and it sentences them to death.21

We recognize passionate hatred of tyranny here. Yet he goes further to dissolve the assembly of the thousand, apparently because he had become suspicious of it. He had extremely inflammatory oratory at his disposal: Timon Phliasius describes him as "mouthing tawdry verses."22 Here arose rhetoric, according to Aristotle, who describes him in the [lost] dialogue Sophist as the "inventor of rhetoric."23 Gorgias is instructed by him. Polos in Agrigentum sketches one art with the aid of which he wins over the Agrigentines to "equality in politics."24 Since he was so rich, he could provide [dowries] for the poorer maidens of the city: apparently he seeks a resolution to differences in wealth. He becomes so popular that he is offered the kingdom (βασιλεία), which he declined. (In this regard his grand manner was such that in the long run he could not avoid suspicion.)25

Well then! After he has reordered Agrigentum, he wants to come to the aid of other cities. He now leaves Agrigentum to wander about: in Olympia he performs the Purifications (καθαρμοί), in which he pronounces a benediction on the Agrigentines. He appears in Thurii, Messana, the Peloponnese and Athens, and Selinus: here he cures a pestilence while joining together two rivers with the Hypsas at his own cost (system of rituals). The Se-

21. [This story is told by Diogenes Laertius in Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 8, sect. 64. Diogenes Laertiuss version is as follows: "The dinner had gone on some time and no wine was put on the table. . . . though the other guests kept quiet, he [Empedocles] becoming indignant, ordered wine to be brought. Then the host confessed that he was waiting for the servant of the senate to appear. When he came he was made master of the revels, clearly by the arrangement of the host; whose design of making himself tyrant was but thinly veiled, for he ordered the guests either to drink wine or have it poured over their heads. For the time being Empedocles was reduced to silence; the next day he impeached both of them, the host and the master of the revels, and secured their condemnation and execution. This, then, was the beginning of his political career" (Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 8, sects. 64–65).]

22. ἄγοραῖον χηλητής ἐπέσω [Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 8, sect. 67].

23. πρῶτον ῥητορικὴν κεκινηκέναι (cf. [Diogenes Laertius,] Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 8, sect. 57; Sextus Empiricus, bk. 7, ch. 6).

24. ἰσότητα πολιτικὴν ἀσκεῖν ([Diogenes Laertius,] Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 8, sect. 72).

25. [This parenthetical remark is not found in the Musarion manuscript and seems to have been inserted by Bornmann and Carpitella.]
linuntines celebrated a friendship festival at the river; when he appears among them, they fall down at his feet and worship him as a god. Coins with the impression of him holding Apollo’s team as its charioteer are in Karsten.  

Well then! Timaeus says, “Subsequently, however, when Agrigentum came to regret him, the descendents of his personal enemies opposed his return home; and this was why he went to the Peloponnese, where he died.”

What is the reason he is not allowed to return home? Would it be, I suppose, “because he declared Agrigentum worth suffering for (αὐτοῦ Ἀκράγαντα οἰκτιρομένου)”? Or does it relate to the return of the earlier outcasts, that is, the Council of the Thousand? Or “because Agrigentum founded a colony (οἰκίζοντος)”?” And he was recalled as leader of the same”?

Concerning his death there are all sorts of legends. It is certain no one can indicate where he is buried; in any case, it would be in the Peloponnese, as Timaeus thinks, not in Sicily. What he says in general is true of himself: “In the course of time there come to earth certain men who are prophets, bards, physicians, and princes; such men later rise up as gods, extolled in honor.”

This was his belief: he has already crossed over into divinity. Fables describe this in part seriously, in part ironically. He is seer, poet, doctor, and prince (a general term, not τῶραννος); now, since his wandering, he is also “god, no more a mortal.”

Well now, how does he cross over to “sharing hearth and table with the other immortals, freed from human woes and human trials?”

He plunges into [Mt.] Aetna because he wants to confirm himself as a god; the immediately preceding event was either the worship of the Selinuntines or the healing of Panthea, a woman of Agrigentum. Timaeus contradicts [these stories], because he [Empedocles] never returned from the Peloponnese. Neanthes narrates the least mythic (but certainly not consequently

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27. ὅστερον μέντοι τοῦ Ἀκράγαντος οἰκίζομένου ἀντέστησαν αὐτοῦ τῇ καθοδό οἱ τῶν ἐξήρων ἄργονον: διόπερ εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἄρχωθηκε κατατάφηκεν (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 8, sect. 67).
28. [Here Nietzsche suggests that οἰκίζομένου should be read as οἰκίζοντος. Empedocles, then, was not allowed to return because he had been recalled as leader of a colony—or perhaps because his enemies, the one thousand senators, had returned to power.]
29. εἰς δὲ τέλος μάντεις ταῦτα ὑμνοῦσκε καὶ ἤρωτοι καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἑπιθυμόσιοι πέλονται | ἐνθαν ἄναβλαστοῦσθαν θεοί τιμήσαν φέρουσι (Karsten, Empedokles, v. 384f.; Empedocles, fragment 146). [English-language translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics. Again, Nietzsche refers to Simon Karsten (1802–64), a Dutch philologist and compiler of fragments by Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Empedocles.]
30. θεός, οὐκέτα θνητός [Empedocles, fragment 112, in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 8, sect. 62.]
31. v. 387–88. [Empedocles, fragment 147. English-language translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics. Nietzsche’s notes give the text verbatim, but without quotation marks.]
32. [See Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “On Great Events.”]
believable) of all the accounts; having gone to Messana to a festival, he [Empedocles] broke his thigh there and died from it.33 But here too he dies in Sicily. His grave would be marked in Megara, in Sicily, of course. The legend of the faithful portrays him disappearing; that of the ironic portrays him plunging into Aetna; that of the pragmatists portrays him breaking a thigh and being buried in Megara.

He is the tragic philosopher, the contemporary of Aeschylus. The most unique thing about him is his extraordinary pessimism, which works on him actively, however, not quietistically. His political views may be democratic, but the real fundamental idea is nonetheless to lead humanity across to the universal friendship (κοινά τῶν φιλων) of the Pythagoreans and thus to social reform with a dissolution of private property; he moves about as a wandering prophet after he failed to found the rule by all (Allherrschaft)34 from love in Agrigentum. His influence belongs to the area of Pythagorean influences, which are flourishing in this century (though not in Sicily). In the year 440 Pythagoreans, repressed everywhere, withdrew to Rhegium: apparently the decline of the Pythagoreans connects to the banishment of Empedocles and to his end in the Peloponnese. In this connection, it is quite possible that he was without direct association with the Pythagoreans; he later confesses to have spoken the true secret. This much is also true: he is related to Pythagorean-Orphic mysticism, just as Anaxagoras is related to Hellenic mythology. He joins this religious instinct to scientific explanation and broadens it in this scientific form. He is one who enlightens and consequently remains unloved among the faithful.

As a result he still takes over the entire collective world of gods and daimons, in whose reality he believes no less than in that of human beings. He even feels himself to be an outcast god; he sighs about the pinnacle of honor and happiness from which he has fallen: "I wept and mourned when I discovered myself in this unfamiliar land."35 He curses the day on which he touched a carnivorous meal; this appears to be his criminal deed, his besmirching as a fugitive (φόνος).36 He portrays the sufferings of such primal
criminals: the anger of aether drives them into the sea, the sea spits them out onto land, land tosses them up into the flames of the sun, and these [push them] once more into the aether: thus the one gathers them from the other, yet each hates them. Eventually they appear to become mortal: "Ah, wretched unblessed race of mortals! Such were the strifes and groanings out of which you were born." Mortals appear to him, accordingly, to be fallen and punished gods! The earth is a dark cave, the unholy meadow (λευκών ἀπό), here reside murder, wrath, and other fates, illness and foulness. He plunges into a pile of opposing daimons: Deris and Harmony [Discord and Harmony], Callisto and Aischre [Beauty and Ugliness], Thoosa and Denaie [Haste and Tarrying], Nemertes and Asapheia [Truth and Obscurity], Physo and Phthimene (Nature and Downfall), and so on. But as a human being one has weak limbs: many misfortunes threaten and make one dull. One struggles through a small part of a life not worth living, and then one wins only an early fate and is diffused like smoke. People hold to be true only that which directly affects them; everyone vainly declares to have found the whole, [but] that is not for human sight or hearing, nor may it be grasped by the mind. This uncertainty is what Empedocles portrays most frequently: "In a way that sometimes make me think him raving," says Cicero. Plutarch portrays the entire character of his poetry in On the Sign of Socrates as "phantoms, fables and superstition, and . . . in a wild state of exaltation."

In this world of discord, of sorrow, of oppositions, he finds only one principle that guarantees an entirely different world order: he finds Aphrodite, known to all, but never as a cosmic principle. The life of sexuality is the best, the noblest, the greatest opposition against the drive toward divisions. This is demonstrated most clearly in cooperation between the conflicting social classes for the sake of production. That which belongs together is torn apart at some point and desires to be together once again with itself. Love (φιλία) has

37. [Empedocles, fragment 124. English-language translation is from Wheelwright, The Pre-socratics. Nietzsche provides the quotation in German without citation.]
38. [Empedocles, fragments 119–23.]
39. [Empedocles, fragment 2.]
40. ut interdum mihi furere videatur (Cicero, Academica 2.5).
41. φασιμάτων καὶ μύθων καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας ανάπλεως καὶ μάλα βεβασχεμένη (Plutarch, On the Sign of Socrates, sect. 580) [Nietzsche’s Greek text is actually two phrases from the same sentence. But only the phrase “in a wild state of exaltation” applies to Empedocles; it was Pythagoras who left philosophy prey to “phantoms, fables and superstition.” English-language translation is from Plutarch, Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 7, with an English trans. by Phillip H. De Lacey and Benedict Einarson (Loeb Classical Library, 1959)]; Reiske, 8, 292 [Nietzsche refers to Johann Jacob Reiske, Ad Euripidam et Aristophanem animadversiones].
42. [Empedocles, fragment 17, 20 ff.]
the will to overcome the rule of strife: [Empedocles] calls her Philotēs, Affec-
tion, Cyprus, Aphrodite, and Harmonia (φιλότης, στοργή, Κύπρις, Ἀφροδίτη, Ἀρμονία). Innermost to this drive is the search for equality: with inequality for everyone, Aversion arises; with equality for all, want. In this sense everything possesses soul, insofar as it has sensations of the drive [Trieb] to equality and the desire for sameness, as well as aversion to inequality. We look at earth by earth, water by water, aether by the aether, fire by fire; we intuit love only by love, hate only by hate.\textsuperscript{43}

Well! The genuine Empedoclean idea is the oneness of all living things: it is one part of all things that presses them toward mixture and unification yet likewise an antagonistic power [Macht] that renders them asunder. Both drives struggle with each other. It constitutes a terrifying punishment to be thrown into the strife, “at the mercy of frenzied Strife.”\textsuperscript{44} Transformation across all elements is the natural scientific counterpart to the metempsychosis of Pythagoras: he himself [Empedocles] claims to have already been a bird, a bush, a fish, a boy, and a girl.\textsuperscript{45} In such instances he avails himself of expressions from the Pythagoreans. Since mythic and scientific thinking go hand in hand for him, understanding him is quite difficult; he rides both steeds, jumping back and forth. Here and there allegory obviously takes the place of myth: thus he believes in all the gods, but he calls his own natural scientific aspects by these names. We especially note his interpretation of Apollo, whom he understood to be spirit [Geist]: “It is not possible to reach out to God with our eyes, or to take hold of him with our hands—he has no human head fitted on to his body, nor does a pair of wings branch out from his back. He has neither feet, quick legs, nor private parts; rather, he became only holy and unspeakably great spirit (φοίνῳ) [Geist], which flashes through the whole world with quick thoughts.”\textsuperscript{46} All the gods, in contrast, are those who have become and also those who do not have eternal life (they are only μακραίωνες).\textsuperscript{47} This spirit is not something in motion, after the fashion of Anaxagoras’s idea; rather, to understand all motion it suffices for him to adopt [principles of] hate and love.

We see here, in comparison to Anaxagoras, that he strives to accept a

\textsuperscript{43. [Empedocles, fragment 109.]
44. νεικεῖ μακραίωνες πίστωνς. [Empedocles, fragment 115. English-language translation is from Wheelwright, The Presocratics.]
45. [Empedocles, fragment 117.]
46. Empedocles, fragments 29, 133, 134 [in] Ammon., De interpretat. 249.1. [Nietzsche refers to Ammonius Hermeiou, De interpretatione. He paraphrases these fragments selectively here. Bornmann and Carpitella have “199” not “249.1.”]
47. [Empedocles, fragment 115, 5; compare 23, 6.]
minimum of mind (voie) in order to explain all motion from it: for him, mind was still too ambiguous and full [voll]. Desire and aversion, the ultimate phenomena of life, were sufficient, both being results of forces [Trieben] of attraction and repulsion. If they empower [bemächtigen] the elements, then all things, including thought, were to be explained from them. The more definite love and strife replace indefinite mind. Of course, he thereby dissolves all mechanical motion, whereas Anaxagoras ascribed only the [primal] onset of motion to mind and considered all further motion as indirect effects thereof. —Yet this was its consequence, for how can something dead, one rigid being (öv), have an effect on another rigid being? No mechanical explanation of motion whatsoever exists; rather, [there is] only one from drives [Trieben], from souls [Beseelungen]. Only they move—hence not merely once but continually and everywhere. Well then! His main difficulty, however, is to allow the ordered world nonetheless to arise from these opposing forces without any purpose, without any mind, and here he is satisfied by the grandiose idea that among countless deformations and limits to life, some purposive and life-enabling forms arise. Here the purposiveness of those that continue to exist is reduced to the continued existence of those who act according to purposes. Materialist systems have never again surrendered these notions. We have here a special connection to Darwinian theory.

Love therefore experiences nothing purposive with its bonding but rather only something binding; she conjoins all things together: lovers from steers with human heads, men with heads of steer, beings at once masculine and feminine, and all manner of monsters.48 Well now! Gradually the members also find themselves harmoniously together, always forced by the drive to sameness.

Powers of motion [Mächte der Bewegung] exist: that which is moved, however, is the övta, according to the idea of Parmenides: ungenerated, indestructible, unchangeable. Whereas Anaxagoras accepted all qualities as real and accordingly as eternal, Empedocles discovers only four true realities, thus also qualities and their mixtures, namely, earth, fire, water, air: “shining Zeus, life-bringing Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis”49—[that is,] Zeus’s fire, Aidoneus’s earth, Hera’s air, Nestis’s water. Along with these mythic designations, we are presented with

48. [Empedocles, fragment 61.]
49. Nestis: a Sicilian deity (Eustath, Il., 1, l. 1180), from νάω, meaning flowed, νήσιος, meaning those who are swimming, πλωτή έτι νήσιο (x 3). Νάξος = Νήκτος, Νηρέως, Νη-νύς. [Cf. Empedocles, fragment 6. Here Nietzsche refers to Eustathius, Commentaries on Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey.]
All matter, which can be neither increased nor decreased, is understood within these four principles. They have remained in physics across 2,000 years. No combinations of these primal materials alter their qualities: their mixture becomes possible only when the particles of one body enter the spatial intervals between the particles of the other: in addition, with complete mixing, there exists fundamentally only a mass of particles [Teilchen]. Likewise conversely: if one body arises from another, the one does not transform itself in the others; rather, the materials occur here only from their prior combinations. When two bodies are divided from one another according to their substance and nevertheless work on each other, this happens only by the detachment of microscopic particles, which penetrate into the openings of the other. The more thoroughly the pores of one body correspond to the effluence and particles of the other, the more capacity it will have for mixture therewith; thus he said those of the same sort and those easily mixed befriend each other—like seeks out like; whatever does not allow mixing is alien. Genuine motion, however, always remains love and strife; that is, a necessary relation holds between their effects and the form of things. Materials must be so mixed and so formed that they resemble each other and correspond to each other; then love enters therein. That which forms things is originally chance, necessity (ἀνάγκη), without any cleverness whatsoever. Love is clueless, too: she possesses only one single drive, to those of the same sort. Thus all motions, according to Empedocles, arise unmechanically yet lead to a mechanical result: a strange union of materialistic and idealistic views of the world.

We observe the legacy of Anaxagoras here: all things [are] only masses of primal materials, yet [these are] no longer of countless but rather of four homeoeomeries (δύομιμερη). Then, however, he attempts to dissolve the dualism of motion that Anaxagoras affirms—motion as an effect of the mind and motion as impact—for Empedocles saw quite rightly that two absolutely different δύνα cannot effect an impact on each other.50 However, he did not quite succeed in recognizing this primal power of motion [Urbewegungs-
\textit{kraft} in all subsequent motion, in recognizing only love and strife as motive principles. The conclusion is this: love alone is thought to be active, such that, after an absolute separation, everything rests once more. Thus both must struggle with each other. Here he touches on Heraclitus's glorification of war as the father of all things. Yet if we conceive their forces as equal and instantaneously effective, then once again motion does not arise. Periodic cycles must thus alternate [in] predominance. In the sphere (\sigma\omega\alpha\iota\rho\omicron\varsigma) harmony and peace originally rule; then strife began to stir, and all things flowed together; now love creates a whirl in which the elements mix and from which the individual creatures of nature are brought forth. Gradually hate leaves off and gives the upper hand to love, and so forth. Well then! Much remains unclear regarding that: is resemblance a consequence of love? Or does love enter into the things that resemble each other? If the latter, whence comes resemblance?

Obviously, in Empedocles we find kernels of a purely atomistic-materialistic viewpoint: the theory of chance forms—that is, all possible random combinations of elements, of which some are purposive and capable of life—belongs here with him. Since the forces of love and strife may not be measured in any way, Empedocles really explains nothing at all: we do not know which one of these forces is more powerful and by how much. In general there is no true peace between the different foundational ideas of Empedocles: love returns to the multiplicity in things as much as does strife. Pessimism decisively calls for the view that earth is the showplace of strife alone. The notion of an age of paradise for humanity has no place in it, or generally in his cosmogony. The realm of chance is totally unclear. The doctrine of effluences (\alpha\pi\omicron\omicron\rho\omicron\omega\omicron\omicron\iota\iota) presumes an empty space; precisely here he rejects Anaxagoras. On the contrary, his greatness consists in this, that he prepared the conditions for rigorous atomism: he went far beyond Anaxagoras. It was a natural consequence to draw—namely, to reduce this power [Macht] of love and of strife to a force [Kraft] lying inside things.\textsuperscript{51} And Democritus found weight and shape sufficient. Likewise, it was necessary to affirm empty space once effluences had been discovered, as did Democritus. Particularly brilliant was the theory concerning the origin of purposiveness. He discovered all foundational conceptions of atomism—that is, the fundamental hypothesis of the scientific view of nature of the ancients, which, continued in its basics, hovers over them. How we have experienced this with

\textsuperscript{51.} [Here too Empedocles is portrayed very similarly to Boscovich.]
our own modern natural sciences! So he won decisively in competition with Anaxagoras. 

Indeed, on only one point does he outdo Anaxagoras but not overcome him: his principles of love and strife in order to eliminate the dualism concerning motion. With Anaxagoras, a leap was taken only once into the unclarified workings of a mind; Empedocles continually affirmed such an unexplicable and unpenetrating, unscientific working. If all motion is reduced to the workings of incomprehensible forces, then science basically dissolves into magic. Empedocles continually stands on this boundary line, however, and in almost all matters Empedocles is such a boundary-line figure. He hovers between poet and rhetorician, between god and man, between scientific man and artist, between statesman and priest, and between Pythagoras and Democritus. He is the motliest figure of older philosophy; he demarcates the age of myth, tragedy, and orgiastics, yet at the same time there appears in him the new Greek, as democratic statesman, orator, enlightenment figure, allegorist, and scientific human being. In him the two time periods wrestle with each other; he is a man of competition through and through.

52. Against Anaxagoras:
Why countless ὀντόν when we can presuppose infinite [divisibility of] parts? Thus reducing the number of true qualities.
Why νοῦς and not the will alone, if only motion is considered?
How is there motion, when the force for it is not present in all things?
Purposes are unnecessary for an explanation of purposiveness, thus no mind is necessary. [Only] that which is capable of life.
Motion does not suffice to explain an organism. Anaxagoras assumes the mind for help. Better to explain all things in a unified fashion.
Life is not something eternal; rather, it is produced whenever certain atoms combine. Chemical events [generate] qualitatively new life. How is the identity of all living things deduced by Empedocles? It [life] is the rarest quality produced.
The holiest thing for Empedocles is the condition of the primal mixture; for Anaxagoras, chaos. Periodicity in Empedocles: in Anaxagoras, what happens when mind is finished with its division?
Life lies only in form, in the grouping of atoms.
Leucippus and Democritus

We know nothing of Leucippus; Epicurus and Hermarch(us) deny his existence altogether.\(^1\) He is said to be from either Abdera or Miletus; Aristotle calls Democritus Leucippus’s disciple (ἑταῖρος), a somewhat general term.\(^2\) Democritus is said to be from either Abdera or Miletus as well. Apparently the unknown was simply inferred from what was known. If he was described as an Eleatic—Theophrastus calls Parmenides his teacher\(^3\)—then the attribution of atomism to the Eleatics is indubitable, but we need not immediately assume a teacher relationship. Aristotle refers to “the works ascribed to Leucippus”: apparently he meant a short enumeration of his doctrinal propositions, not genuine writings, as we accept something similar for Thales.\(^4\) Theophrastus attributed Great Cosmos (μέγας διάκοσμος) to Leucippus.\(^5\) It remains to be investigated whether Aristotle, in the passages where he quotes Leucippus, sharply distinguishes him from Democritus. From one passage it has been concluded [by others] that Aristotle claims absolute sameness in all their opinions, but this cannot be found in On Generation (περὶ γενέσεως): “The most systematic and consistent theory, however, and one that applied to all bodies, was advanced by Leucippus and Democritus.”\(^6\) “They explained all phenomena with scientific rigor by the same principles.”\(^7\) We must inquire, then, whence originate the reports concerning the doctrines of Leucippus,

\(^1\) Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 10, sect. 13. [Bornmann and Carpitella delete the latter half of this sentence without notice or explanation.]

\(^2\) [Aristotle,] Metaphysics, bk. 1, ch. 4.

\(^3\) Simplicius on Aristotle, Physics 7a.

\(^4\) ἐν τοῖς Λευκίππωσι καλουμένοις λόγοις ([Aristotle,] On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, chapter 6 [980a]). [English-language translation is from Aristotle, Minor Works, with an English trans. by W. S. Hett (Loeb Classical Library, 1955).]

\(^5\) [Diogenes] Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 9, sect. 46.


\(^7\) [This is Nietzsche’s paraphrase. In the translation from Joachim (Aristotle, Basic Works, ed. McKeon), this passage finishes: “They took as their starting-point what naturally comes first.”]
for example, with [Diogenes] Laertius. Assuming that Theophrastus’s work *On the Opinions of the Physicists* (ἡ ψυκτικὴ ἱστορία) is the source, then it may contain a summary of *Great Cosmos*, for which we should pay attention.

[Democritus] is probably called Democritus of Abdera or Miletus, his family having emigrated from there. His father was Hegesistratus, Damasippus, or Athenocritus; apparently the name has been lost. Determining the chronology also plays a role in [identifying] these names for his father: [there is a possible] switching of grandfather with grandson. We shall orient ourselves after the fashion of Apollodorus. He says Democritus was born in Olympiad 80, that is, forty years after Anaxagoras. This chronological determination was made with the aid of Democritus’s report in *Lesser Cosmos* (μικρός διάκοσμος). “As regards chronology, he was, as he says himself in the *Lesser Cosmos*, a young man when Anaxagoras was old, being forty years his junior. He says that the *Lesser Cosmos* was compiled 730 years after the capture of Troy.” If we think of Anaxagoras as being sixty years old in 440 [b.c.e.], then Democritus was twenty years old at that time: if, as is probable, Empedocles had already died in the next decade, then Democritus must have studied under Empedocles, but not the reverse, for he himself testified that he had sought out all the famous men of the spirit and came to know them: “I am the most widely traveled man of all my contemporaries, and have pursued inquiries in the most distant places; I have visited more countries and climes than anyone else, and have listened to the teachings of more learned men. No one has surpassed me in the drawing of lines accompanied by demonstrations, not even the rope-knotters of Egypt, with whom I passed five [?] years on foreign soil.” I read “ἐπίσοτος” as “with those altogether” “during a life of eighty years in foreign lands.” In any case, in his reckoning Clement [of Alexandria] did not refer to the Egyptian sojourn at all, because he continues:

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10. ἔγω δὲ τῶν κατ’ ἐμεμυχνόν τυλθόσεστος γῆν πλείστην ἐπελανσάμην ἵστορεσ τὰ μῆχστα (the furthest removed) καὶ ἄρεσ τε καὶ γέας πλείστας ἐδὼν καὶ λοξῶν ἀνθρώπων πλείστους ἐσήκυσα καὶ γραμμὼν ἤτοι θέσεως μετ’ ἀποδεξίων σωδής καὶ με παρῆλλαξε σωδ’ οἱ Αγγείων καλείμονοι ἀρπαγοδιόκται: σὺν τοῖς ἐπὶ πᾶσα ἐπὶ ἔτοι οὐδήκοντα ἐπὶ ἕνας ὑγιῆς ἔγενην (Clement of Alexandria). [Democritus, fragment 299. English-language translation is from Philip Wheelwright, *The Presocratics* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966). Nietzsche cites “Stromateis 1.357 Potter (Syll. 121),” which is *Stromateis*, bk. 1, ch. 69, sect. 5.]
11. Inscription on Crete, [August] Boeckh, vol. 2, 409, 15. [Nietzsche refers to Boeckh’s *Corpus Inscriptionum graecorum*. He borrowed this volume from Basel University Library several times.]
"He travelled to Babylon, Persia, and Egypt and studied with magi and priests."  

12 Otherwise ἐπὶ πᾶσι means "moreover," "on top of everything." I assume that the eighty year old is writing this, that is, in the year 380 [B.C.E.]. Assuming this to be a passage from *Lesser Cosmos*, then the Trojan era of Democritus would accordingly be 380 + 730, that is, 1110 [B.C.E.]. However, this passage means only, "I have been in foreign lands with those altogether, during a life of eighty years." Normally—for example, by Mullach—it is presumed that π, which means πέντε [five], was mixed up with π’, the numeral for eighty: [if so,] then Diodorus says Democritus sojourned in Egypt for five years.  

With this opportunity to speak of Anaxagoras, he [Diodorus] probably also tells what Favorinus reports, that Democritus sharply attacks his teachings concerning origins and mind and behaves in a hostile fashion toward him. We know nothing of his teachers, since Leucippus comes without a known explanation. His contemporary Glaucus of Rhegium is said to have maintained that he was taught by a Pythagorean; by the way, neither in him nor in Empedocles do we find anything at all that recalls Pythagorean philosophy. The concept of number does not have the significance it has for Philolaus, his contemporary; with the latter, it seems, Pythagorean philosophy begins. Concerning his life little has been produced other than a mass of fables: incredible journeys, impoverishment, recognition from his fellow citizens, and great loneliness and productivity. The belief that he laughed about all things is later [in origin].

He is a great writer: Dionysus of Halicarnassus calls him, along with Plato and Aristotle, an exemplary author. Because of his zest and his ornatum genus dicendi [flowery speech], Cicero places him together with Plato. His
Leucippus and Democritus

Clarity is renowned; Plutarch is amazed at his verve.20 His writings are ordered by the Pythagorean Thrasylus according to tetralogies: thirteen tetralogies, encompassing fifty-six separate books—thus just as many as by Plato (only nine tetralogies there). The collected amount is divided into five rubrics: Democritus is comparable to a pentathlete in ethics (ἡθικά), physics (φυσικά), mathematics (μαθηματικά), music (μουσικά), and the arts (τέχνικά).21

We very much encourage updated collection of the fragments. Also, the problem of pseudepigraphy has not been solved: Rose, for example, considers all the physics to be inauthentic.

The points of departure for Democritus and Leucippus are the propositions of the Eleatics. Democritus proceeds only from the reality of motion, because, to be precise, thought is a motion. This is in fact the point of attack: “There exists a motion, since I think and thought has reality.” But if motion exists, then empty space must also exist, unless “Not-Being is as real as Being.”22 or Not-Being (οὐδέν) is in no way less than Being (δέν).23 With absolutely filled space [a plenum], motion is impossible. Reasons: (1) Spatial motion can take place only in what is empty, because the full is incapable of taking another into itself. If two bodies could be in the same [point of] space, then there could just as well be countless ones therein, and the smallest body could take the largest onto itself. (2) Thinning and thickening may be explained only by means of empty space. (3) Growth can be explained only if nutrition penetrates into the empty intervals between bodies. (4) A vessel filled with ashes still holds almost as much water as when it was empty, so the ashes must disappear into the intervals of the water. Not-Being is therefore...

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20. Cicero, De oratore 1.11 and De divinat. 2.64; Plutarch, Symposiaca 5.7.6. Concerning the index of his writings in Laertius, see Schleiermacher, Gesammelte Werke, 3, pt. 3, 193ff., Mein Programm (1870), 22. [Oehler comments, “see Volume II, page 64ff.,” referring to the Musarion edition of Nietzsche’s Werke.]


22. [Democritus, fragment 156.]

23. Alcaeus fragment 76. Zenobius (Et. M 639) believes in this deduction. δεὶς δὲν is related to δεῖνα by way of οὐδείμα: a false analogy. οὐδὲ εἶς is ne unus quidem [not even one]. c. δὲ δὴ 
δεῖρο δῆται. [Alcaeus was a Greek poet of Mytilene on Lesbos. See Greek Lyric I, trans. D. A. Campbell (Loeb Classical Library, 1982). Unfortunately, fragment 76, which appears on page 281 of Campbell’s translation, is a very conjectural reading in which the negations are not certain. According to the Oxford Classical Dictionary, “The origins of the existing Corpus Paroemiographorum go back to Zenobius, a sophist of the time of Hadrian” (Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3d ed., s.v. “paroemiographers”). Nietzsche’s citation “Et. M 639” refers to Etymologicum Magnum (1868, in Mélanges de littérature grecque), edited by the French philologist Bénigne Emmanuel Clément Miller (1812–86), which contains four previously unknown series of proverbs, at the beginning of which one reads the title, known to the ancients, [Ζηνο] Ἑπτάομη τῶν Ταρατού καὶ Διδύμου παρομιῶν. Otto Crusius (1857–1918) developed a criticism of Zenobius; see his Analecta critica ad. Paroem. gr., (1883) and Paroemiographica (1910).]
that which is full (ναστόν, from νάσοω, to press in/down/together firmly), which is identical to a solid body (στερέον). We characterize the full such that it contains in itself absolutely no void (κενόν). If every size were divisible into infinity, then no size at all would remain, and then there would be no Being. If we are to say at all that there is something filled—that is, Being—then division must not go on endlessly. Motion demonstrates Being as much as Not-Being. If Not-Being were to exist alone, there would be no motion. Hence, atoms (ἄτομα) remain. Being is indivisible oneness.

If these beings are said to affect one another by means of impact, then they must be entirely homogeneous: Democritus holds fast to what Parmenides had said, that Being (ὁν) must be absolutely of the same sort at every point. Being does not come to one point more than to the others. If one atom were something other than that which the others are, it would be a Not-Being, that is, something contradictory. Only our senses show us qualitatively determinative differences: "By convention sweet [ . . . , ] by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention colour, but in reality atoms and the void. . . . None of these appears according to truth but only according to opinion: the truth in real things is that there are atoms and void." 24 They are also called ideas (ιδέαι) or schemata (σχήματα). All qualities are conventions (νόμω); the οντα differ only quantitatively. Thus all qualities should be reduced to quantitative differentials. They differentiate themselves solely through shape (φυσιμός, σχήμα), arrangement (διάστημα, τάξις), and position (τροπή, θέσις): we distinguish A from N by shape, AN from NA by arrangement, and Z from N by position. Differentiation by size and weight comes from the main difference, shape (and consequently also schemata). Each body as such receives weight as a standard relation for all quantities: since all beings (οντα) are of the same sort, all bodies must receive weight of the same sort, that is, equal weight for equal mass. We thus rewrite (umschreiben)

24. [Democritus,] fragment 9. [The English-language translation is an altered version of that in G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). The Greek text in Nietzsche’s lecture notes is either his own paraphrase in Greek or a severe corruption of the original. In his version of the fragment, the sentence order has been reversed, the grammatical structure has been changed, and some words have been omitted. Nietzsche’s notes give νόμω γλυκό, νόμω πικρόν, νόμω θερμόν, νόμω ψυχρόν, νόμω χρωτ. έτει δè ἄτομα καί κενόν. ἀπερ νομίζεται μὲν εἰναι καί δοξάζεται τὰ αλήθητα, οὔτε ἔτει δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄτομα μόνον καί κενόν. The received version of fragment 9, with proper word order, but omitting the same phrase deleted by Nietzsche, is as follows: μηδὲν φαίνεσθαι κατ’ ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον κατὰ δοξάζειν, ἀλήθεις δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἄτομος εἰναι καί κενόν: “νόμω” γὰρ φησὶ “γλυκό, [καί], νόμω πικρόν, νόμω θερμόν, νόμω ψυχρόν, νόμω χρωτ. ἐτεὶ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν.”]
Being (the ὁμοίωμα) as filled, shaped, and weighted: bodies and these predicates are identical. We have here the distinction that returns with [the English philosopher John] Locke: *primary* characteristics, which the thing-in-itself receives apart from our representations, such that we cannot think of it separated from extension, impenetrability, shape, and number. Everything else is *secondary*, the product of these primary characteristics’ operations on the organs of sensation, the mere sensation of these followed by color, sound, taste, smell, solidity, smoothness, flatness, roughness, and so on. The creativity of things is also what accounts for the action of the nerves of the sense organs.

A thing arises whenever a complex of atoms is formed; it passes away when that [complex] dissolves; it alters whenever the condition and place change or one particle is replaced by another; it grows whenever new atoms enter. Each thing’s effects on another [occur] by means of the impact of atoms: given spatial separation, the theory of effluences (ἀπορροξία) offers help. We see a fundamental use of Empedocles in general: *he* had recognized Anaxagoras’s dualism of types of motion and had attacked magical efficacy. Democritus placed himself on the reverse side. He [Empedocles] had presented four elements; Democritus worked to characterize them in terms of his own homogeneous atoms: fire consists of small round atoms, [whereas] in the others, atoms of various types are mixed. The elements distinguish themselves solely by the size of their parts; for this reason, water, air, and earth can also originate from one another by means of excretion.

Democritus believes, along with Empedocles, that like works on like alone. The theory of the void had its groundwork laid by the theory of pores and effluences. The *reality of motion*—perhaps along with its deduction from the reality of thought—is the point of departure common to Empedocles and Anaxagoras. [Democritus believes,] along with Anaxagoras, that primal matter [is] the Unlimited. Parmenides, of course, is especially influential and dominates all fundamental concepts: his more ancient system—the world consisting of Being and Not-Being—comes into its own here again. The unconditional [Democritean] belief in motion, the belief that every motion presupposes an opposite, that war is the father of all things, agrees with Heraclitus.

Of all the more ancient systems, the Democritean is of the greatest consequence. The most rigorous necessity is presupposed in all things: there are no sudden or strange violations of nature’s course. Now for the first time the collective, anthropomorphic, mythic view of the world has been overcome.

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25. [Reading *Weichheit* instead of *Weiche*.]
Now for the first time do we have a rigorous, scientifically useful hypothesis. As such, materialism has always been of the greatest utility. It is the most down-to-earth point of view; it proceeds from real properties of matter, and it does not indifferently leave out the simplest forces, as is done by [accounts of] mind or that of final ends by Aristotle. It is a grand idea, this entire world of order and purposiveness, of countless qualities to be traced back to externalizations of one force [Kraft] of the most basic sort. Matter, moving itself according to general laws, produces a blind mechanical result, which appears to be the outline of a highest wisdom. We read in Kant’s *Natural History of the Heavens*:

I accept the matter of the whole world at the beginning as in a state of general dispersion, and make of it a complete chaos. I see this matter forming itself in accordance with the established laws of attraction, and modifying its movement by repulsion. I enjoy the pleasure, without having recourse to arbitrary hypotheses, of seeing a well-ordered whole produced under the regulation of the established laws of motion, and this whole looks so like that system of the world before our eyes, that I cannot refuse to identify it with it. . . . I will therefore not deny that the theory of Lucretius, or his predecessors, Epicurus, Leucippus, and Democritus, has much resemblance with mine. . . . It seems to me that we can here say with intelligent certainty and without audacity: “Give me matter, and I will construct a world out of it!”

We recommend here Friedrich Albert Lange’s *History of Materialism*. Concerning formation of the world, Democritus thought that atoms hover in eternal motion within infinite space—this point of departure was often criticized in ancient times. The world is moved and arises out of “chance,” accidental colliding (concurso quodam fortuito). “Blind chance” rules among materialists. This is an entirely unphilosophical manner of speaking; we should instead call it “purposeless causality,” “necessity (ἀνάγκη) without purposive intentions”: precisely here is there no chance whatsoever but rather the most rigorous lawfulness, only not according to laws of reason. Well then! Democritus derives all motion from empty space and weight [mass, Schwere]. Heavy atoms sink down and drive the smaller ones upward by

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28. N.D. 1.24. [Cicero, *De natura deorum*, bk. 1, ch. 24.]

29. Critique: What does weight mean in an empty infinite space? So then, given infinite time, motion never begins (a standstill).
pressure. The most primal motion of all, of course, is vertical—a steady eternal fall into the infinity of space; speed cannot be ascribed to them, since, given the infinity of space and the absolute steadiness of the fall, no [relative] standard for it exists at all.

The apparent repose of earth lies in the commonality of movement (Epicurus). Rightly considered, neither up nor down exists. Well then! How did the atoms come to make sideward movements and whirls in combinations that lawfully dissolve themselves and reconfigure anew? If all were to fall with the same velocity, it would resemble absolute rest. Given unequal acceleration, they collide with each other, and several ricochet; thus is a circular motion produced. Diogenes Laertius describes it more precisely. First of all, those [atoms] of a like sort are driven against one another by a whirl. Since these atoms are so numerous that they can no longer revolve in equilibrium, the lighter ones pass into the empty space outside, like seeking like. Those remaining keep together and, becoming entangled, form a clod [Klump]. He calls motion upward “surge” (σωτς); he calls the entanglement (συμπλοκή) of the atoms their “crossing” and “folding” (ἐπάλλαξις). Each self-isolating entity from the mass of primal bodies is a world: countless worlds exist. They are generated yet also cast into destruction.

Well then! A single world arises thus: impact between different sorts of atoms produces the excretion of a mass in which the lighter particles are driven upward. By the same effects of collision, the mass is caused to turn—the bodies forced outward settle themselves down from outside, like a sort of skin. This shell becomes increasingly thin, since its particles are driven more and more into the middle. Out of the atoms in the middle, earth is formed; out of those that climb upward, sky, fire, and air. Here and there thicker masses

30. Epicurus's famous postulate: he supposes a slight deviation from vertical fall, a willful sideward movement, since, in a situation where no atom has yet been mixed with another and where none has fallen further than another, all atoms would have to have places next to one another in a level plane, without colliding with one another. Now, when they all begin to fall at one moment in time, there would be, despite everything, no impact: they would never touch one another, because they would fall past one another into the infinite. That is, given vertical fall, every atom would describe an infinitely long line through infinite space. How is it possible that another atom would operate in this line? In itself, only if two atoms were in the same line. If these are equally heavy, then they will never reach each other: thus, in order to impact on each other, they would have to be of unequal weight; that is, the upper must be heavier than the lower. That is, however, nonsensical, for how could the lighter atom already be farther below than the heavier? Therefore, two atoms cannot be in the same line. Therefore, given vertical fall, they cannot collide with each other.

31. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 9, sect. 31. [Laertius describes Leucippus here as distinct from Democritus.]

32. σῶς σάμα, to move frequently (opposite: ὀπατή, downward). Originally σεφος in σο-βαρός, frequently excited subidus (insubidus securus).

33. [Durchkreuzung, Verschränkung]
ball together. Air, which forces itself about, is a stormy vortex motion; they gradually dry out in this and are ignited by rapid motion as stars. Thus, smaller particles are squeezed out of the earthly corpus by winds and stars and flow together into the depths as water. The earth became increasingly more firm. Gradually it takes its place at the center of the world; in the beginning, since it was still small and light, it moved here and there. The sun and moon, being at an earlier stage of their formation, were stirred by those masses orbiting around the earth’s core and so were brought into line in our world system.

The origins of animated creatures: The essence of spirit [Seele] lies in invigorating force [belebende Kraft]; it is this that moves spirited creatures. Thought is a motion. Consequently, spirit must be formed from the most mobile matter, of fine, smooth, and round atoms, from fire. These fiery particles extend throughout the entire body; a spirited atom [Seelenatom] is inserted between every two physical atoms. They are in continual motion. Now, due to their fineness and mobility, the danger arises that these same ones will be pushed out of the body by circulating air. We are protected against this by respiration, which continuously adds new fiery and spirited matter, replacing the lost atoms, which are hindered [anyway] from leaving bodies by counterflows at their exists. Whenever the apparatus of respiration is arrested, the inner flame softens. Death follows. That does not occur in an instant; capacity for life may be resorted after a part of spirited matter has been lost. Sleep—apparent death. In his writing Of Those in Hades (περὶ τῶν ἐν ὁδοῖον), he confronts the problem of how the dead return to life (πῶς τὸν ἀποθανόντα πάλιν ἀναβιώναι δυνατόν). For him, the spirit is what is essential to humanity; the body is its vessel (σκήνας). Well, that which is warm and spirited is extended throughout the entire world: there is a great deal of it in air, since otherwise, how would we be able to inhale spirit?

Theory of sense perception: Aristotle says [of Democritus and others], “They identify all sense qualities with the tactual.”34 Contact is not immediate but rather is mediated by effluences. These penetrate the body through the senses and extend themselves throughout all parts of the same; in this way arises our representation [Vorstellung] of things. Two types of this are necessary: first, a certain strength of impression, and then a corresponding constitution in the receptive organ. Only like is sensed by like; we receive each thing with that part of our being related to it. The result is that we do not perceive

34. πάντα τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ὑπὸ ποιοῦσιν ([Aristotle,] On Sense and the Senses [De sensu], ch. 4) [English-language translation is from Aristotle, De sensu and De memoria, ed. and trans. G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1906)]. Subspecies of taste sensation, the ὑπό.
much of what is perceptible, because it does not correspond to our senses, and that it could be [perceived] by beings with senses other than our own. Concerning sight, he says that visible things emit effluences that bear their shapes; the eye reflects them. Since the space between objects and ourselves is filled with air, however, the detached images cannot reach our eyes directly; rather, what touches this itself [the eye] is only the air that moves from these images and is made into an impression of them. At the same time, effluences proceed from our eyes and modify the image. Aristotle says, “Democritus misrepresents the facts when he expresses the opinion that if the interspace were empty one could distinctly see an ant on the vault of the sky; that is an impossibility”.

He [Democritus] also explains reflections by way of effluences. Thus, the eye still presents things as they are. Concerning sound, a stream of atoms goes from the auditory body, which sets the air surrounding it in motion. Within this stream of atoms, the similarly shaped atoms come together; these reach the spirited atoms. The sounds penetrate the entire body, foremost though into the hearing apparatus, while the remaining body parts allow too few atoms to perceive them.

That which perceives is the same thing as that which thinks. Aristotle: “[Democritus] roundly identifies soul and mind, for he identifies what appears with what is true—that is why he commends Homer for the phrase, ‘Hector lay with thought distraught.’” Compare *Metaphysics*: “[Homer made Hector,] when he was unconscious from the blow, lie ‘thinking other thoughts.’” Both are mechanical alterations of spirited matter; this motion sets the spirit at the proper temperature, so that it will grasp objects properly, [so that] thought is healthy. If it is excessively heated or cooled by this movement, it will think improperly and will be unhealthy.

Here the genuine embarrassments of materialism always enter, because here it suspects “all is false” (πρῶτον ψεῦδος). All things objective, extended, and efficacious, thus all things material, which qualify as the most solid of

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foundations to materialism—[all this] is nonetheless only an extremely mediated given, an extremely relative existence that has passed through the machinery of the brain and has entered into the forms of time, space, and causality, by dint of which it is presented as extended in space and working in time. Well, the materialist wants to deduce the truly immediate given—representation [Vorstellung]—out of a given of this sort. It is an incredible circular argument (petitio principii): the final member suddenly reveals itself as the point of departure, on which the first element of the chain is already hung. Consequently, the materialist has been compared to Baron von Münchhausen, who, on horseback in the water, with the horse using its legs to swim, lifts its mane into the air. The absurdity consists in this, that he proceeds from objectivity, while in truth everything objective is conditioned by the knowing subject in multifarious ways and consequently vanishes entirely whenever the subject is denied. On the contrary, materialism is a worthwhile hypothesis of relativity in truth; accordingly, "all is false" has been discovered to be an illuminating notion for natural science. We still consider, then, all its results to be truth for us, albeit not absolute. It is precisely our world, in whose production we are constantly engaged.

38. [Nietzsche refers here to Schopenhauer’s *World as Will and Representation*: “Now if we had followed materialism thus far with clear notions, then, having reached its highest point, we should experience a sudden fit of the inextinguishable laughter of the Olympians. As though waking from a dream, we should all at once become aware that its final result, produced so laboriously, namely knowledge, was already presupposed as the indispensable condition at the very first starting-point, at mere matter. With this we imagined that we thought of matter, but in fact we had thought of nothing but the subject that represents matter, the eye that sees it, the hand that feels it, the understanding that knows it. Thus the tremendous petitio principii disclosed itself unexpectedly, for suddenly the last link showed itself as the fixed point, the chain as a circle, and the materialist was like Baron von Münchhausen who, when swimming in water on horseback, drew his horse up by his legs, and himself by his upturned pigtail. Accordingly, the fundamental absurdity of materialism consists in the fact that it starts from the objective; it takes an objective something as the ultimate ground of explanation. . . . Some such thing it takes as existing absolutely and in itself, in order to let organic nature and finally the knowing subject emerge from it. . . . Materialism is therefore the attempt to explain what is directly given to us from what is given indirectly” (Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, trans. E. F. J. Payne, 2 vols. [New York: Dover, 1969], 1:27).]
Their philosophy is to be spoken of, according to Aristotle's ordering scheme, at the conclusion of what has gone hitherto [in ideas about original cause] and before the Platonic theory of Ideas. His *Metaphysics* demonstrates the extraordinarily diverse development of their fundamental ideas and their power to influence every new system.1 In this connection their rise is perhaps somewhat later than that of atomism: it suffices that neither Empedocles nor the atomists could know anything of them. The first one to become well known, Philolaus, probably did so because of his work in three volumes, *On Nature* (περὶ φύσεως), designated later by the mystical name *Bacchai* (Βάκχαι). He originates in Tarentum and came to an end during the last decade of the fifth century in Thebes, somewhat contemporary to Lysis and Timaeus, with Eurytus as Philolaus's pupil. According to Aristoxenus,2 who to some extent still saw them, the scientific school dies out with the students of Philolaus and Eurytus: Xenophilus, Phanton, Echecrates, Diocles, and Polymnatus—this Echecrates is the one who appears in the *Phaedo*. There are two generations of them. [August] Boeckh [presents] the Pythagorean doctrines of Philolaus alongside the main points of his works.3

To understand their fundamental principles, we must first of all proceed from Eleatism. How is a multiplicity of things possible? In this way alone, that Not-Being has reality also. Now Not-Being is identical to Anaximander's Unlimited, the absolutely Indefinite, that which has no qualities at all, which is contrasted to the absolutely definite (πέρας). The One originates from them, though. In other words, we may say of it that it is equal and unequal, limited and

1. [Aristotle,] *Metaphysics* 1.3b.
unlimited, without qualities and having qualities. Thus—contrary to Eleatism—they say if the One is real, it has certainly come to be from two principles; then, however, there is also a multiplicity. Out of oneness is produced the series of arithmetic (monadic) numbers and then geometric numbers or magnitudes (spatial things). Thus oneness is something that has come to be, and hence there is also multiplicity. If we have first of all points, lines, surfaces, and bodies, then we also have material objects: number is the genuine essence of things. The Eleatics say: “There is no Not-Being, thus all things are a oneness.” The Pythagoreans [say in contrast]: oneness itself is the result of something being and not being, hence Not-Being certainly exists, and then, in addition, multiplicity.

This is an entirely strange speculation for the times. Its point of departure appears to me to be none other than a defense of mathematical science against Eleatism. We recall the dialectic of Parmenides, where [the following] is said of the oneness (assuming there to be no multiplicity): (1) it has no parts, yet it is a whole; consequently, (2) it has no boundaries; consequently, (3) it is never actual [vorhande]; (4) it neither moves nor rests itself; and so on. And on the other side: being one, it produces Being and the One, hence distinction and then many parts and number and the multiplicity of Being, then limitedness, and so on. That resembles attacking the concept of real oneness to arrive at the opposite predicate, in other words, as a self-contradictory thing, an unthing. The mathematical Pythagoreans believed in the reality of their discovered laws; it satisfied them that the existence of the one was maintained in order also to deduce multiplicity from it. And indeed they believed to have recognized the true essence of each thing in its numerical relations. Hence fundamentally qualities do not exist; only quantities [do,] yet not quantities of elements (water, fire, and so forth) but rather limitations to the Unlimited, to the ἀπειρον: as such, it resembles Aristotle’s merely potential being of matter (ὕλη). Therefore, all things originate from two factors out of two oppositions—in this regard, a dualism once again! Aristotle's noteworthy table,

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4. [Aristotle,] *Metaphysics*, bk. 1, ch. 5.
Pythagoreans recalls the exemplary table of Parmenides: Being as light, thin, warm, active; Not-Being as night, thick, cold, suffering.

The point of departure for the claim that everything qualitative is only quantitative lies in acoustics. Taking two strings of equal length and thickness and weighing down both of them next to each other with different weights, we observe that the sounds may be reduced to definite numerical relations. Then, we fasten a movable bridge (μαγάδιον) under one of several tightened strings and press the same at two different spots: it [the bridge] divides the strings into two equal parts, giving, by each halving, a higher octave than the undivided string. When we hold both of them in a 2:3 ratio (λόγος ἡμιόλιος), we hear the fifth (διὰ πέντε); like 3:4 (ἐπίτριτος), the fourth (διὰ τέσσαραν). The instrument was called the canon (κανών). Pythagoras is said to have divided the string into twelve lengths with surfaces under it and doing so assigned the numbers 6, 8, 9, and 12 to octave, fourth, fifth, and [prime] as the standard lengths of string. Since the fifth is around a whole tone higher than the fourth, Pythagoras observed from his canon, in addition, the numerical relation of the whole tone (τόνος): the 8:9 ratio (ἐπόγδοος λόγος). So the sacred numbers are derived here in this way: the numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 contain the consonant intervals (σύμφωνα)—namely, 1:2, the octave; 2:3, the fifth; and 3:4, the fourth. Together they constitute the tetractys (τετρακτύς).

Were we to add the units in them, the decas (δεκάς) is created. Adding these numbers to the numbers 8 and 9, which include the whole-tone interval, results in $1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 8 + 9 = 27$. The number of individual addends yields the holy number 7. Plato proceeds from the number 7 in his construction of the world spirit in the Timaeus.5

Music in fact provides the best example for what the Pythagoreans mean. Music is, as such, actual [vorhanden] only in our auditory nerves and brains: externally, or in itself (in Locke’s sense), it consists entirely of numerical relations; namely, first according to its quantity with regard to time and then according to its quality with regard to degree of tone, in both its rhythmic and harmonic elements. In a similar sense, the entire essence of the world, whose image [Abbildung] is music, would be expressible, albeit in only one aspect, purely in numbers. And now the field of chemistry and that of the natural sciences rigorously strive to find the mathematical formula for absolutely impenetrable forces [Kräfte]. In this sense, our science is Pythagorean!6 We

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6. [Here Nietzsche means the dynamic notion of force initiated by Boscovich and reflected in the sciences, especially atomism and chemistry. Lancelot Law Whyte called Boscovich, “Pythag-
find a bond between atomism and Pythagoreanism in chemistry, just as Ecphantus is said to have banned them in ancient times.

The Pythagoreans have thus discovered something extremely important: the significance of number and hence the possibility of a completely exact investigation into physical things. In the other physical systems, elements and their combinations were always discussed. The various qualities were said to originate by means of association or dissociation. Now, finally, the message will be delivered that qualitative differentiation resides solely in differences of proportion. Well, it was still an incredible path from the conception of this relationship until its strict fulfillment.

In the meantime, let us entertain a fantastic analogy. Aristotle describes it this way: in the mathematical sciences,
numbers are by nature the first, and in numbers they [the Pythagoreans] seemed to see many resemblances to the things that exist and come into being—more than in fire and earth and water (such and such a modification of numbers being justice, another being soul and reason, another being opportunity—and similarly almost all other things being numerically expressible); since, again, they saw that the modifications and the ratios of the musical scales were expressible in numbers;—since, then, all other things seemed in their whole nature to be modelled on numbers, and numbers seemed to be the first things in the whole of nature, they supposed the elements of numbers to be the elements of all things, and the whole heaven to be a musical scale and a number.7

Since, for example, they considered the number 10 to be perfect and the epitome of the entire essence of number, they maintained as well that there were ten bodies moving themselves about in the heavens; because only nine were visible, however, they made the counterearth into the tenth. They consider as elements of number the even and the odd, and of these [they hold] that [the even] is unlimited and [the odd is] limited, while oneness consists of both of these (because it is both even and odd). From this oneness originates number, and the universe consists of numbers.

All numbers are divided into the even (ἀρτιος) and the odd, and any given number is resolved partially into even and partially into odd (περισσός) elements. Here they concluded that even and odd are the general conditions of existence for things. Well then, they equate the odd to the Limited and the even to the Unlimited because the former sets a boundary to division; the other, not. Thus all things originate from the Limited and Unlimited. The Limited and odd are considered perfect (observe the folk significance of uneven numbers). They called these odds "gnomones" (γνώμονες) as well: a gnomone is a number that corresponds to a quadratic number yielding another quadratic number; this, though, is a property of all odd numbers.

\[
\begin{align*}
1^2 + 3 &= 2^2 \\
2^2 + 5 &= 3^2 \\
3^2 + 7 &= 4^2
\end{align*}
\]

Well, adding the odd numbers to oneness produces nothing but quadratic numbers and thus numbers of a single form \((1^2 + 3 = 2^2, 2^2 + 5 = 3^2, \text{etc.})\), against which we obtain on every other path—[for example,] by adding the evens to oneness or summing evens and odds—numbers of the most diverse sorts. Well, wherever the Pythagoreans perceived opposite qualities, they there considered the superior to be limited and odd and the inferior to be limited and even. If the conditions of existence for things are of opposing composition, a bond was necessary for anything at all to arise from them. This is, according to Philolaus, harmony: “Harmony involves a unity of mixed elements that are various, and an agreement of elements that disagree.”

This is oneness of diversity and agreement in two split opinions. If opposition between the elements is in all things, then harmony is in everything as well. Everything is number, everything is harmony, because every definite number is a harmony of the even and the odd. Harmony is characterized as an octave, however. We have in the octave the relation 1:2, which resolved the primal opposition into harmony. In this notion we notice the influence of Heraclitus.

We mention, in characterizing their method of equations, that justice consists of like times like—in other words, of quadratic numbers; for this reason [the number] 4, or especially 9 (the first uneven quadratic number), was called justice. The number 5 (the union of the first male and first female number) is called marriage, the unity of reason, because it is immutable. Twoness [is called] opinion, because it is alterable and indefinite. This and that concept has its place in the world in this and that region. For example, opinion [has its place] in the region of earth (because earth occupies the second position in the series of celestial bodies); opportune moment (καιρός), in the solar region (both being expressed as the number 7). The corners of the quadrate are devoted to Rhea, Demeter, Hestia, and the earth deities, because the quadrate forms the surface boundaries of the cube, but according to Philolaus, the cube is said to be the fundamental form of earth. The angles of the triangle are devoted to the deities of destruction—Hades, Dionysus, Ares, and Chronos—because the fundamental form of fire is the tetractys forming four equilateral triangles.

The decadic system is especially important: since to them [the Pythagoreans] all numbers after ten appear to be only repetitions of the first ten, it

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8. ἕστι γὰρ ἀρμονία πολυμεγέθων ἐννοιῶν καὶ δίχα φρονεόντων σώμφρονις [Philolaus, fragment 10. English-language translation is from Philip Wheelwright, *The Presocratics* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966). Diels has σωμφρóbóνις as the final word.]
seemed that all powers of number were contained within the decas; it signifies
greatness, omnipotence, the completion of all things, beginning and feminine
guide to divine and earthly life. It is perfection: for this reason [we find]
enumerations of ten parts where the totality of reality is said to be described
(table of opposites, system of celestial bodies). They spoke of the tetractys,
"which contains the fount and root of ever-flowing nature."9 Oaths were taken
[such as] "Nay, by him that gave to us the tetractys."10 They (e.g., Thrasyllus)
loved to order things in four-part series. Oneness is the first from which all
numbers originate, which is why the opposing qualities are said to be unified:
"For if you add it to an even number it produces an odd, and if you add it to an
odd number it produces an even; which it would not be able to do unless it
shared in both natures."11

In the case of deduction of geometric dimensions, they equate oneness
with the point, twoness with the line, threeness with the surface and the
number 4 with the solid. With figure, however, they believed to have deduced
the corporeal itself. Well, their elementary composition is said to depend on
the shape of the body. Of the five regular solids he [Philolaus] assigned the
cube to earth, the tetrad to fire, the octrad to air, the isosceles triangle to
water, and the dodecads to all the remaining elements; in other words, he
assumed that the smallest parts of existence of these various materials would
have the given shape. That the number of fundamental materials is five pre-
supposes a period after Empedocles, which means the influence of Empedoc-
les on Philolaus. They had the Cosmogony in mind: in the beginning fire
arises at the core of the universe (called the one or the Monas, the lord of the
universe, the watchtower of Zeus). From here, it is said, the surrounding parts
of the Unlimited are drawn onto it and thereby became limited and definite (I
recall the Anaximandrian concept of the Unlimited). This effect continues
until the building of the universe comes to a conclusion (Heraclitean fire is
employed to produce a definite world out of the Anaximandrian Unlimited).

This world construction is a sphere (Empedoclean or Parmenidean), at

9. ποιήν ἀεινόου φύσιος ριζώματ' ἐξουσιών. [English-language translation is from G. S. Kirk,
of Texts, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 233, which uses a slightly
different text by Sextus Empiricus, Ado. math. 7.94–95: πηγήν ἀεινόου φύσεως ριζωμά τ' ἐξουσιών.]

10. οὐ μὰ τὸν ὄμετέρα γενεῖ παραδόντα τετρακτύν. [English-language translation is from
Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, which has κεφαλά instead of γενεῖ.]

11. ἀρτίῳ μὲν γὰρ προστεθὲν περίττον ποιεῖ, περίττῳ δὲ ἀρτίων, ὃ οὐκ ἂν ἔδωκα, εἰ μὴ
ἄμφων ταῖν φύσειον μετέχῃ. [Theodorus Smyrniacus. English-language translation is from
Wheelwright, The Presocratics. Nietzsche gives no citation whatsoever for this quotation.]
the middle point [of which is] the central fire, around which ten celestial bodies are coiled from west to east, their round dance [occurring] in the widest distance in the heaven of fixed stars; after that [come] the five planets (Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury); to this [are added] the sun, the moon, the earth, and the counterearth as the tenth; the outermost boundary is formed by the fire of the circumference. Around the central fire moved the earth, and between the two [moved] the counterearth, in such a way that the earth always turns the same face to the central fire and counterearth, and consequently we who live on the other side can perceive the rays of the central fire not directly but rather at first indirectly by way of the sun. The Pythagoreans thought of the shape of the Earth as spherical—an extremely significant astronomical advance. Whereas previously the fixedness of the earth had been presupposed, and the change of days had been inferred from movement of the sun, here we have an attempt to explain it from the motion of earth. If only the central fire is abandoned, and the counterearth is unified with the earth, then the earth would move about its own axis. Copernicus is said to have taken his idea straight from Cicero and Plutarch by way of Philolaus.\(^\text{12}\)

One consequence of the motion of the stars is the doctrine of **harmony of the spheres**. Every rapidly moved solid emits a sound. The stars build an octave together, or, what is the same, a harmony—thus not a harmony in our sense but rather the tuned string of the ancient heptachord [a Greek musical instrument]. More precisely, when all pitches of the octave sound together, there is no “harmony.” That we do not hear it they clarify as follows: it comes to us like a smithy to its occupants: from birth on we hear the same noise; in its presence, we never come to notice stillness by contrast. This notion originally referred only to the planets, by the way, since otherwise ten sounds would have been produced, though harmony calls for seven, after the fashion of the heptachord. What the eyes see in their observation of the stars is that which the ears hear in the sounds of tones.

The fire of the circumference had the assignment to hold the world together: for this reason they called it necessity (\(\text{δύναμις}\)). [August] Boeckh has proved that this signifies the Milky Way. Beyond the circumferential fire lies the Unlimited. Archytus asked whether a man could stretch out his arm or a

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branch at the edge of the world; if it can be done, though, then there must be something outside [the world], namely, the unlimited body (σωμα ἄπειρον) and position (τόπος), which come to the same thing. A second reason: if a motion were said to have taken place, then, for the body in motion to create space over which others would cross the boundary of the universe, the world would have to seethe over (κυμανεῖ τὸ ὅλον, überwallen).

It is among the Pythagoreans that, for the first time, the notion of an up and down in the world, or rather a greater or lesser distance from the center, is abandoned. They call that which lies nearer the middle the right and the more distant the left; the motion of the heavenly bodies occurs forward from West to East: the middle has the place of honor to the right of the cosmic bodies. They considered the upper part of the world to be more perfect. They distinguish the outer fiery circle from the circle of stars, and these from the ones above and below the moon: Olympus, the outermost circumference; Cosmos, the stars of heaven; and Uranos, the lower region. In one [Olympus], [we have] the elements in all their purity (namely, the limited and unlimited); the second [Cosmos] is the place of ordered motion; and the third [Uranos], that of Becoming and Passing Away. Whenever the stars once more attain the same position, not only the same people but also the same behavior will again occur.13

[The Pythagoreans had] little to say about psychological or epistemological matters. These are relevant, if Philolaus reduced physical composition to the number 5; animation to number 6; reason, health, and “what he calls

13. [This is a later Pythagorean variation of eternal recurrence of the same. Nietzsche, we must remember, believes the Neo-Pythagoreans to have been influenced by Heraclitus, to whom the idea of eternal recurrence of the same may be attributed. Porphyry attributes “the doctrine . . . of the periodic recurrence of events” to them (see Hermann Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: Griechisch un Deutsch, ed. Walther Kranz, 3 vols. (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1934–37), 14.8a. Eudemus (from Simplicius, In phys. 732.30 [Diels, Die Fragmenten der Vorsokratiker 58B34]) says: “If one were to believe the Pythagoreans, with the result that the same individual things will recur, then I shall be talking to you again sitting as you are now, with this pointer in my hand, and everything else will be just as it is now, and it is reasonable to suppose that the time then is the same as now” English-language translation is from G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962). Stobaeus, Eclog. Physic. 1.20.2, attributes a sort of eternal recurrence to the Pythagoreans. See also Nietzsche’s Use and Abuse of History: “Ultimately, of course, what was once possible can only become possible a second time on the Pythagorean theory that when the heavenly bodies are in the same position again the events on earth are reproduced to the smallest detail; so when the stars have a certain relation, a Stoic and an Epicurean will form a conspiracy to murder Caesar, and a different conjunction will show another Columbus discovering America” (Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, trans. Adrian Collins [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957], 14–15). Friedrich Ueberweg also draws his readers’ attention to this striking doctrine.]
light” to 7; and love, friendship, cleverness, and inventiveness to 8. Then [there is] the famous proposition that the soul is a harmony, namely, the harmony of its body. Reason has its seat in the brain; life and sensation [have theirs] in the heart; rooting (ῥίζωσις) and germination (ἀνάφυσις) [have theirs] in the navel; and productivity [has its] in the reproductive parts. In the first lies the core of humanity; in the second, that of the animals; in the third, that of the plants; and in the fourth, that of all beings. Without number knowledge is impossible. It admits no untruth in itself; it alone makes the relation of things knowable. Everything must be either limited, unlimited, or both; without boundaries, however, nothing would be knowable.

If we ask about the kinship of the Pythagorean philosophy, we would first of all find the system older than [that of] Parmenides, which derives all things from a duality of principles; then [there is] the Unlimited of Anaximander, limited and moved by the fire of Heraclitus. But that is all obviously only the philosophemes at their disposal; the original [Pythagorean] leap is their knowledge of numerical relations in the world, an entirely original viewpoint. To protect this from the Eleatic teaching of oneness, they had to allow the concept of number to develop; the One must also have come to be. Here they took Heraclitus’s notion of war as the father of all things and that of Harmonia, which unites opposing qualities (Parmenides called this same power “Aphrodite”). She symbolized the relation of the origin of all things in the octave. They reduced both hostile elements from which number arises to the even and the odd. They identified this concept with previously existing philosophical terminology. Their greatest departure is to call the Unlimited the even, [doing so] only because the gnomones, the uneven, a limited series of numbers, give rise to the quadratic numbers.

With this they burn a bridge to Anaximander, who appears here for the last time. However, they identify the limiting with Heraclitean fire, whose task is to now resolve the Indefinite into nothing but definite numerical relations; a calculating force [eine rechnende Kraft] is essential. Had they taken the expression Logos from Heraclitus, they would have meant by it precisely proportio (that is, producing proportions, as the Limited-πέρας sets boundaries). The basic idea is the matter considered to be entirely without quality

15. [See Parmenides, fragment 18.]
becomes this and that various quality by way of numerical relations alone. So Anaximander’s problem is answered. Becoming appeared as a calculating! We are reminded of Leibniz’s saying that music is “an unconscious exercise in arithmetic in which the mind does not know it is counting.”16 The Pythagoreans could not, of course, also have said of the world what actually calculates!

16. exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animi. Epistol. collectio. Kortholti ep. 154. [This passage from Leibniz’s correspondence is quoted by Arthur Schopenhauer in The World as Will and Representation, trans. E. F. J. Payne, 2 vols. (New York: Dover, 1969), 1:264. In the same chapter (vol. 1, bk. 3, ch. 52) Schopenhauer “parodies” the Leibnizian formula with his own: Musica est exercitium metaphysices occultum nescientis se philosophari animi (“Music is an unconscious exercise in metaphysics in which the mind does not know it is philosophizing”). Yet Schopenhauer comments: “But further, in virtue of the saying of Leibniz, corroborated in many ways, music, apart from its aesthetic or inner significance, and considered merely externally and purely empirically, is nothing but the means of grasping, immediately and in the concrete, larger numbers and more complex numerical ratios that we can otherwise know only indirectly by comprehension in concepts. Therefore, by the union of these two very different yet correct views of music, we can now arrive at a conception of the possibility of a philosophy of numbers, like that of Pythagoras and of the Chinese in the I Ching, and then interpret in this sense the saying of the Pythagoreans quoted by Sextus Empiricus (Adversus Mathematicos, Bk. vii §94): τὸ ἀριθμὸν δὲ τὰ πάντα ἐπέσκεψα (numero cuncta assimilantur ['All things are similar to number'])” (ibid., 265). Translations of the Latin and Greek are by E. F. J. Payne.]
Democritus was born in Olympiad 80 and so was around ten years younger than Socrates. About this Laertius says expressly that, according to Apollodorus, he [Socrates] was born under Apsephion in the fourth year of Olympiad 77, on the sixth [day of the month of] Thargelion, “when the Athenians purify their city” (for the birth of Artemis), thus in the eleventh month of reign of the archon. In the passage just cited, Laertius [continues] that he died in the first year of Olympiad 95, “at the age of seventy” [γεγονὸς ἐτὸν ἔβδομήκοντα] (under Archon Laches, at the end of the Thargelion in this eleventh month). “With this Demetrius of Phalerum agrees.” In other words, in Thargelion 399 he had entered into [angetreten] his seventieth year, [having been] born in 468 according to Apollodorus. I trust him, especially his source Demetrius (ἀρχ. ἀωνογρ.). [August] Boeckh and K[arl] F[riedrich] Hermann polemicize against his approach. They proceed from Plato’s Apology 17d, where he says, “although I am seventy years old.” Accordingly, he

1. δὲ καθαίροντι τὴν πόλιν Ἀθηναίων (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 2, sect. 44). Antiquity gives only one report concerning this matter.
2. καὶ τοῦτο φησὶ καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φόληρεως. [English-language translation is from Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).] That this τούτα refers to the year of birth comes from the following: “But some say he was sixty when he died” (ἐν ὧδε γάρ ἐξήκοντα ἐτῶν τελευτήσας αὐτὸν φασίν)—that is, as ἐξηκοντότης, sexagenarian. Demetrius of Phalerum, pupil of Theophrastus, was born around 345.
3. August Boeckh, Corpus inscriptionum graecorum, 2:321; Karl Friedrich Hermann, Geschichte und System der platonischen Philosophie [Heidelberg, 1839], 666; Friedrich Ueberweg, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie von Thales bis auf die Gegenwart [Berlin, 1868], 86. [I have supplied complete titles and author names, though the original lacks them. Ueberweg's book is in three volumes, with the first concerning antiquity, but Nietzsche does not cite a volume. The relevant passage may be found in vol. 1, p. 86, of the German edition or vol. 1, p. 83 of the English edition (Ueberweg, History of Philosophy from Thales to the Present Times, trans. George S. Martin [New York: Scribner, Armstrong, 1877]).]
4. ἔτη γεγονός πλείω ἔβδομήκοντα. [English-language translation is from Plato, Euthyphro, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, with an English trans. by Harold North Fowler (Loeb Classical Library, 1923).]
must certainly have been born before 469. Then the laws of Athens declare: “You had seventy years in which you could have left the country, if you were not satisfied with us.” That also would lead to an age of more than seventy years. Thus, we assume the first or second year of Olympiad 77 as the year of birth. Then the meeting of Socrates with Parmenides at the great Pan-Atheneum has been calculated: according to Synesius, at that time, the third year of Olympiad 83, he was twenty-five years old and hence born in the second year of Olympiad 77. The last argument does not merit discussion. Nonetheless, the second, from the Crito, speaks precisely for seventy years, and the first is an exaggeration by Plato in a defense speech. How can Plato’s testimony prevail over Demetrius? Indeed, precisely here lies the value of Apollodorus, that between different exaggerations he chose according to their merits. We have only to emphasize that the age [γεγονός] may be rigorously calculated: seventy years means that he celebrated [the close of] his sixty-ninth year and begins the seventieth year. The twenty-five days into his seventieth year that he lived count as the seventieth year: the unfinished year was counted as complete.

His father, Sophroniscus, [being] from the [gens] of the Daidalids, and his mother, Phaenarete, [being] a midwife, he distinguishes himself from all previous philosophers by his plebian origins and by an altogether meager education. He was always hostile to the entire culture and arts, along with the natural sciences. Astronomy he considered among the divine secrets, which would be nonsense to investigate. There is indeed advantage to knowing the motion of the celestial bodies as a leader of sea and land journeys and night-watches—one may learn this much from navigators and watchmen—but everything beyond that is wasting valuable time. Geometry is necessary insofar as it puts everyone in the position properly to carry out buying, selling, and measuring land—a man with normal attentiveness learns this without a teacher—but silly and worthless if it leads to the study of juxtaposed mathematical diagrams.

He dispenses entirely with physics: “Do these researchers think that they know human relations sufficiently that they begin to mix into the divine? Do they think that they are in the position to provoke wind and rain in any way they want? Or will they content themselves only with idle curiosity? They should remember how the greatest men diverge in their results and present opinions just as the mad do.” Socrates never came to know physics, since that

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5. Plato, Crito 52e.
6. Of physics and astronomy, “much or little” (οὐτε μικρὸν οὐτε μέγα), he understands
which Plato narrates concerning the studies of Anaxagoras at *Phaedo* and so
on is certainly only Plato's own historical development.7 Likewise, he thinks
nothing of art; he grasped only its practical and agreeable aspects, and he
belongs among the despisers of tragedy. So says Aristophanes’ *Frogs*:

Right it is and befitting,
Not, by Socrates sitting,
Idle talk to pursue,
Stripping tragedy-art of
All things noble and true.
Surely the mind to school
Fine-drawn quibbles to seek,
Fine-set phrases to speak,
Is but the part of a fool!8

Powerful education of the spirit and of the heart through poetry is generally
preferred to the philosophical training beloved by Socrates: consequently
Aeschylus wins, and consequently Euripides is defeated.

Socrates is plebian; he is uneducated and also never went back and picked
up his education lost in childhood. Further, he is, to be precise, ugly, and as he
himself said, he suffers the greatest from natural passions. Flat nose, thick
lips, bulging eyes: Aristoxenus (whose father, Spintharus, was familiar with
Socrates) reports he was prone to violent outbursts. He is a self-taught ethi-
cist; from him proceeds a moral flood, an incredible force of will [Willens-
kraft] directed toward an ethical reform. That is his single interest: “What-
so’er is good or evil in an house.”9 What is most remarkable about this moral
reform, however—indeed, the Pythagoreans also strive for this—is the means.

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7. [Plato,] *Phaedo*, ch. 46, 97d ff.
8. [Aristophanes,] *Frogs* 1491:

Χαρίειν οὖν μὴ Σωκράτει
παρακαθήμενον Αλείν
ἀποβάλλοντα μουσικήν
τὰ τε μέγιστα παραλιπόντα
τῆς τραγωδίας τέχνης
τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ σεμνοσίαν λόγοις
καὶ σκαρφισμοῖς (σκαρφισμοῖς: an inexact outline of a shadow, abstract) ήρων
dιατριβὴν ὀργήν (active leisure) ποιεῖσθαι
παραφρονοῦντος ἀνδρὸς (is for “crazy old screech-owls”).

9. ὅτι τοῦ ἐν μεγάροις κακῶν τ’ ἀγαθὸν τε τέτυκται. [Nietzsche gives no citation: this
quotation is found in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, bk. 2, sect. 21, but comes
from the *Odyssey*, bk. 4, l. 392. The English-language translation is from Homer, *The Odyssey*,
The means, knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), distinguishes him! Knowledge as the path to virtue differentiates his philosophical character: dialectic as the single path, induction (ἐπαγωγικὸς λόγος) and definition (ὁριζεσθαι). The struggle against desire, drives, anger, and so on directs itself against a deep-lying ignorance (ἀμαθία). He is the first philosopher of life (Lebensphilosoph), and all schools deriving from him are first of all philosophies of life (Lebens-philosophien). A life ruled by thought! Thinking serves life, while among all previous philosophers life had served thought and knowledge: here the proper life appears as a purpose; there proper knowledge [is seen as] the highest.

Thus Socratic philosophy is absolutely practical: it is hostile to all knowledge unconnected to ethical implications. It is for everyone and popular because it holds that virtue may be taught. It does not appeal to genius and the highest powers of knowledge. Previously simple custom and religious subscription sufficed; the philosophy of the Seven Sages was merely the vitally practical morality so highly esteemed throughout Greece made into formulas. Now the resolution of moral instinct enters: bright knowledge should be the sole merit, but with bright knowledge humanity has virtue as well, for this is the essentially Socratic belief, that knowledge and morality conjoin. Now the reversal of this proposition is revolutionary in the highest degree: everywhere luminous knowledge does not exist is the bad (also evil or the ill, τὸ κακόν). Here Socrates becomes the critic of his times: he investigates how far it behaves from dark drives and how far it behaves from knowledge, thereby yielding the democratic result that the lowest manual laborer stands higher than the statesman, orator, and artist of his times. A carpenter, coppersmith, navigator, and physician are taken, and their technical knowledge is tested—[each] can cite the persons from whom he learned the means. In contrast, everyone had an opinion concerning [the questions], What is Justice? What is piety? What is democracy? What is law? Yet Socrates found only darkness and ignorance. Socrates claims the role of a learner, but he persuades his interlocutors of their own rashness.

His next step was therefore to arrive at a definition from the moral, social, and political realm; in this regard his method was dialectical or epagogic. The entire world of human affairs (ἀνθρώπινα) reveals itself to him as a world of ignorance; there are words but no concepts tightly connected to them. His task was to order this world, thinking that mankind could do no other than live virtuously if it were so ordered. A moral doctrine of goodness is the goal of his entire school, that is, a sort of arithmetic and art of measurement in the ethical world. The entirety of older philosophy still belongs to the time of unbroken
ethic instincts; Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Empedocles—each breathes Hellenic morality, yet each according a different form of Hellenic ethics. We now arrive at a search for the purely human ethic resting on principles of knowledge; it is sought. To those of earlier times it was there as a vital breath of air. This sought-after, purely human ethic conflicts with the traditional Hellenic custom [Sitte] of ethics: again, we must resolve custom into an act of knowledge. We must also say that the Socratic ethic corresponded to the goal of the age of resolution: the best and reflective men lived according to a philosophical ethic alone. A moral flood therefore flows forth from Socrates; in this way he is prophetic and priestlike. He feels a sense of mission.

Apparently the most important point in the life of Socrates came when [his emissary], the enthusiastic Chaerephon, received his answer at Delphi. Socrates offers to introduce the testimony of Chaerephon's brother to verify the actuality of this question and answer: "For he asked if there were anyone wiser than I. Now the Pythia replied that there was no one wiser." And afterward, "He [Apollo] certainly cannot be lying, for that is not possible for him." Laertius describes the verse "of all men living Socrates most wise" as "the famous response." More exactly, in a scholium to Apology 21a: "Concerning Socrates the Oracle gladly gave, wise the Sphettian Sophocles, more wise Euripides, the most wise of all men Socrates." Iambic foot was necessary, given two such names.

Great embarrassment and painful error; finally he decides to measure the wisdom of others against that of his own. He chooses a famous statesman who is considered wise and poses challenging questions to him. He discovers that the man's alleged wisdom is no wisdom at all. He attempts to demonstrate

10. ἧτοι γὰρ δὴ εἰ τις ἐμὸν ἐφ' ςοφὸτερος· ἀνείλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφότερον εἶναι ([Plato,] Apology 21a). [English-language translation is from Plato, Euthyphro . . . , trans. Fowler.]


13. χρησμὸς περὶ Σωκράτους διδασκεῖ Χαίρεσσων τῷ Σφητίῳ σοφὸς Σοφοκλῆς, σοφότερος δ’ Ἐυρίπιδῆς, ἀνδρῶν δ’ ἀπάντων Σωκράτης σοφότατον. [My translation of the Greek.] See scholia to Aristophanes, Clouds 144. Of course, the anapest in the second position is incorrect; it begins Σοφοκλῆς σοφός, σοφότερος—already Apollonius Molon (I. J. by C. G.) challenges its authenticity [reading Achteit as Echtheit]. Anapest. Personal names. (Porson) in Wl. 89 unconditionally also in the second and first foot. [In the first parenthetical remark, Nietzsche refers to Ionian Iambics, by his close friend Carl Gersdorff. Oehler and Oehler do not include this footnote in their edition.]
how much wisdom fails the politician; this was impossible, and he only made himself hated. "I am wiser than this man; for neither of us really knows anything fine and good, but this man thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I, as I do not know anything, do not think I do either." He repeats this experience first with politicians and orators and then with poets and artists. He recognizes "what they composed they composed not by wisdom, but by nature and because they were inspired, like the prophets and givers of oracles; for these also say many fine things, but know none of the things they say." Thereupon he remarks that they also believe themselves, because of their poetry and for other reasons, to belong to the wisest of men. Well then! He goes to the artisans with more satisfaction. They know more than he does and are wiser than him. They too commit the main mistake, because each, being well schooled in his own trade, believes himself to be wise in other regards as well. This error far outweighed their skills.

Thus he comes to the belief that Apollo wanted to say that human wisdom is of meager significance; he who is persuaded of its worthlessness relative to [true] wisdom is actually the wisest. As a consequence of this, he lives in great poverty, hated everywhere. In this he would persist until death, to fulfill his office of philosophy and its test, to be their warning, to sit like a brake on the napes of their necks. If you condemn me, you shall suffer. Silence on my part would be disobedience to God. The greatest happiness that a human being can achieve is daily discussion concerning virtue and others. Life without such conversation is not a life at all. He senses how everything sounds unbelievable and strange—knowledge as the path to virtue, yet [followed] not as a scholar but rather like a transporting god (θεός ὁν τις ἠλεγγικός), wandering and testing. The search for wisdom appears in the form of the search for sages: thereby it is connected to history, whereas Heraclitean wisdom was self-sufficient and despised all history. Belief in alleged knowledge appears as

15. ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῦν ἤ ποιοῦν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τυι καὶ ἐνθουσιαζόντες, ὅπερ οἱ θεομάντες καὶ οἱ χρησμαδοί, καὶ γὰρ σωτηρίου λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ, ἵσσοι δὲ σωθὲν ὑπό λέγουσι [Plato, Apology 22c. English-language translation is from Plato, Euthyphro . . . , trans. Fowler.]
16. Plato, Sophist, chapter 1. [More precisely, Sophist 216b–216c. In reference to “the Stranger,” Theodorus says, “I should not call him a god by any means, but there is something divine about him.” “I would say that of any philosopher.” Socrates replies, “And rightly, my friend, but one might almost say that the type you mention is hardly easier to discern than the god. Such men—the genuine, not the sham philosophers—as they go from city to city surveying from a height the life beneath them, appear, owing to the world’s blindness, to wear all sorts of shapes” (English-language translation is from Plato, Sophist, trans. Francis M. Cornford, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Bollingen Series 71 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973).]
the worst sort "of ignorance, that of thinking one knows what one does not
know." According to Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, "Though for a man to be
ignorant of himself, and to fancy and believe that he knew what he did not
know, he considered to be something closely bordering on madness." According to Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, "Though for a man to be ignorant of himself, and to fancy and believe that he knew what he did not know, he considered to be something closely bordering on madness." **18**

Well then! We also understand the polemic against *Sophists* here. That was a bold position for an individual. [George] Grote has clarified the Sophists; according to the usual notions they are a sect; according to him, a class, an estate. **19** According to the standard view they disperse morally corruptive teachings, "sophistical propositions." They were regular teachers of customs, neither above nor below the level of the times, according to Grote. Plato and his successors were aristocratic teachers, according to the standard view, the established clergy of the Greek nation, and the Sophists [were] the alternative thinkers. [In fact,] the Sophists were the clergy, and Plato [was] the alternative thinker—the socialist who attacked the Sophists (as he attacks the poets and statesmen) not as a special sect but rather as one of the persistent estates of society. For the uneducated masses, Socrates was indistinguishable from the Sophists: in general, entirely naive custom requires no teacher; the more elevated the teacher, the more offensive. There tragedy and comedy are sufficient—that is the standpoint of Aristophanes. He sketches the image of an Enlightenment figure in Socrates; characteristics of the Sophists and of Anaxagoras are transferred to him. But the Sophists distinguish themselves in that they completely meet the needs, that they deliver what they promise. In contrast no one could say why Socrates taught, he himself excluded. Wherever he went he produced the feeling of ignorance; he embittered men and made them greedy for knowledge. One had the sort of feeling one gets at the mention of [for example] an electric eel. Actually, he merely prepares the lesson in which he uses his own ignorance (άμαθία) to convict his epoch. He directs the entire flood of knowledge on this course; the chasm he opens engulfs all the floods issuing forth from the more ancient philosophers. We see it as remarkable how everything gradually ends up on the same path. He hates all previous closings of this chasm.

For this reason he hates the naive representatives of education and sci-

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ence, the Sophists; if conceit of wisdom (σοφία) resembles madness (μανία), then the teachers of such concealed wisdom are likewise makers of nonsense. He was most unceasing when he was struggling against them. Here he had the entirety of Greek education against him: it is quite remarkable how, in opposition to it, he nonetheless never left the impression of a pedant. His means are, first of all, irony in the roles of a learner and a questioner, a gradually [and] masterfully refined art form. [There is] then the indirect way, fraught with detours, with dramatic effects, then an extremely likeable voice, and finally the eccentricity of his Silenusian physiognomy. Even his manner of expression had the aftertaste of stimulating the ugly and plebian. The testimony of Spintharus: “[Spintharus said] that he at any rate had met very few more persuasive [than Socrates]; for so great was his voice, his speech, his outward disposition, and, to complement all the things he said, the peculiar quality of his appearance.”

Whenever a plan was congenial to him, then a true enchantment arose: a feeling like being a slave, the most extreme shame, and then, as a result, a pregnancy of good ideas. [He sought] to uphold the maieutic arts (μαίευτική τέχνη) during the birthing, to examine the newborn, and if he is crippled, to dispose of him with the hardness of a Lycurgian wet nurse.

Against him an incredible animosity had gradually accumulated—[he attracted] countless personal foes, fathers whose sons left against their wishes, and many slanderers, such that Socrates says in the Apology: “And this it is which will cause my condemnation, if it is to cause it, not Meletus or Anytus, but the prejudice and dislike of the many.” The [members of the] upper class, each of whom was hostile to him, created still-greater danger. The astonishing liberality of Athens and its democracy to tolerate such a mission for so long! Freedom of speech was considered sacred there. The trial and death of Socrates prove little against this general proposition. Anytus was embittered because of his son and also because he considered Socrates to be
the teacher of Alcibiades and Critias. Meletus was incensed as a poet; Lycon, as a rhetorician. Socrates, says Anytus, taught young people to despise the standing political constitution (as an example of the most predatory of the Thirty and of the insult of Alcibiades' democracy). Then the youth learned the darkness of their own [alleged] wisdom and the need to slander their fathers. Then Socrates used to select passages from the best poets to explain them in a damaging manner. Then [there was] the introduction of new divinities while neglecting the old (ἀσέβεια, as with Anaxagoras, the warning genius).

As Xenophon reports, Socrates had from the first expected to be convicted and was hindered by his daimon from preparing himself against this. He believed specifically that it was the right time for him to die; were he to live longer, his age would render his normal lifestyle impossible for him, hence the conviction to give an impressive doctrine by way of such a death. We must consider his grand defense speech in this way; he is speaking before posterity. What an incredibly meager majority convicts him! Of 557 persons, some 6 or 7 more than half! Above all, they probably felt the barbs of the courtroom. Xenophon says explicitly, "Though he might easily have been acquitted by his judges, if he had but in a slight degree adopted any of those customs."23 Socrates probably brought this pronouncement on himself intentionally. Well then! The imposed penalty was determined by a special speech of the defendant (dikastes). First of all, the prosecutor names what to him is the appropriate punishment; here he [Socrates] takes on a still more proud tone and recommends maintenance at the Prytaneum. As a monetary fine he cites one mina; Plato and his friends recommend thirty minas and guarantee it. Had he only suggested these thirty, without further insult, he would have been set free. But the court felt deeply insulted.

Socrates knew what he had done; he wanted death. He had the most magnificent opportunity to demonstrate his domination of human fear and weakness and also the dignity of his divine mission. Grote says death took him away in complete majesty and glory, as the sun descends in the tropic lands. The instincts are overcome; intellectual clarity rules life and chooses death. All systems of morality in antiquity concern themselves with either reaching or conceiving the heights of this act. The last exemplar of the sage that we

23. [Xenophon,] Memorabilia, bk. 4, ch. 4 [l. 4]. [English-language translation is from Xenophon, Xenophon's Anabasis, or Expedition of Cyrus, and the Memorabilia of Socrates, trans. J. S. Watson (London: George Bell and Sons, 1907). Nietzsche cites this passage but then gives only his own German paraphrase. I am supplying the exact quotation. Nietzsche’s paraphrase does not mention “custom.”]
know is Socrates as the evoker of the fear of death: the wise man as the conqueror of the instincts by means of wisdom. Thereby the series of original and exemplary sages is completed; we recall Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Democritus, and Socrates. Now comes a new age of the sages, commencing with Plato, the more complicated characters, from the convergence of the currents formed by the flowing about of the original and single-minded sages. For the moment, then, my task has been achieved; later I will discuss the Socratic schools in their significance to Hellenic life. 24

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24. Supplement: to Parmenides, separate imagistic depiction of his genesis. Compare Rheinisches Museum, IXX [sic] 513 to Socrates Lichtenberg I 65. [At the end of the manuscript Nietzsche adds these notes to himself as to what remains to be done in the supplementary study of the pre-Platonics: Nietzsche refers here to C. R. Volquardsen, “Genesis des Socrates,” Rheinisches Museum, n.s., 19 (1863): 513, and to Georg Christoph Lichtenberg’s Aphorismen (in Lichtenberg, Vermischte Schriften, 8 vols. in 4 [Göttingen, 1867]). Volquardsen was a professor at Kiel. Lichtenberg (1742–99) was a prodigious literary figure mentioned numerous times in Nietzsche’s David Strauss: Confessor and Writer, the first of the Untimely Meditations.]

Imperative: to Thales: exact consideration of facts
to Anaximander: the metaphysical in every mundane phenomenon.
to Anaxagoras. The infinitely small. Absence of any fixed standard.
Lichtenberg 1.58.52.

Would it be inconceivable that the organic world began with the human being and that from human beings came animals, from animals the plants?

Sources of Laertius and of the Suidas
Pseudepigraphy
The diadochae [succession]
Chronology according to Apollodorus.
Protagoras
a) 70 years old 74
4 18
30 18 or 7 102 (born 500) 48
Olympiad 84 acme (440)
then born Ol. 74 (480) according to Apollodorus
died Ol. 102 or 101 (410?)

What is the purpose of division into φιλ. ἰωνικῆ [Ionian and Italian philosophy]
End Chrysippus Epicurus Clitomachus Theophrastus
Laert. 2.2 “Thus he flourished almost at the same time as Polycrates . . .” (ἄχμασσαν τὴν μᾶλλον κατὰ Πολυκράτη [Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers,]) against Bergk c. 48–50
The pupil relationships from Simplicius [sic] are not according to Theophrastus.
The sole positive [evidence] that Parmenides was a student of (ἀκούσατ) Anax. cannot be found there.
Theophrastus says cautiously of Parmenides τούτω δ’ ἐπηγεγνώμενος, living after him.
Empedocles as the πλησιαστής of Parmenides is nonsense.
Parmenides flourishes in Olympiad 69/Emepdocles was born, however, Olympiad 72.
What is correct is found at Laertius, bk. 8, sect. 55, namely, ζηλωτής.
πάνυ γὰρ ἄνδρες οὗτοι παντοῖοι φανταζόμενοι διὰ
tὴν ἄλλων ἄγνοιαν ἐπιστροφῶσι πόλης,
oἱ μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ’ ὀντῶς φιλόσοφοι,
kαθορόντες ὑψόθεν τὸν τῶν κάτω βίον,
καὶ τοῖς μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τοῦ μηδενὸς τίμιοι,
tοῖς δ’ ἀξίοι τοῦ παντός·
kαὶ τοτὲ μὲν πολιτικοὶ φαντάζονται,
tοτὲ δὲ σοφισταί,
tοτὲ δ’ ἦστιν οἷς δόξαν παράσχοιντο ἄν
ὡς παντάπασιν ἔχοντες μανικῶς.
(“Such men—the genuine, not the sham philosophers—
as they go from city to city surveying from a height the life beneath them,
appear, owing to the world’s blindness, to wear all sorts of shapes.
To some they seem of no account, to others above all worth;
now they wear the guise of statesman, now of Sophists,
and sometimes they may give the impression of simply being mad”
[Plato, Sophist 216c–d, trans. F. M. Cornford].)
APPENDIX ONE

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Acknowledgments

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


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